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Social protection, in particular unemployment benefits, minimum income support and 
progressive taxation, have significantly contributed to reducing the depth and the 
d u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  r e c e s s i o n  i n  E U  M e m b e r  S t a t e s  a n d  t o  s t a b i l i s i n g  l a b o u r  
markets and consumption. Not only does social protection provide a safety net for 
those groups which have been hit hardest by the crisis, it has also a stabilising effect 
on the overall demand for goods and services produced in the economy. Discretionary 
a c t i o n  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  s o c i a l  a n d  l a b o u r  market policy, pursued in most European 
economies, included a broad range of measures, such as employment incentives, 
higher benefits and increased transfers to low-income households. Further action, 
however, is needed to overcome inequalities in access to social protection faced by 
non- standard workers, and in designing a suitable exit strategy from discretionary 
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The stabilising effect of social protection  
Both automatic and discretionary measures can stabilise the economy and thereby 
contribute to mitigating the societal consequences of a recession. Expenditure on social 
protection can actually be expected to have a larger stabilising effect than the average of 
total government expenditure. Empirical evidence gathered in this study can show that this 
was and still is the case, also with respect to the recent global economic crisis. ‘Firm policy 
interventions and automatic stabilisers embedded in European welfare states have limited 
the economic and social impact of the worst recession in decades’, as the 2010 Joint Report 
on Social Protection and Social Inclusion rightly states. This study indicates that GDP, 
employment and unemployment were positively affected by stabilisation measures. At the 
same time, it finds large variation between EU Member States in their actual use of 
automatic stabilisers and discretionary fiscal stimuli with respect to social policy purposes. 
Social protection systems as automatic stabilisers  
The tax and transfer system determines the way in which a given unemployment or income 
shock to gross income translates into a change in households’ disposable income. The 
impact of automatic stabilisation on individuals and the economy can be simulated based 
on a model incorporating unemployment benefits, social insurance contributions and 
progressive income taxes. Our evidence shows that social protection has significantly 
contributed to reducing the depth and duration of the recent recession and stabilising 
labour markets and consumption in EU Member States. Not only does social protection 
provide a safety net for those groups which have been hit hardest by the crisis, it also has 
a stabilising effect on the overall demand for goods and services produced in the economy. 
Due to the more progressive tax system and the more elaborated welfare state, the extent 
of automatic stabilisation in the EU is significantly larger than in the US. While the tax 
system stabilises disposable income most after an income shock, automatic stabilisation 
through unemployment benefits is most important when unemployment rises. However, 
there are marked differences in the extent of automatic stabilisation across EU Member 
States. In the case of an income shock, stabilisation is strongest in Denmark, where 
automatic stabilisers cushion 56 per cent of the shock. Belgium, Germany and Hungary also 
have strong automatic stabilisers. The lowest values are found for Estonia, Spain and 
Greece. Regarding an unemployment shock, the stabilisation effect is largest in Denmark, 
Sweden, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, reaching about 60 per cent and more. 
Scandinavian and Continental European countries have significantly larger mechanisms of 
automatic stabilisation than Southern and Central European countries.  
In most EU Member States, social protection against unemployment is based on two pillars: 
unemployment insurance and minimum income support. While means-tested income 
support is generally available as a basic social security net in most EU Member States, 
unemployment insurance systems are more exclusive, as they do not equally protect every 
type of workers. The extent of unemployment risks and the ‘quality’ of social protection 
provided to different socio-economic groups do not coincide, so those most affected are 









Discretionary action  
Discretionary action in the field of social and labour market policy has been pursued in most 
EU Member States. Strong multipliers can be expected with social transfers targeted 
towards households which have high propensities to consume. This qualifies social policy in 
the form of transfers to the social groups affected as an effective instrument of 
discretionary fiscal action.  
The first phase of discretionary anti-crisis interventions was characterised by a number of 
reforms strengthening the current unemployment insurance benefit system in place, in 
particular by easing access or improving benefit generosity for non-standard workers who 
had been made redundant. A number of countries have also expanded public measures 
encouraging working-time flexibility, in particular short-time work schemes, to prevent 
dismissals. Furthermore, activation policies aimed at labour market (re)integration were 
reinforced. In particular, most countries have emphasised job placement and publicly 
funded training within the framework of active labour market policies. In addition, tax cuts 
for low income groups and families, as well as cuts in social security contributions, 
generally accounted for a large share of overall social policy stimulus packages. 
When the crisis spread across the continent, European governments responded with 
discretionary policy to a varying extent, reaching about 1.3 per cent of GDP on average, 
but up to more than 2 per cent in Finland, Spain, the Czech Republic and Sweden. Social 
policy played an important role in almost every national stimulus package and, on average, 
represented about two thirds of discretionary measures. 
Macroeconomic simulations show that, with a certain time lag, discretionary social policy 
action has a stabilising effect on GDP, basically mirroring the size of the stimulus. 
Discretionary social policy measures implemented in response to the crisis accounted for 
1.07 per cent of GDP in 2008 for the years 2009 and 2010 (euro area). The cumulated 
multiplier for these discretionary expenditures amounts to 0.85: every euro directed to 
discretionary social policy measures in the wake of the crisis resulted in an additional 85 
cents GDP. Countries which implemented significant measures have grown faster. A 
coordinated policy in the EU has larger effects than single Member State action because 
economic integration allows for substantial spill-over effects between countries. Due to the 
comparatively smaller weight that foreign trade has on the domestic economy in large 
countries, they benefit less than smaller states from fiscal stimuli implemented in 
neighbouring countries. Accordingly, the cumulated multiplier is smaller in major European 
economies and larger for small countries. 
Benefits from a discretionary social policy stance are equally observable on labour markets. 
Employment rises significantly and unemployment declines. According to our estimations, 
the social policy stimulus packages in 20 EU Member States created 330,000 new jobs (in 
full-time equivalents) at the peak of their effect. A positive impact which these simulations 
do not reflect is the reduction of uncertainty on an economy-wide level induced by 
discretionary social policy. Well-targeted discretionary measures help to insure households 
against income or wealth losses, thus diminishing their uncertainty, stabilising their 
expectations and smoothing their consumption behaviour. 
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The right timing  
Discretionary measures work best when timely, temporary and targeted. While automatic 
stabilisers set in immediately, discretionary policy has to be timely, which means it has to 
be designed and initiated as soon as the economic downturn appears. When the policy is 
enacted too slowly, it risks acting not as an anti-cyclical stabiliser but as a pro-cyclical 
enhancer. The most important advantage of automatic stabilisers is their automatic 
response, implying comparatively small time lags between the decline in economic activity 
and immediate effects on household disposable income. The disadvantage of discretionary 
fiscal measures is generally seen in time lags concerning the diagnosis of the problem, the 
decision making process and the implementation of the measures. An additional 
shortcoming of discretionary measures is that they are not automatically reversed when the 
economic situation improves, giving rise to a potential deficit bias. 
Empirical evidence from historical comparisons indicates that recessions following a 
financial crisis have more severe effects on output and employment than recessions which 
have their origin in other economic adversities. Hence, a fiscal stimulus has ample time to 
yield a beneficial impact despite implementation lags. Although comparisons of different 
crises across time and place have to be interpreted with caution, fiscal policies are 
generally associated with the positive effects on the length and depth of financial crises. 
Discretionary policy experiences two lags: first, a lag which captures the time between the 
implementation of policy and its results. This lag is not very large if the policy is correctly 
targeted. The second lag represents the political process of identifying the economic 
problem and formulating a response. The duration of this lag is unpredictable as it depends 
not only on economic facts but also on political considerations. It is essential that 
discretionary measures are lasting and contingent in order to assure consumers that they 
will not face a sudden loss of income. Lasting in this case means the measures need to last 
as long as the recession; contingent means tha t  i t  m u s t  a l s o  b e  p o s s i b l e  t o  e x t e n d  o r  
expand them. However, measures must also expire at some point to allay fears about long-
term fiscal stability. Taking into account empirical evidence about agenda-setting, decision 
making and implementation, it seems safe to state that in general, European stimulus has 
been enacted timely to act as a stabiliser against the crisis.  
Case studies show that several countries prolonged the lifespan of some measures beyond 
the limit that was first set. Even so, it is important to note that most measures were 
initiated with time limits or budgetary limits in place, guaranteeing their temporary nature, 
as prolonging them could only be done by making a new discretionary decision. 
Discretionary measures related to objective parameters or existing automatic stabilisers 
tend to be easier to implement and show smaller time lags than fully discretionary 
measures, as stimulus related to automatic stabilisers is easy to maintain but also easy to 
phase out. Projects of a continued nature, such as education and ensuring employability, 
initiated by stimulus measures, may prove more difficult to end as policy-makers may fear 
the loss of systems considered valuable for society. 
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Fiscal constraints  
The study finds that both high budget deficits and debt levels before the start of the crisis 
had significantly negative effects on the size of discretionary measures taken during the 
crisis. At least some governments were constrained in their decision making because of 
weak financial positions. Empirical research has shown that the relationship between 
government debt and real GDP growth is weak for debt/GDP ratios below a threshold of 90 
per cent of GDP, but that growth rates fall substantially if government debt is above this 
threshold. 
Taking into account that fiscal balances and debt levels have dramatically worsened in 
almost all advanced economies due to the economic crisis, the exertion taken in the last 
crisis is not repeatable in the near future. Debt levels are projected to remain on a high 
level and it will take a long time until pre-crisis levels are reached. Recent projections 
manifest that the aim of achieving sustainable public finances will be a long-term task, 
which will require fiscal discipline in the upcoming years. 
A challenge for governments in Europe is to find the optimal consolidation path, i.e. to 
reach consensus about fiscal austerity. As each country starts from a different initial 
position in terms of debt and deficit levels and the state of the economy in general, each 
country should implement the policy which best fits its own conditions. Fiscal consolidation 
will be necessary when economic conditions start to improve. Projections indicate that 
lowering the gross general government debt-to-GDP ratio back to 60 per cent by 2030 in 
advanced economies would require improving the cyclically adjusted primary balance by 
8.7 percentage points of GDP from 2010 to 2020. Steady but gradual consolidation may be 
the strategy that has the lowest cost in terms of lost output, as higher debts result in 
higher real interest rates. Recent policy measures indicate that this is indeed the strategy 
which European governments intend to follow. 
 
Inequality in access to social protection  
There has been a dual-track or two-tier reform strategy in Europe during the last 30 years. 
These reforms in most cases have not changed - and may have even tightened – the rules 
governing regular or open-ended contracts. Instead, reforms were carried out primarily by 
only changing the rules for new hires, introducing a wide array of flexible, fixed-term types 
of contracts or expanding the scope of existing temporary contracts. These asymmetric 
reforms caused a dramatic increase in the use of fixed-term work, which did not exist in 
most EU Member States only two decades ago. 
The share of temporary contracts steadily increased before the recession in countries with 
stricter employment protection. Temporary contracts are overrepresented among young 
(those aged less than 35) and less educated workers (primary level). Temporary workers, 
in particular the young, experienced the majority of recession-related job losses, and hence 
this share has been falling in the recession. Four countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy and 
France) experienced an increase in the share of temporary workers who declare that the 
temporary contract was the only kind of contract at their disposal, regardless the nature of 
the job. Empirical evidence suggests that younger people are much less covered by social 
protection than older workers, both in less dualised EU Member States (e.g. Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Ireland and the United Kingdom) and more dualised 
countries such as France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. In the most dualised 
countries, the difference between the share of young and middle-aged covered is very high. 
This suggests that younger benefit recipients, who more often have temporary jobs, are the 
most exposed to unemployment-related poverty. 
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Policy recommendations  
Taking fiscal constraints seriously  
While automatic and discretionary measures can effectively stabilise the economy and 
society, one has also to be aware of the fiscal constraints generated by stabilisation efforts 
which may have negative repercussions for economic and labour market dynamics in the 
future. Hence, one important issue is to find a plausible and timely exit strategy from anti-
cyclical stabilisation policies. This is not only of relevance for discretionary action but also 
for the further development of automatic stabilisers. Public spending has to be contained, 
and at the same time, policies should be focused on measures which deliver medium and 
long-term benefits to the economy and society.  
The need for structural adjustments of welfare state expenditure can be seen as a 
consequence of the crisis. If the crisis brings about a lower long-term growth path, this in 
itself is a cause for fiscal adjustment. These long-term effects as well as the budgetary 
strain caused by automatic stabilisation, which had a quantitatively higher impact than 
discretionary stabilisation, represent the crucial factors with respect to fiscal constraints.  
The future role of automatic stabilisers  
The study argues that automatic stabilisers inherent in unemployment and minimum 
income support schemes, but also short-time work allowances and progressive income 
taxation, can work without a significant time lag and also lead to timely phase out when the 
economy and the labour market recover. Unemployment benefits work as automatic 
stabilisers and can therefore act as major elements of stabilisation in the future as well. 
The same holds in particular for public short-time work subsidies which help stabilise 
employment and a trained workforce and thereby facilitate a dynamic economic 
development after crises.  
Hence, automatic stabilisers are of particular importance and should be developed in EU 
Member States, not in a uniform way, but taking into account the specific national 
economic and institutional context.  
Therefore, the European Parliament should, in collaboration with other actors at the 
European level, help establish a proper system of automatic stabilisers amongst EU Member 
States that reduces the need for further discretionary action and avoids time lags inevitable 
in the case of discretionary fiscal stimuli.  
Strengthening social protection  
Furthermore, policy-makers should now prepare social protection schemes for the future 
and overcome present inequality in social security. It is particularly important to ensure 
that non-standard workers, those with fixed-term contracts or only a short employment 
record, in particular young people and other labour market entrants, have access to 
sufficient social protection so that social exclusion is prevented.  
One element is the creation of general minimum income schemes for all working-age 
people. This should, of course, be based on a careful assessment regarding the appropriate 
benefit level and not lead to work disincentives. In order to avoid long-term benefit 
dependency through exclusion from work, proper activation measures have to be put in 
place, including job search assistance and training. Minimum wages – set at an adequate 
level taking into account national circumstances - can have an important indirect effect by 
making paid work more attractive relative to out-of-work benefits and thus help avoid 
poverty traps. In addition, statutory minimum wages can be seen as a complement to in-
work benefits and as an integral part of social protection systems comprising minimum 
income schemes. However, minimum wages have to be set carefully in order not to raise 
barriers against labour market entry of low skilled people or long-term unemployed.  
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Therefore, the European Parliament should ask EU Member States to examine whether and 
how access to unemployment insurance benefits can be made more general, in particular 
by assessing the role minimum employment or contribution conditions play in the case of 
young people, other labour market entrants and, in general, people on non-standard 
c o n t r a c t s .  S o m e  E U  M e m b e r  S t a t e s  h a v e  a l r e a d y  m o v e d  i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n .  T h e y  s h o u l d  
refrain from making unemployment benefits more exclusive again in the imminent phase of 
fiscal austerity but try to develop a sustainable and fair system of social protection.  
Implication for incentives and costs  
All social benefits, including short-time work schemes, have cost implications in terms of 
taxes and social insurance contributions. They also raise incentive issues which have to be 
discussed carefully. Automatic stabilisation is a positive feature of the welfare state, but 
there is a risk of prolonged passive support if not combined with activation and effective 
active labour market policies.  
The European Parliament should promote unemployment benefits, as well as a reliance on 
short-time work schemes in EU Member States, that help prepare workers for accelerated 
economic restructuring by raising employability. Hence, phases of unemployment or short-
time work should effectively be devoted to further labour market-related training.  
The role of discretionary action: A more rule-based approach  
Discretionary action has its role to play, too, although there is always some delay in 
decision making and implementation. Discretionary action should be well-targeted and 
timely, but also temporary. Hence, there is a need for a clear exit strategy in order to avoid 
the risk of ineffective spending of public resources through prolonged subsidisation and 
eventually pro-cyclical impacts. Discretionary policy measures should only be adopted with 
clear time and budget limits. Growing fiscal constraints will otherwise hamper the capacity 
of governments to counter future economic uncertainties.  
As temporary measures quite often tend to be prolonged, it is important that policy-makers 
assess the need for discretionary measures carefully and regularly check the justification 
for their existence. A more rule-driven, quasi-‘automatic’ approach to discretionary action 
could be helpful in this respect, i.e. by referring to objective indicators when deciding on 
the introduction or maintenance of fiscal stimuli, in particular temporary social measures. A 
rule-based approach to discretionary spending could refer to the development of (non-
subsidised) employment, unemployment rates or to GDP – both current and forecast data.  
The European Parliament should favour a coordinated approach to fiscal stimuli, also in the 
s o c i a l  p o l i c y  r e a l m ,  t h a t  h a s  p r o v e n  t o  b e  more effective than isolated national steps. 
Hence, there is need for better coordination and collaboration for the future.  
National responsibilities and the role of the European Union 
Most of the responsibilities for the design and the implementation of automatic and 
discretionary stabilisation still lie within the EU Member States. However, there is a role for 
the European level, in particular for the European Parliament, to call on Member States to 
make sure proper benefit systems are in place which do not exclude vulnerable groups. 
Moreover, the European Parliament should ask Member States to implement viable 
automatic stabilisers, e.g. by setting some minimum requirements, and introducing more 
‘automatic’ discretionary measures. In addition, the European Parliament should promote a 
better coordination of discretionary anti-crisis measures, probably based on joint 
assessment of core economic indicators from which proper discretionary action is derived. 
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1.  SOCIAL PROTECTION AS ECONOMIC STABILISER – 




  Social protection and social policy, in particular unemployment benefits, minimum 
income support and progressive taxation, have significantly contributed to 
reducing the depth and the duration of the recession and stabilising labour markets 
and consumption. Not only does social protection provide a safety net for those 
groups which have been hit hardest by the crisis, it has also a stabilising effect on 
the overall demand for goods and services produced in the economy. 
  The social protection system has acted as an automatic stabiliser on both the 
revenue side as well as the expenditure side of general government budgets and 
the social security system in particular. 
  Discretionary action in the field of social and labour market policy has been 
pursued in most European economies. This includes a broad range of measures, 
such as employment incentives, higher benefits and increased transfers to low-
income households. Strong multipliers can be expected with social transfers 
targeted towards households which are liquidity constrained and have high 
propensities to consume. This qualifies social policy in the form of transfers to the 
social groups affected as an effective instrument of discretionary fiscal action. 
  The most important advantage of automatic stabilisers is their automatic response, 
implying comparatively small time lags between the decline in GDP and immediate 
effects on disposable income. The disadvantage of discretionary fiscal measures is 
generally seen in time lags concerning the diagnosis of the problem, the decision-
making process and the implementation of the measures. An additional 
shortcoming of discretionary measures is that they are not automatically reversed 
when the economic situation improves, giving rise to a potential deficit bias. 
  Empirical evidence from historical comparisons indicates that recessions after a 
financial crisis have more severe effects on output and employment than 
recessions which have their origin in other economic adversities. Hence, a fiscal 
stimulus has ample time to yield a beneficial impact despite implementation lags. 
Although comparisons of different crises across time and place have to be 
interpreted with caution, fiscal policies are generally associated with positive 
effects on the length and depth of financial crises. 
  Economic stabilisation through social protection, however, is closely linked to 
issues of timeliness and financial sustainability, which are of paramount 








                                                
1.1. Introduction 
In 2008, the global economy was hit by a major negative shock on aggregate demand 
originating from a deep financial crisis. Although coordinated efforts of monetary and fiscal 
policy in the course of 2009 resulted in a stabilisation of production in the industrialised 
economies, the economic situation remains fragile: financial markets are nervous, growth 
rates of GDP remain weak, unemployment is at record levels and the extended loss of 
confidence has yet to be overcome. 
In 2009, worldwide output fell by 0.9 per cent, with a drop by 2.4 per cent in the United 
States, 5.2 per cent in Japan and 4.2 per cent in the EU.
1 It is beyond dispute that both the 
magnitude of this economic contraction and of its effects on labour markets, disposable 
household incomes and private consumption have been attenuated considerably by the 
work of automatic and discretionary stabilisation. In fact, both the extent and the duration 
of the recession and the stabilisation of labour markets and consumption have been due to 
the important contributions from social protection and social policy. This has occurred 
through two channels: 
  Firstly, the social protection system has been acting as an automatic stabiliser on 
both the revenue side as well as the expenditure side of the general government 
budget and the social security system in particular. 
  Secondly, discretionary action in the field of social and labour market policy has 
been pursued in most European economies. This includes a broad range of 
measures such as employment incentives, higher benefits and increased 
transfers to low-income households. 
Economic stabilisation is a topic characterised by high policy relevance and a long research 
tradition. To date, however, we possess only a limited knowledge on the importance of 
social spending and social protection for stabilisation in times of recession. The vast 
majority of studies on automatic and discretionary stabilisation focus on taxes, transfers 
and fiscal stimulus in general, without identifying the specific role played by social spending 
and the social protection system. This lack of knowledge is particularly detrimental within 
the European context, as comprehensive welfare systems and strongly institutionalised 
forms of industrial relations represent a distinctive feature with respect to other 
economically developed areas of the world (Grahl, J. and Teague, P.). 
The present report aims to shed light on the role played by social policies and the social 
protection system in the context of the current crisis. This is of importance in several 
respects: not only does social protection provide a safety net for those groups which have 
been hit hardest by the crisis, it has also a stabilising effect on the overall demand for 
goods and services produced in the economy. Moreover, stabilisation through social 
protection is an issue with high relevance for future developments: this concerns, for 
instance, the effects of stabilisation on public finances as well as possible trade-offs 
between stabilisation and delayed structural adjustments.  
This first section sets the stage for further analysis by providing a review of theoretical and 
empirical knowledge on the mechanisms through which social protection can act as 
economic stabiliser in times of economic downturn. 
 
 
1 Data from the European Commission’s Spring 2010 Economic Forecast. 
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1.2. Economic  stabilisation: General considerations 
Economic stabilisation is primarily associated with the ability of taxes and transfers to 
stabilise income, and consequently consumption, automatically in the face of economic 
downturns. The stabilising character of the tax and transfer system relies on a simple 
mechanism: in the presence of a negative shock to income, taxes net of transfers should 
react more than proportionately, so that disposable income is affected less than 
proportionally by the downturn. Several components of government budgets are impacted 
by the macroeconomic situation in ways that operate to smooth the business cycle, with 
unemployment benefits being the most prominent example. Automatic stabilisation might 
have effects not only on disposable income but also on GDP itself. If in a recession fewer 
taxes are collected and more transfers are paid, this should support private incomes and 
damp adverse movements in aggregate demand. We can expect this stabilising property to 
be stronger if the tax system is more progressive (van den Noord, P.). From a theoretical 
viewpoint, it could be argued that private households can stabilise consumption by 
adjusting their savings and dissavings on an intertemporal basis. Automatic stabilisation 
can, however, be justified on the ground that the government faces fewer liquidity 
constraints and a lower risk premium than the private sector and therefore is likely to be 
more efficient at consumption smoothing through cyclical downturns than households are. 
According to the IMF, a consequence of the crisis is that private consumption growth in 
advanced economies will remain sluggish for years to come (IMF, 2009a). 
The most important advantage of automatic stabilisers is their automatic response, 
implying comparatively small time lags between the decline in GDP and immediate effects 
on disposable income. The disadvantage of discretionary fiscal measures is generally seen 
in time lags concerning the diagnosis of the problem, the decision-making process and the 
implementation of the measures. An additional shortcoming of discretionary measures is 
that they are not automatically reversed when the economic situation improves, giving rise 
to a potential deficit bias (Baunsgaard, T. and Symansky, S.A.). The advantages of fiscal 
stimuli concern the volume of activities and the higher public awareness of policy activities 
that could help to stabilise expectations. Counter-cyclical fiscal policy became a central tool 
for macroeconomic policy in the aftermath of the Great Depression and of the Keynesian 
revolution and maintained a prominent position in economic policy as well as in the 
academic discourse in the 1960s and 1970s. In the following decades, fiscal policy as a 
counter-cyclical tool fell out of favour, particularly in the academic world. The reputation of 
discretionary fiscal measures was tarnished because of several reasons, not least the view 
that these measures are constrained by political agendas and particularistic interests.
2 The 
rejection of discretionary fiscal policy was strong in the economic profession, whereas fiscal 
stimulus measures were generally still accepted and implemented by policy-makers in the 
face of (severe) shocks (Blanchard, O. et al.). 
Governments across the world made intensive use of fiscal policy to combat the economic 
crisis which began in 2008. One reason for the heavy reliance on counter-cyclical fiscal 
policies for crisis management can be found in the rapid exhaustion of alternative policy 
tools: after a long period characterised by stable inflation and low interest rates, most 
countries had little room left for effective monetary policy. The intensive use of fiscal 
policies is, however, also connected to the depth of the crisis and to the challenge it 
represented with respect to stabilisation. From the onset of the crisis, it became clear that 
the economic slump would be markedly deeper than in usual cyclical downturns and that its 
effects on unemployment rates would be long lasting.  
                                                 
2 This process was accompanied by the rise of monetarism as a dominant theory in mainstream economics. 
According to prominent monetarists like Milton Friedman, policy-makers should refrain from influencing the 
economy using discretionary, demand-side policies. The popularity of monetarist views increased partly due to the 
inability of Keynesian economics to solve the problems of rising unemployment and inflation in the 1970s. 
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Empirical evidence indicates that recessions after a financial crisis have more severe effects 
on output and employment than recessions which have their origin in other economic 
adversities (Reinhart, C.M. and Rogoff, K.S., 2008). Against this backdrop, ‘it was clear that 
fiscal stimulus would have ample time to yield a beneficial impact despite implementation 
lags’ (Blanchard, O. et al.). Although comparisons of different crises across time and place 
have to be interpreted with caution, fiscal policies are generally associated with positive 
effects on the length and depth of financial crises. Baldacci, E. et al. study the impact of 
different stimulus measures on the duration of banking crises in the last three decades. 
They find that discretionary government consumption (such as higher transfers) has a 
greater ability to shorten a banking crisis than government investment; whereas stimulus 
packages focused on investment show the largest positive effect on output in the medium-
term. This suggests that optimal fiscal stimulus can be achieved through a careful mix of 
measures with immediate demand effects and with positive medium-term growth effects. 
The case for a strong public intervention to stabilise the economy is corroborated by 
comparisons between the present crisis and its best known historical antecedents, i.e. the 
Great Depression in the United States and Japan’s lost decade in the 1990s. Studies which 
explore the general role of fiscal stimulus in both the Great Depression and Japan’s lost 
decade stress the importance of prolonged and aggressive intervention (see Spilimbergo, A. 
et al., 2008; Fatás, A. and Mihov, I., 2009; Aiginger, K.). The present crisis was 
characterised by a decline in manufacturing, trade and stock markets on a comparable 
scale with the Great Depression. A major difference lies in the duration of the two episodes, 
as in the Great Depression, production and trade fell over a long period of time, with bank 
failures happening in different waves over years (Aiginger, K.). Employment, 
unemployment and GDP all had a less favourable development in the wake of the Great 
Depression than they have so far had in the current crisis. This can be linked to the 
restrictive fiscal policy stance during the first years of the depression, when the US 
government tried to keep budgets balanced and counteract the automatic stabilisers by 
increasing tariffs and taxes and by cutting expenditure. The view that the economy would 
recover on its own had fatal and long-lasting consequences. In 1937, contractionary effects 
as a consequence of the attempt to balance the budget led to another relatively severe 
recession (Romer,  C.D.). Also in the case of Japan, the long crisis duration can be 
associated with restrictive fiscal policies, as a new downturn ‘was initiated by a larger-than 
expected fall in household spending after the April 1997 tax hike and cuts in public 
investment’ (Spilimbergo, A. et al., 2008: 24). (Fatás A. and Mihov, I., 2009: 68) come to 
the conclusion that the Japanese experience ‘offers evidence of what happens in a post-
bubble economy with a struggling financial sector if policy interventions are not aggressive: 
debt still increases and possibly by much more than if a fiscal stimulus is introduced.’ 
Research on past economic crises deals with economic stabilisation focusing on indicators 
such as aggregate demand or measures for financial sector stability. Policy responses and 
the extent of automatic stabilisation are measured through total government budgets or 
single items such as tax revenues, public consumption and public investment. There exists 
some anecdotal evidence for the stabilising effects of social protection measures. Aiginger, 
K. for instance reports that work relief programmes undertaken by the US government in 
the 1930s, where unemployed were hired for low wages, lowered the unemployment rate 
significantly at that time. In 1935, the unemployment rate stood at 14.2 per cent, whereas 
it would have been 20.1 per cent if the relief programme workers had been included. The 
specific role and contribution of social expenditure and of the social protection system for 
economic stabilisation has, however, not been singled out in analytical terms. This lack of 
evidence can largely be linked to the difficulty and high data requirements necessary for 
isolating the effects of single institutional aspects and government interventions on 
aggregate measures for output, employment and consumption.  
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Comparisons between the present situation and past crisis situations are complicated by 
the uniqueness of the modern European social protection systems. The magnitude of social 
spending in the EU, with a share of 25 per cent of GDP, implies a much larger automatic 
response to the crisis than during the Great Depression. Even during Japan’s lost decade, 
social spending played a comparatively minor role, with a share of public social expenditure 
on GDP of 11.2 per cent in 1990. In the present crisis, the extent of automatic stabilisation 
provided by the social protection system has been magnified by a wide array of 
discretionary measures targeted at low-income groups and households hit by 
unemployment (see chapter 2 for more details). 
Although difficult to verify in empirical terms, the positive effects of social protection 
policies and institutions in the face of a crisis need not to be confined to the stabilisation of 
employment and disposable income. A major function of the social protection system is its 
stabilising effect on expectations (Tichy, G.). While stabilising effects on income and 
employment are of great importance to smooth cyclical economic fluctuations, the general 
effect of reducing uncertainty arguably carries a particularly large weight for consumption 
stabilisation in the context of a severe and potentially prolonged crisis. The fact that the 
social protection system reduces uncertainty on a personal as well as on an economy-wide 
level stems from a simple logic. Confronted with the perspective of unemployment or 
uncertainty about future income, households will refrain from spending even if their 
disposable income has not been immediately affected. As a matter of fact, savings rates 
increased in the wake of the crisis.
3 Higher private saving rates are to be expected in the 
coming years in those countries which experienced a surge of household debt before the 
crisis. The effects of the crisis on consumption have, however, been more moderate than 
expected given the severity of the downturn. In 2009, private consumption fell by 1.8 per 
cent in the EU and 0.8 per cent in the euro area. Newly released data indicate that in the 
US the decline in private consumption was even less pronounced in 2009 (-0.6 per cent, 
after -0.2 per cent in 2008). The automatic responses of the social protection system, as 
well as ad hoc measures implemented during the crisis, had a positive impact on present 
and future income perspectives of the population. We can thus assume that they dampened 
the spread of insecurity and contributed decisively to strengthen anti-cyclical behaviour on 
the part of private households. 
The large increase in unemployment furthermore demonstrates that deep economic 
downturns affect households very asymmetrically. Job loss leads to a sharp decline in 
income for the unemployed and their families, at the same time other social groups are 
affected only marginally through stagnating real wages. The challenge for social policy 
which results from these asymmetric effects of the crisis is further enhanced by the 
presence of in-work poverty. As the OECD highlights in its 2009 Employment Outlook, even 
before the crisis, poverty rates in the working-age population were sizeable.
4 Although 
employment represents an important avenue out of poverty, ‘on average 7 per cent of 
individuals living in households with at least one worker are poor in the OECD area’ (OECD, 
2009c: 167). According to these data, the working poor account for more than 60 per cent 
of all the poor of working age. In some countries, including the EU Member States Greece 
and Portugal, this proportion increases to 80 per cent (OECD, 2009c: 167; data refer to 
mid-2000s). This issue is becoming increasingly important in connection with the crisis as 
the risk of poverty will be acerbated not only for those who lose their job, but also for those 
who will work fewer hours.  
                                                 
3 In the EU, the share of households’ gross savings on available income rose from 11.0 % in 2008 to 13.4 % in 
2009; in the United States the savings rate went from 2.7 % in 2008 to 4.2 % in 2009 (data from Eurostat and 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, WIFO calculations). 
4 The average for the OECD area lies at 10 %, with particularly high rates in Mexico, Poland, Turkey and the 
United States, and low rates in the four Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden), Austria, the Czech 
Republic and France. 
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For most of the working poor, underemployment represents the major problem, as data for 
21 European countries indicate that only slightly more than 20 per cent of the working poor 
work full-time, all-year round (OECD, 2009c). In the case of families with children, low-
income workers might be unable to secure economic self-sufficiency even if they hold a full-
time job. The OECD therefore recommends that governments put in place a solid safety net 
for those individuals with weak employment prospects. In this respect, social protection has 
not only a stabilising function in the short-term but can also make a positive contribution to 
future economic development. Children are confronted with more than proportional poverty 
risks and with detrimental effects of poverty on their development.
5 Numerous studies 
highlight that incomes tend to persist across generations and that children largely ‘inherit’ 
their parents’ socio-economic status (d’Addio, A.C.). Parental poverty is associated with 
lower levels of good health, nutrition and housing, affecting child development and the risk 
of poverty in adulthood. Institutional arrangements and measures that address poverty and 
social exclusion are necessary to secure adequate life chances to children that are 
confronted with poverty. In economic terms, transfers addressing the socially needy, as 
well as in-kind benefits such as low-priced, high-quality childcare and education, can thus 
be regarded as long-term, stabilising investments in human capital and as a way to reduce 
the intergenerational transmission of inequality. 
1.3.  Social protection as automatic stabiliser in the cycle 
Earlier macroeconomic studies on automatic stabilisers focused mainly on taxes and 
regarded unemployment benefits as the only government social spending item with 
stabilising properties. This view has been questioned on several grounds. Firstly, there are 
good theoretical and empirical reasons to think that unemployment compensation is not the 
only social expenditure which reacts to the cycle and has a stabilising effect on income and 
consumption. In the second place, there is evidence that social spending may actually have 
a larger stabilising effect than the average of total government expenditure. 
Darby, J. and Melitz, J. argue that besides unemployment benefits, expenditures on health, 
retirement, incapacity and sick pay also increase in times of economic downturn. The 
counter-cyclical movement of spending on old age can be comprehended intuitively, as 
‘strong forces act to lower the average age of retirement in recessions, thereby causing the 
numbers of retirees to exceed the long-term trend, and to raise the average age of 
retirement in expansions, thereby causing the number of retirees to fall below trend’ 
(ibidem: 719). Empirical evidence for this statement comes from Darby, J. et al., who 
report a significant impact of the cycle on labour participation rates for both sexes, 
especially in the over 54 age-group in France, Japan, Sweden and the US. The counter-
cyclical component of retirement decisions and of social spending on old age is well 
documented in a number of other studies, too. Coile, C. and Levine, P. show that 
downturns influence retirement decisions in the US, to the extent that an increase in the 
unemployment rate of 3 percentage points raises the retirement hazard for workers aged 
55-69 by 5 to 10 per cent. This phenomenon is not driven by labour supply decisions only, 
firms in many Western countries have a strong incentive to encourage early retirement and 
to lay off older workers during recessions on the basis of the structure of payroll taxes, 
contributions to health insurance and social security systems (see Hutchens, R.). Hakola, T. 
and Uusitalo, R. confirm the importance of firm behaviour in contributing to counter-cyclical 
movements in retirement with an analysis based on Finnish data. 
 
 
5 According to EUROSTAT data in 2008, 17 % of the population in the EU-27 were at risk of poverty. In 20 of the 
27 Member States, child at-risk-of-poverty rates were higher than for the total population, averaging 20 % in the 
EU-27. 
IP/A/EMPL/ST/2009-07 PE 451.484Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
A similar line of reasoning also applies to incapacity benefits. Arguably, health and disability 
do not represent dichotomous states and do to a certain extent respond to economic 
incentives. Marginal workers with health problems may face a choice between declaring 
incapacity or unemployment, depending on types of available benefits and on overall 
employment perspectives. Accordingly, more workers can be expected to report 
incapacitated in times of economic downturn. Black, D. et al. investigate the impact of 
economic growth on disability programme participation and find that permanent job 
destruction has a sizeable effect on disability programme use. A review of the literature 
suggests that labour market variables go some way to explain both the growth over time 
and the regional distribution of disability benefit recipients (McVicar, D.).  
The case with respect to sick-pay benefits and to general health expenditure is less clear-
cut. There is abundant evidence for the existence of a pro-cyclical pattern of sick leave, 
covering a broad range of countries (see, for instance, Kenyon, P. and Dawkins, P.; Fahr, 
R. and Frick, B.).
6 More in general, studies indicate that the working populations’ health 
status is counter cyclical and worsens during booms. In spite of this, it has been argued 
that public health spending might deviate from this pattern, as it is related to health care 
(Darby, J. and Melitz, J.). According to this hypothesis, even if people are healthier on 
average in recessions, they might consume more health care. In fact, much health care can 
be postponed and individuals might be induced to consume more of it when they have 
more leisure time and face lower opportunity costs (particularly in cases where health care 
is covered by health insurance). 
In spite of some conflicting theoretical expectations with respect to the stabilising effects of 
specific social spending items, recent empirical evidence indicates that government 
spending in social areas has on average a more stabilising effect than total government 
spending as a whole. Furceri, D. finds that total social spending is able to absorb about 16 
per cent of shocks to GDP in OECD countries. This result is robust to different 
specifications, with estimations ranging between 12 and 23 per cent. Afonso, A. and 
Furceri, D. analyse the period from 1980 to 2005 and find that both for EU-15 and EMU 
countries, social benefits provide the largest amount of consumption stabilisation of all 
fiscal variables. In accordance with the consensus expressed in the economic literature, the 
component of government spending that reacts most to the economic cycle is 
unemployment benefits. According to Furceri, D., unemployment benefits provide a 
smoothing to income fluctuations of about 5 per cent. Roughly the same amount of 
stabilisation can, however, also be attributed to spending on old age. Regarding the other 
components it is mainly spending devoted to active labour market policies and spending 
related to incapacity, health and family which contributes to smooth income fluctuations 
(Furceri, D.). 
Recent evidence provided by the OECD sheds light on specific aspects of the reaction of 
spending on unemployment to cyclical fluctuations (see OECD, 2009c). Overall expenditure 
on unemployment is highly counter-cyclical. Significant differences between passive and 
active measures can be observed, especially as to the proportionality with which spending 
reacts to changes in the absolute number of unemployed. Estimates based on the 
historically typical reaction of spending indicate that in the OECD countries per person 
resources for labour market policies do not rise in proportion to the increase in 
unemployment (OECD, 2009c, 2010b). This finding is driven by a sharp decline in per 
person resources for active measures. As we would expect, unemployment benefits move 
proportionally with the number of unemployed. This implies that during a recession public 
employment services are confronted with significant constraints in assisting unemployed 
people and that they have to ration active measures.  
                                                 
6 This is consistent with the hypothesis that in times of rising unemployment workers will be particularly loath to 
report sick, as unemployment may act as “worker discipline device” (Shapiro, C. and Stiglitz, J.E.). 
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This finding can be linked to the difficulty to adjust active labour market policies quickly in 
the face of a downturn. Spending on unemployment is less responsive to cyclical 
unemployment than to trend developments in the unemployment rate. With respect to 
activating measures, such as training or job search assistance, capacity constraints may be 
an important barrier to rapid expansion of service offerings. Looking at the cyclicality of 
more detailed programme categories the OECD finds that expenditures on training have 
been totally unresponsive to cyclical unemployment, whereas they represent the category 
o f  a c t i v e  m e a s u r e s  t h a t  h a s  b e e n  m o s t  r e sponsive to changes in trend unemployment. 
Conversely, direct job-creation schemes display the opposite pattern, i.e. a strong 
correlation with cyclical unemployment and none with trend unemployment (OECD, 2009c).  
The ability of the state to smooth income shocks through social expenditure is equally 
present in economic downturns and upswings. Furceri, D. finds that unemployment 
benefits, as well as spending on old age, lead to a bigger income smoothing effect in 
downturns, however this difference is of a small magnitude and low statistical significance. 
On a similar note, Darby, J. and Melitz, J. do not find any remarkable difference in the 
stabilisation effect of social spending between boom and bust periods. What determines the 
effectiveness of automatic stabilisers? Furceri, D. comes to the conclusion that the size of 
the deficit has a little or negligible effect on the efficiency of social spending in providing 
income smoothing. A similar conclusion was reached by Arreaza, A. et al. with a view on 
total government spending.
7 T h e  s a m e  i s  t r u e  w i t h  r e s p e c t to a differentiation between 
countries with high versus low discretionary spending volatility. The studies do however 
corroborate the intuitive view that the size of government expenditure matters for the 
effectiveness of automatic stabilisers. Estimates on the amount of income smoothing 
provided by social spending display positive and statistically significant coefficients for all 
countries. The strength of reactions of automatic stabilisers during the business cycle 
primarily depends on the size of government, i.e. the dimension of the social system and 
on the volume of taxes and contributions in relation to GDP. Overall, Furceri, D. confirms 
that countries with a larger share of social spending on GDP are indeed those where income 
smoothing following an output shock is the largest. This is consistent with previous 
research on macroeconomic stabilisation effects of overall government expenditure. Galí, J. 
presents evidence of a negative correlation between government size (measured as the 
ratio of government spending to GDP) and volatility, thus implying that larger governments 
stabilise output. Fatás, A. and Mihov, I., 2001 carry out further tests using intranational 
data covering US states, and corroborate the view that government size can be interpreted 
as a proxy for automatic stabilisers. 
In spite of the consistent picture which emerges from the literature, we should not overlook 
the possibility of large differences across countries in the stabilising impact of the social 
protection system. As will be discussed in detail in chapter 2 of this report, such differences 
can be related to the structure and financing of the social protection system. The most 
important stabilising effect of social protection stems from the automatic reaction of 
revenues and expenditures. The quantitative rea c t i o n  o n  t h e  r e v e n u e  s i d e  i s  g e n e r a l l y  
stronger, as financing of the social security system - irrespective of whether this happens 
through payroll taxes or through (income) taxes - depends primarily on the development of 
wages and employment. Differences exist in the responsiveness of different revenue 
components to changes in output.
8 Different forms of revenue have different elasticities 
and hence are inherently more or less stabilising.  
 
7 In addition, Arreaza, A. et al. investigate the hypothesis that the level of the government deficit affects the 
ability of the private sector to smooth consumption through crowding out, but they find no support for this 
hypothesis. 
8 The technical term used by economists is the (output) elasticity of taxes. 
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The empirical literature indicates that in general the elasticity of tax revenues (especially 
income taxes) is higher than that of social security contributions.  
This reflects the progressive structure of personal income taxes and the close link to 
profitability for corporate taxes. Payroll taxes and social security contributions (particularly 
if capped at a nominal level) have considerably lower elasticities (Baunsgaard, T. and 
Symansky, S.A.). 
 









(unweighted)  1.49  1.25  0.68 
Median  1.52  1.18  0.69 
Min  1.08  0.70  0.00 
Max  2.08  1.92  0.92 
Source: Baunsgaard, T. and Symansky, S.A. The tax elasticities are the product of the elasticity of tax revenue 
with respect to the tax base and the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the output gap. 
Not only the size of government and financing structure of the welfare state but also other 
institutional and structural country characteristics might influence the level of stabilisation 
provided by single social spending items and therefore result in considerable cross-country 
heterogeneity with respect to automatic stabilisation through social protection. One case in 
point is represented by retirement benefits, with incentives of firms to encourage early 
retirement during recessions likely to be influenced by features of payroll taxes, entitlement 
rules and social security payments, as well as by differences in labour regulations and trade 
union power (Hutchens, R.; Darby, J. and Melitz, J.). Another important institutional aspect 
concerns the existence of minimum income levels, both in the guise of primary market 
incomes through minimum wages and of secondary incomes through minimum income 
schemes. Minimum wages represent a well-established component of labour market 
regulation in most European countries and they are an increasingly important issue for 
wage settings institutions in the EU (European Commission, 2009b). In a number of 
countries the real value of the minimum wage has been rising faster than average wages in 
the economy (Schulten, T.). Currently, 20 out of 27 EU Member States have a statutory 
minimum wage covering the whole economy. The group of countries with no statutory 
minimum wage (comprising Germany, Austria, Italy, Sweden, Denmark and Finland)
9 is 
characterised by high collective bargaining coverage, which means that in these countries 
the majority of workers is covered by a form of minimum wage negotiated by social 
partners at the sectoral level. 
In spite of wide-spread diffusion of minimum wage legislation in the EU, its macroeconomic 
relevance has to be assessed at the national level. For one thing, minimum wages display 
large cross-country variation in terms of absolute and relative value. The ratio of the 
minimum wage relative to the average wage in the economy ranges between 30 and 50 per 
cent depending on the country (Schulten, T.). Further distinctions can be made with 
respect to the share of the workforce which is paid the minimum wage and to the minimum 
wage coverage of specific labour force groups (for instance women and young workers). 
Furthermore, the actual role and impact of minimum wage legislation depends crucially on 
its interaction with other labour market institutions as well as with the national tax and 
benefit system.  
                                                 
9 Cyprus has a statutory minimum wage for specific occupations in which unionisation and collective bargaining 
coverage are low (European Commission, 2009b). 
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This is true for potential negative effects of the minimum wage (especially disemployment 
due to a distortion of wage setting) as well as for positive effects.  
Generally speaking, minimum wages can represent a stabilising factor in the economy by 
supporting consumption and preventing excessive downward real wage flexibility. Arguably 
minimum wages possess a signalling function and therefore affect not only the least paid 
workers but the whole wage distribution. Minimum wage legislation can also help to combat 
poverty. The direct effect of minimum wages on poverty might however be of limited 
magnitude, as the main beneficiaries of the minimum wage might be living in households 
with other sources of income (Gosling, A.; Sutherland, H., 2001b). Beside the direct 
stabilisation of earned income of those receiving the lowest wages, minimum wages can 
have an important indirect effect by making paid work more attractive relative to out-of-
work benefits and thus help avoid poverty traps. In addition, statutory minimum wages can 
be seen as a complement to in-work benefits and as an integral part of the social protection 
system. Due to the stickiness of wages in the short-term, minimum wages are unlikely to 
have played a prominent role when the economic crisis was unfolding. Although their 
immediate stabilising effect was probably of limited magnitude, they might represent an 
important labour market variable with respect to economic recovery. In fact, the presence 
of minimum wage legislation will be felt more intensely in the medium-term, as its 
influence on wage formation and on labour market agents’ behaviour will come to the fore.  
Whereas minimum wages play prevalently an indirect role in the strategy to combat 
poverty, minimum income legislation is more explicitly geared at lifting beneficiaries out of 
poverty. Almost all EU Member States have some form of minimum income scheme for 
people of working age. Their main aim is to ensure a minimum standard of living for 
individuals and households which have no other means of financial support. The extent to 
which minimum income schemes raise income levels above the poverty threshold does 
however vary widely across Member States. Further cross-country distinctions concern 
eligibility conditions and take-up rates of the benefit, as well as mechanisms for its uprating 
and the link between benefit reception, active labour market integration and access to 
services. According to the EU network of national independent experts on social exclusion, 
commissioned by the European Commission, minimum income schemes in most countries 
fall short of preserving people from poverty (Frazer, H. and Marlier, E.). A handful of 
countries, such as the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark, come close to achieving the at-
risk-of-poverty threshold with their minimum income schemes. In numerous countries 
experts are very negative about the adequacy of social assistance and other transfers on 
reducing poverty. Nevertheless, the level of payments in most cases is sufficient to make a 
contribution to reduce the intensity of poverty. 
As in the case of minimum wages, the economic impact of minimum income schemes is 
likely to vary considerably between countries. Although some minimum income schemes 
apply only out of work, in the majority of countries they function also as in-work benefits, 
at least in specific cases. The impact of the economic crisis and of rising unemployment had 
already begun to have tangible repercussions on the number of those seeking support in 
the course of 2009 (Frazer, H. and Marlier, E.). In conjunction with discretionary measures 
targeted at household incomes, minimum income transfers have thus exerted a stabilising 
function during the most dramatic phases of the crisis. We can however expect the need for 
adequate income support to increase with some delay with respect to the trough of the 
economic recession. Labour market developments typically lag behind the business cycle: 
This empirical regularity is highlighted by the fact that unemployment rates in Europe are 
expected to peak in the course of 2010, at a time when most economies are registering 
timid signs of growth.  
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In addition, many individuals will fall back to minimum income benefits only once their 
unemployment benefits and in some cases also their personal savings are exhausted. In a 
scenario where numerous workers will not be able to return to employment or at least to 
full employment for some time after the crisis, this will result in large scale reliance on the 
social protection system and on basic forms of income support.  
Accordingly, the main impact of minimum income schemes – both positively in terms of 
social protection and economic stabilisation and negatively in terms of financial strain on 
national budgets – has yet to come. 
1.4.  Active social policy via fiscal stimuli 
In a ‘normal’ recession, when GDP does not grow or slightly declines for two or three 
quarters, the work of automatic stabilisers is the most important policy tool to mitigate the 
decline in demand and production. But in times of a deep and lasting crisis, active fiscal 
stimuli gain importance. As early as the end of 2008 – when first data about the marked 
drop of GDP became available – the IMF was calling for worldwide extensive fiscal stimuli 
(Spilimbergo, A. et al., 2008). An optimal fiscal package has been described as ‘timely, 
large, lasting, diversified, contingent, collective and sustainable’ (ibidem: 3). The empirical 
estimates of the quantitative effects of fiscal stimuli on GDP offer a very broad range of 
results. In general, one can summarise that the size of fiscal multipliers depends on the 
spillovers into savings and imports as well as on the response of monetary policy to fiscal 
action.
10 Multiplying effects of a fiscal stimulus on GDP are higher: 
  when households with a low savings and a high consumption rate are profiting 
from the measures, since low income households typically show a much higher 
marginal propensity to consume than high income households - measures from 
which the poor profit most are therefore more effective; 
  when small amounts of additional demand are captured by imports; multipliers 
in larger economies are therefore generally higher than in smaller ones, and – 
especially relevant in the current world wide crisis - internationally coordinated 
fiscal stimuli are much more effective than single country measures; 
  when fiscal measures are accommodated by monetary measures; as 
expansionary fiscal policy tends to increase interest rates, a low interest rate 
policy by monetary authorities counteracts this threat and increases the 
multiplier effect. 
Generally speaking, the highest multipliers expected concern government investment 
expenditures, as the effect on GDP is immediate and not dampened by household’s savings 
(Freedman, C. et al.). Decision and implementation lags are however often very high. The 
multiplier concept has its origin in the traditional Keynesian textbook model, according to 
which an increase in spending of any form gets magnified through subsequent rounds of 
consumption spending. The multiplier will be an increasing function of the marginal 
propensity to consume (Fatás, A. and Mihov, I., 2009). Accordingly, strong multipliers can 
be expected with social transfers targeted towards households which are liquidity 
constrained and have high propensities to consume. Multiplier effects of general transfers 
or general tax cuts are considerably smaller, especially in periods of high uncertainty, 
where they tend to increase the propensity to save. This qualifies social policy in the form 
of transfers to the social groups affected as an effective instrument of discretionary fiscal 
action.  
                                                 
10 Basically the fiscal multiplier is “the ratio of a change in output (…) to an exogenous change in the fiscal deficit.” 
(Spilimbergo, A. et al., 2009: 2) If a fiscal stimulus by one million euros increases GDP in the European Union by a 
half or two million euros, the multiplier is a half or two, respectively. 
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Authors from a neoclassical perspective are much more critical about the positive effects of 
fiscal stimulus. This scepticism is rooted in the idea that private households behave on the 
basis of rational expectations and anticipate that they will have to repay present 
government expenditure in the future. This implies limited stabilising effect of fiscal policy, 
as additional disposable income will be saved to pay for future taxes. 
The coordinated worldwide fiscal stimulus in response to the crisis has induced increased 
interest in the effectiveness of the measures taken. Consequently, a large number of 
studies that estimate multipliers of different forms of government interventions have been 
reconsidered recently. The IMF compiled multiplier estimates from a number of studies 
(Spilimbergo, A. et al., 2009). The authors report two studies which are concerned with the 
euro area as a whole. This is important because of the high interconnectedness of the 
European economies. A single country perspective cannot capture the whole multiplier 
because part of the stimulus will drain into imports. 
 
Table 2: Multipliers for the euro area 
 











T. et al.¹ 
Government 
spending 





1.9  1.5  0.7  3.4 
Freedman, 
C. et al.² 
Government 
investment 
0.5  0.3  -0.1  0.8 
Source: Spilimbergo, A. et al., 2009. ¹Authors assume monetary accommodation. ²Authors assume no monetary 
accommodation. Monetary accommodation refers to the behaviour of central banks relative to an expansionary 
stance by governments. If government spending increases and monetary authorities implement monetary 
accommodation (i.e. they leave interest rates constant or lower them), central bankers support the public effort to 
boost growth by providing the necessary financing conditions. Whether central banks opt for monetary 
accommodation or not is typically dependent on the prevailing inflation expectations. 
 
The results obtained by Dalsgaard, T. et al. and Freedman, C. et al. show a considerable 
degree of variation. This is because the latter assume no monetary accommodation 
(Spilimbergo, A. et al., 2008: 8). A similar set of multipliers has been compiled by the 
OECD in an interim chapter for the Economic Outlook 2009 (OECD, 2009a). The average 
results of a number of studies are listed below. In this case, only studies which assumed 
accommodative monetary policy were considered. 
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Table 3: OECD survey on multipliers, range of estimates based on large-scale 
models 
 






  low  high  mean  low  high  mean 
Purchases of goods and 
services 
0.9  1.9  1.2  0.5  2.2  1.3 
Corporate tax cut  0.1  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.8  0.5 
Personal income tax cut  0.1  1.1  0.5  0.2  1.4  0.8 
Indirect tax cut  0  0.6  0.2  0  0.8  0.4 
Social security 
contribution cut 
0  0.5  0.3  0.2  1  0.6 
Source: OECD, 2009a. Only studies which assumed monetary accommodation were considered. 
 
The figures clearly show that purchases of goods and services by governments have the 
highest stimulating effect. This is recognised in a note from the IMF, which also claims that 
‘in the current circumstances, its [i.e. public spending on goods and services] first round 
effects are more certain than those related to transfers or tax cuts’ (Spilimbergo, A. et al., 
2008: 5). The fact that government investment has the highest multiplier is also confirmed 
by Baldacci, E. et al., whose findings suggest a crowding-in effect of public investment 
rather than the crowding out effect predicted by rational expectation models. A comparison 
of Tables 2 and 3 indicates that the Dalsgaard, T. et al. study for the euro area, which is 
not part of the OECD sample, is within the range of results surveyed by the OECD. The low 
results found by Freedman, C. et al. can be explained by differences in methodology, in 
particular the assumptions with respect to monetary policy and private household 
behaviour. 
The actual multipliers attached to the measures which have been implemented in the 
course of the current crisis may depend on numerous factors and vary considerably across 
countries. As interest rates fell to a minimum in the course of the crisis, one would expect 
multipliers to be closer to estimates based on the assumption of accommodating monetary 
policy (such as Dalsgaard, T. et al.). The effect of governmental action on expectations and 
uncertainty can be considered from different viewpoints. On the one hand, it can be 
assumed that strong intervention to stabilise incomes and support employment has had a 
beneficial effect on private consumption. Governments across the EU have implemented a 
broad range of measures aimed at low-income groups and households hit by 
unemployment, such as increased tax allowances, higher benefits and additional cash 
hand-outs. Numerous households will have had little choice but to spend this additional 
disposable income. On the other hand, the comparatively high multiplier for general 
personal tax cuts reported in the OECD survey can be questioned under current 
macroeconomic conditions. As the IMF points out, decreases in wealth and high uncertainty 
have led households to cut consumption and take a ‘wait and see attitude’ (Spilimbergo, A. 
et al., 2009: 6). 
The size of multipliers is normally analysed regarding the effects on GDP. Especially in 
periods of deep labour market crisis, the effects on employment might be more important. 
The ranking of multipliers concerning employment effects will in general be similar to that 
of income multipliers with the exception of direct public employment, where the job effects 
tend to be much higher than with any other measure.  
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This can also be true for employment subsidies to firms. The employment effects of fiscal 
stimuli and of employment subsidies can be of great macroeconomic importance in periods 
where unemployment rates experience a sharp increase. Severe recessions can arguably 
lead to an inefficient number of layoffs as the full economic cost of a displacement is higher 
in recessions when longer unemployment spells and harsher effects on individual careers 
can be expected (OECD, 2009c). This hypothesis explains the strong interest in short-time 
working schemes and other forms of employment subsidies in the course of the present 
crisis. Such schemes can be successful at avoiding cases where employers dismiss workers 
and thus waste human capital, although the jobs in question would be viable in the long-
run. It is, however, very difficult to verify empirically to which extent employment subsidies 
achieve this objective. These measures are not undisputed due to the likely presence of 
deadweight and displacement effects which can hamper structural adjustment.
11 The same 
is true of other government actions which are targeted at supporting labour demand 
directly, such as public works programmes and employment guarantee schemes. 
Other forms of active labour market policy (ALMP) are less controversial from a theoretical 
viewpoint and have also been reinforced across the EU in the course of the crisis. The most 
wide-spread reaction has been to step up efforts to train both employed and unemployed 
workers and to intensify job search assistance and overall public employment services 
capacities (Cazes, S. et al.). Some countries also implemented other types of policy 
changes or new initiatives, such as increasing incentives for entrepreneurship. This 
response represents a discretionary component of stabilisation, complementing the 
automatic stabilisation through mainly passive labour market expenditure discussed in the 
previous section. The overarching objective of activating measures is to improve the match 
between labour demand and supply and to bring people (back) into employment. Against 
the backdrop of the economic crisis, its impact has to be assessed with a view to short and 
medium-term effects and to be differentiated by type of measure. Some measures are 
unlikely to impact unemployment positively in a situation where labour demand is low. Job 
search assistance, which represents one of the main components of ALMP, is a good case in 
point. Job search programmes, consisting of activities such as skill assessment and 
presentation training, can be particularly useful for workers who lack the necessary skills to 
find a job. A recent meta-analysis of ALMP indicates that such programmes have a 
favourable short-run impact on unemployment (Card, D. et al.). Arguably, they are 
however ineffective in a situation where job openings are scarce, because firms reduce 
hiring and those currently employed are reluctant to risk a job change. As evidence from 
past recessions – at least in the United States - suggests, it is mainly reduced job openings 
and the subsequent collapse in hiring that drives the unemployment rate once the cycle has 
reached the trough (Cazes, S. et al.). 
Hence, we can expect more positive employment effects of ALMP to emerge in the medium 
or even long-run. Although the worst stage of the crisis has been overcome, weak 
economic growth and the lag between growth and unemployment rates represent a major 
challenge. ALMP can contribute to maintain and increase the employability of the 
unemployed, and thus help them find a job once the labour market situation improves. Not 
unlike short-time working schemes and other measures that support existing jobs, 
activating measures can have long-term effects on employment and growth by preserving 
and enhancing human capital. Numerous measures, including on-the-job training, work 
experience and apprenticeship programmes aim at improving the employability of 
beneficiaries by increasing their productivity (Calmfors, L. et al.).  
 
11 Employment subsidies can interfere with the allocative efficiency of the market and thus result in a suboptimal 
market equilibrium. Displacement effects refer to cases in which subsidies are used to support jobs which would 
have been retained even in absence of the subsidy. Deadweight losses can occur when employment subsidies 
result in the preservation of inefficient jobs and firms. 
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Depending on its macro-economic setting and labour market situation, each individual 
country is confronted with the task to develop a suitable package of policies and measures. 
C a r d ,  D .  e t  a l .  f i n d  t h a t  m a n y  A L M P  p r o g r a m m e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  c l a s s r o o m  a n d  o n - t h e - j o b  
training programmes, appear in a more favourable light in longer-term evaluations (with 
impact estimates two or three years after treatment). Due to the depth of the recent crisis 
and the length of the drawn-out recovery, this represents an encouraging finding. Measures 
to increase human capital formation could specifically focus on the long-term and go 
beyond what is usually conceived as labour market policy. Bell, D.N.F. and Blanchflower, 
D.G., 2010 for instance argue that special efforts should be made to help youth to prevent 
the long-term impact of unemployment on their future by supporting and encouraging them 
to undertake further or higher education to improve their skills. Investment in the youngest 
groups of the population is going to pay off in the long-run as the financial burden of young 
people which fail to integrate in labour market and society is going to be much larger - 
under the assumption that we can provide measures which are adequate to avoid long-
term youth unemployment. 
1.5. Concluding  remarks and open questions 
The discussion of economic stabilisation from the viewpoint of social policies and the social 
protection system raises a number of issues which are relevant for the present report. One 
interesting point concerns the relation between fiscal stimulus packages and automatic 
stabilisers. As automatic stabilisers are occurring automatically, one could ask whether 
countries with strong effects of this category of fiscal policy have less need for additional 
active fiscal stimuli. On the other hand, countries with a larger size of government could be 
more open for state involvement in economic affairs, which in turn could lead to more 
discretionary fiscal activity rather than to substitution between the two. Empirical evidence 
on this topic is mixed, with some studies finding no relation between the size of automatic 
stabilisers and the size of discretionary actions (Dolls, M. et al.) and others a – albeit rather 
weak – negative correlation (Padoan, P.C.). This question will be discussed in more detail in 
section 2.2. 
Irrespective of the actual relationship between automatic and discretionary stabilisation, 
economists tend to express clear preferences for a stronger role of automatic stabilisation. 
This is particularly true regarding emerging and developing economies, where fiscal policy 
and specifically social spending has been found to be pro-cyclical (Braun, M. and di Gresia, 
L.; Ilzetzki, E. and Vegh, C.A.). Also with respect to high-income countries, some thought is 
being given to increasing the size of automatic response to economic downturns. The IMF 
has recently made a case for enhancing traditional automatic stabilisers by setting up rules 
to link temporary fiscal policy changes to chosen economic indicators (Baunsgaard, T. and 
Symansky, S.A.; Blanchard, O. et al.). This would correspond to automating a larger 
fraction of discretionary fiscal response, for instance with temporary tax policies targeted at 
low-income households triggered by the crossing of a threshold by the unemployment rate 
or another macro variable. An example for such an automated fiscal policy can be found in 
Denmark, where a rise in unemployment leads automatically to channelling more resources 
into active labour market policy (OECD, 2009b). Additional costs and deficits resulting from 
this policy in times of crisis should be counterbalanced by an adequate reduction of 
expenditure in times of decreasing unemployment. 
A further issue which is of relevance to the present report refers to the medium- and long-
term implications of stabilisation through social protection for economic growth and labour 
market developments. One risk clearly associated with the stabilising role of economic 
policy lies in the difficulty of drawing a distinction between cyclical developments and 
structural changes. There exists a trade-off between the macroeconomic need for 
stabilisation in the short-term and policies to support long-term economic growth.  
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Short-term macroeconomic stabilisation is beneficial as large under-utilisation of resources 
can have damaging long-term effects if it leads to under-investment and failure to maintain 
physical and human capital (van den Noord, P.). On the other hand, if the current economic 
crisis in not only a cyclical phenomenon, but is also associated with a decline in the EU’s 
growth potential, stabilisation may have a negative effect on future economic performance. 
It can be questioned, for instance, whether institutional arrangements and policy measures 
that induce long-term exits (i.e. retirement) from the labour force in the face of a crisis 
represent a sound approach (Darby, J. and Melitz, J.). Similar questions can be raised with 
respect to the long-term effects of crisis-related measures such as employment subsidies, 
income support schemes or overly generous short-time work programmes. 
Not only discretionary measures but also permanent, institutional characteristics of the 
social protection system can entail different economic implications and thus policy 
recommendations, depending on whether we look at the short-term and crisis management 
or at the long-term and recovery support. For instance, it can be argued that minimum 
wages will contribute positively to economic recovery by stabilising the real wage 
adjustment and counteracting pressure to expand the number of low-wage jobs and of 
working poor. Simultaneously, minimum wages could have detrimental effects on 
employment creation by distorting real wage adjustments to an extent which chokes off 
labour demand. The existence and magnitude of such distortionary effects will largely 
depend on their real value relative to the prevailing market wage rate as well as on their 
interaction with the tax and benefit system. Potential negative effects would be felt 
particularly among youth and other individuals without work experience. Since these people 
are among those hit hardest by the crisis anyway, it is important to pay sufficient attention 
to potentially undesirable outcomes of existing labour market and social protection 
institutions. On a similar note, minimum income schemes are likely to play a crucial role for 
stabilising income (and thus consumption) of the poorest groups in society. In this case, 
too potentially counterproductive effects might emerge, especially due to the creation of 
poverty traps and a negative impact on labour market participation. 
More generally, economic stabilisation through social protection is linked to issues of 
timeliness and financial sustainability, which are of paramount importance for a successful 
management of the post-crisis period and which will be discussed at length in the following 
sections. 
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2.  SOCIAL PROTECTION AS ECONOMIC STABILISER  
The preceding chapter discussed the role of automatic and discretionary stabilisation at a 
general level in order to identify the basic features, advantages, costs and benefits of 
different types of policies. This section will now provide an empirical account of how 
automatic and discretionary measures to stabilise the economy and the labour market have 
worked in the current crisis in EU Member States.  
As a first step, the report will describe and analyse core systems of social protection such 
as unemployment insurance and basic income support, as well as basic features of the tax 
system, in order to assess their capacity for automatic stabilisation. This comparative 
analysis is based on the institutional arrangements in place at the outset of the recent 
crisis. Automatic stabilisation depends in particular on the generosity of the benefit system, 
i.e. coverage, formal and practical access to benefits and income replacement received by 
different socio-economic groups. The study focuses in particular on vulnerable groups such 
as holders of fixed-term contracts, low pay workers, labour market (re-)entrants, and 
working and non-working poor. Additional discretionary measures, however, can and have 
in fact addressed these groups to some extent.  
The second step will provide an assessment of the impact of existing systems of social 
protection in terms of an automatic stabilisation of incomes. Discretionary measures are 
assessed in parallel and compared to automatic stabilisers. Both elements show 
considerable variation across countries.  
With the third step, we will discuss the issue of timing regarding automatic and 
discretionary stabilisation.  
Fourthly, while anti-crisis measures adopted at the outset of a recession are expansionary, 
in later phases the fiscal costs come into play. Therefore, we analyse the budgetary 
implications of automatic and discretionary stabilisation and the resulting constraints on 
public budgets.  
Finally, with the fifth step the consequences of broad socio-economic developments for the 
labour market in a situation of crisis are analysed. In particular, we analyse which socio-
economic groups have been most affected by the economic crisis and its labour market 
effects in different countries and to what extent have there been actual differences in 
access to and generosity of benefits received.  
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2.1.  The quality dimension of social protection systems  
KEY FINDINGS 
 
  In most EU Member States, social protection against unemployment is based on 
two pillars: unemployment insurance and minimum income support. While means-
tested income support is generally available as a basic social security net in most 
EU Member States, unemployment insurance systems are more exclusive, as they 
do not equally protect every type of workers. The extent of unemployment risks 
and the ‘quality’ of social protection provided to different socio-economic groups do 
not coincide, so those most affected are often the least protected. Hence, a dual 
pattern of social protection applies. However, an optimum system of social 
protection should try to avoid this double disadvantage. 
  The first phase of discretionary anti-crisis interventions was characterised by a 
number of reforms strengthening the current unemployment insurance benefit 
system in place, in particular by easing access or improving benefit generosity for 
non-standard workers who had been made redundant.  
  A number of countries have also expanded public measures encouraging working 
time flexibility, in particular short-time work schemes, to prevent dismissals. They 
are standing features of unemployment protection in many EU Member States, but 
they have become more widespread recently; and they have been made more 
generous and attractive for firms in order to set incentives to save jobs during the 
crisis.  
  Furthermore, activation policies aimed at labour market (re)integration were rather 
reinforced than reversed. In particular, most countries have emphasised job 
placement and publicly funded training within the framework of active labour 
market policies. 
 
Systems of social protection play a major role in buffering economic crises. The institutional 
set-up of social protection in place before a crisis affects the labour market is therefore one 
major element to consider when comparing economic and social consequences to the 2008-
09 crisis. First, as shown in the preceding section, social safety nets provide income 
security for individuals and households and thereby stabilise national demand in a phase of 
rising or high unemployment. Here, two elements have to be distinguished:  
(i)  the first tier of unemployment benefits stemming from unemployment insurance 
generally tied to contributions and substantial prior employment; 
(ii)  the second tier of means-tested minimum income support and related benefits 
for inactive or long-term unemployed people, including housing allowances etc.  
2.1.1. Unemployment insurance  
Unemployment insurance benefits provide for income replacement in case of redundancies 
if certain national entitlement and availability criteria are met. Of particular importance is a 
sufficient employment record in terms of duration and earnings. While fixed-term contracts 
are often covered by unemployment insurance, holders of these types of jobs may not have 
a substantial entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits if waiting periods are not 
fulfilled due to interrupted employment spells.  
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In addition, part-time employees or low-wage workers, while covered by the insurance, 
may only be able to draw very limited benefits from unemployment insurance due to the 
close link between earnings-related contributions and benefits. Furthermore, national 
systems of unemployment insurance vary in their coverage of different types of non-
standard employment, such as self employment or marginal part time.  
Table 4 provides evidence on access criteria to unemployment insurance coverage and 
benefit receipt. It refers to the situation in 2008, i.e. at the outset of the current economic 
crisis.  
It is particularly important to note that there are substantial minimum employment and 
contribution requirements which tend to leave labour market entrants with very short 
employment spells without substantial benefit claims. The same is true for self-employed in 
a number of countries and marginal part-time workers in Austria and Germany.  
Payment rates, as well as minimum and maximum benefits, also vary considerably, with a 
rather long maximum benefit duration but a relatively compressed distribution of benefits 
in countries such as Denmark and Belgium and mostly shorter, but more status-protecting, 
insurance benefits in France, Germany, Luxembourg or the Netherlands.  
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Table 4: Entitlement criteria, employment forms covered by unemployment insurance and benefit generosity of 
unemployment insurance, 2008  
Coverage of non-
standard work 
Payment rate (% of 
earnings base) 
 














(months)  initial 





% of AW* 
Maximum 
benefit 
% of AW* 




voluntary  9  55   
39 
Belgium  E+C: 468 days in  
27 months 
C  yes  no  Unlimited  60   50 (after one 
year) 
24  33 
Bulgaria  E: 9 months in 15 
months 
C  yes  no  12      19  39 
Cyprus 
(2007) 
    yes  no           
Czech 
Republic 
E+C: 12 months in 3 
years 
C  yes  yes  6  50  45 (after 3 
months) 
--  58 
Denmark  E: 52 weeks in 3 years, 
C: membership fee 
V  yes  voluntary  48  90  42  51 
Estonia  C: at least 12 months in 
the last 36 months 
V  yes  no  12    --  -- 
Finland  E: 43 weeks in 28 
months, C: 10 months. 
V  yes  voluntary  23  Basic benefit (17 % of AW*) 
plus up to 45 % of earnings 
exceeding basic benefit. 
--  None 
France  C: 6 months in 22 
months 
C  yes  no  23  57-75   30  240 
Germany  E: 12 months, C: 12 
months in 2 years 





15  60  --  94 
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Payment rate (% of 
earnings base) 
 














(months)  initial 





% of AW* 
Maximum 
benefit 




Greece  E+C: 125 days in 14 
months or 200 days in  
2 years 
C  yes  no  12  Basic benefit (19 % of 
AW*). 
11  21 
Hungary  E+C: 365 days in 
4 years. 
C  yes  yes  9  60  21  42 
Ireland  C: 39 weeks in 1 year 
(or 26 ‘reckonable’ 
contributions in 2 years). 
52 weeks’ contributions 
paid since starting work  
C  yes  no  15  Fixed amount (24 % of 
AW*). 
--  -- 
Italy  C: 52 weeks in 2 years  C  yes  no  7  50  40 (after six 
months) 
--  47 
Latvia  C: at least 12 months in 
the last 18 months 
C  yes  yes  9    30  38 
Lithuania  C: at least 18 months in 
the last 3 years 
C  yes  no  9     
33 
Luxembourg  E+C: 26 weeks in 1 year  C  yes  yes  12  80  --  90 
Malta  C: at least 50 weekly 
social security  
contributions, of which 
20 in benefit year 
C  yes  no  5.2    13  33 
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Payment rate (% of 
earnings base) 
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% of AW* 
Maximum 
benefit 
% of AW* 
Netherlands  E: 26 weeks in 36 weeks  C  yes  no  38  75   70 (after 2 
months) 
37  107 
Poland  E+C: 365 days in 18 
months and earnings > 
1/2 minimum wage 
C  yes  yes  12  Fixed amount (24 % of 
AW*) 
16  24 
Portugal  E+C: 450 days in 
2 years 
C  yes  no  30  65  30  91 
Romania  E: at least 12 months of 
the last 2 years,              
C: 6/9/12 months for 
those who contributed at 
least 1/5/10 years 
C  yes  voluntary  12    62  131 
Slovak 
Republic 
E+C: 3 years in 4 years  C  yes  voluntary  6  50  33  33 
Slovenia  E: at least 12 of the last 
18 months 
C  yes  voluntary  24    45  135 
Spain  E: None,                        
C: at least 360 days in 
the last 6 years 
C  yes  no  24  70  60 (after  
six months) 
31   
Sweden  C: 360 days in 6 years  C  yes  voluntary  14  80  70 (after 200 
days) 
24  50 
United 
Kingdom 
E: less than 16 hours a 
week 
C: 12 months in 2 years 
C  yes  no  6  Fixed amount (9 % of 
AW*). 
7  9 
Note: * AW = National Average Wage.  
Source: OECD. 
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Apart from the more or less inclusive character of unemployment insurance, the generosity 
of unemployment insurance benefits is a crucial feature in assessing its role as an 
automatic stabiliser. To evaluate this, the extent of income replacement and the maximum 
duration of benefit have to be taken into account. Table 4 also provides the formal 
replacement rates together with upper or lower limits as well as information on the 
maximum duration of unemployment insurance benefits.  
Taking into account the institutional framework, the OECD provides net replacement rates 
of unemployment insurance for selected household types and different earnings levels. 
These calculations refer to the initial phase of unemployment. They do not include basic 
income support schemes, i.e. social assistance and unemployment assistance, and related 
benefits such as housing allowances (see www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives).    
Figure 1 shows the net replacement rates of single people at three different earnings levels 
in 2008.  
 
Figure 1: Net replacement rates of unemployment insurance, single people at 














































































































































































































































Figure 2 extends the perspective to families, taking dual earner couples with two children 
as an example. Overall, there are large cross-country variations in the first tier of 









Figure 2: Net replacement rates of unemployment insurance, two earner couples 
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Special focus on short-time work schemes  
One element of unemployment insurance that has been of particular importance in most 
European countries during the current crisis is partial unemployment or short-time work 
allowance. Short-time work schemes can be classified as a specific element of automatic 
stabilisation embedded in a country’s labour market policy arrangement. They have been 
adopted in some, but not all, of the EU Member States. If the employer reduces work-hours 
and pay due to lack of demand, the unemployment insurance provides the employee a 
partial replacement of the earnings lost and – if the employer continues to face labour costs 
during this time – additional employer support.  
Table A5 in the annex gives an overview of core features of both existing short-time work 
schemes (some of which have been modified during the current crisis) as well as recently 
introduced schemes. Core elements of short-time work schemes are (i) sectoral coverage, 
(ii) work-sharing requirements, (iii) eligibility requirements (in particular proof of a difficult 
economic situation on the employer side and sufficient unemployment insurance 
contributions on the worker side), (iv) conditionality in terms of non-dismissals after short-
time work (e.g. in Austria, France and the Netherlands) or a requirement for workers to 
participate in training in order to access the programme (e.g. in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, the Netherlands and Portugal) or receive more generous subsidies (e.g. in 
Finland, Austria, Poland, Belgium and Germany) and (v) the generosity of the public 
support in terms of the amount and duration of public support per firm and worker. 
Discretionary action has temporarily increased these schemes in terms of generosity, scope 
or worker coverage (see Arpaia et al.; European Foundation; OECD, 2010b), e.g. by longer 
durations, a wider sectoral coverage or better access of non-standard workers; but still 
there are significant variations in the importance of short-time work schemes across EU 
Member States. In particular, non-standard workers still face difficulties in accessing to 
these schemes. 
Figure 3 shows the extent to which short-time work schemes were used during the most 
recent economic crisis. Generosity of the system and easiness of access can basically 
explain the strong variation across countries in interaction with the specific motivation of 
employers to rely on short-time work. But very generous and large systems may lack 
proper targeting and therefore risk being less cost-efficient. The annual average stock of 
short-time workers was more than 5 per cent of all employees in Belgium in 2009 and 
around 3 per cent in Italy, Germany and Luxembourg. Apart from Belgium’s heavy reliance 
on short-time work, which had already begun by 2007, all the countries experienced a 
marked increase from very low levels.  
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Figure 3: Annual average stock of employees participating in short-time work 





























































































































































Source: OECD, 2010b.  
 
Adoption of short-time work when counted per head or in full-time equivalents is not a 
straightforward indicator of effectiveness, as some of the jobs under short-time work 
scheme may not be viable in the medium-run due to a permanent loss in productivity, and 
some short-time workers would have been retained even in the absence of a public 
subsidy. In effect, strong subsidisation of short-time work may just reduce the 
attractiveness of other, mainly intra-firm measures to help stabilise the stock of employees. 
However, unemployment has increased less in countries with elaborate short-time work 
schemes than elsewhere.   
The OECD Employment Outlook 2010 (OECD, 2010b) provides one of the first assessments 
of the effectiveness of short-time work schemes. The OECD finds that short-time work 
schemes change the adaptation strategies of firms in a situation of crisis. Short-time work 
subsidies encourage a reduction of working time (and hourly wages) of permanent workers, 
but lowers the risk of permanent staff being dismissed. These schemes do not help 
temporary workers, as their risk of dismissal is not affected, i.e. short-time work schemes 
set incentives to keep their skilled core labour force but provide no benefits for workers on 
fixed-term contracts. OECD estimates suggest that these programmes have preserved 
more than 200,000 jobs in Germany and about 120,000 in Italy. In Belgium, for example, 
short-time work programmes saved 1.3 per cent of permanent employees from losing their 
jobs in the 2008-09 crisis. However, take-up was already significant before the crisis, and 
so this estimate must be seen as the upper limit of the actual effect. Short-time work 
stabilised between 0.2 and 0.8 per cent of permanent jobs in Spain, the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Italy and Finland. The OECD could not find effects of recently introduced new 
short-time work schemes. Setting up a new scheme takes more time, making the labour 
market impact hard to identify.  
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Figure 4: The contribution of short-time work schemes to the preservation of jobs 
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short-time work scheme
Absolute number of permanent
jobs saved (right-hand side)
 
Source: OECD, 2010b.  
In general, unemployment insurance benefits tend to be generous for those with a solid 
employment record and substantial earnings. However, unemployment insurance benefits 
may not be available for vulnerable groups who either do not meet the entitlement criteria 
or do not have substantial benefit claims but face a higher risk of unemployment due to a 
more difficult situation on the labour market before and during crises. This concerns 
particular groups such as (i) employees with fixed-term contracts and a short employment 
record, some of them labour market entrants, (ii) employees with low monthly earnings 
due to low hourly pay or part-time work, (iii) the self-employed. These groups tend to be 
a f f e c t e d  b y  u n e m p l o y m e n t  m o r e  t h a n  g r o u ps which are better integrated into the 
unemployment insurance system. But they may actually not have access to substantial 
insurance benefits in practice. Access to short-time work schemes, which provide an 
additional safeguard against unemployment, is also biased in favour of the core labour 
force, i.e. workers with specific skills and substantial tenure.  
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2.1.2.  Minimum income support  
Minimum income support is a second and basic safety net providing basic social benefits for 
those not eligible for unemployment insurance or additional benefits in cases when 
unemployment insurance benefits do not suffice to avoid poverty. In general, the receipt of 
minimum income support depends on household-related means testing. It is not time-
limited in European countries, but some age restrictions and availability criteria apply.  
The generosity of minimum income support is more complex to assess, as other means-
tested benefits can play a major role, in particular child-related and housing benefits (see 
appendix tables A2 for unemployment assistance and A3 for social assistance). A reliable 
measure of basic income support generosity can be calculated as a combination of different 
relevant benefits available to typical target groups, including housing and child allowances 
after longer unemployment.  
 
Figure 5: Net replacement rate after 5 years of unemployment, single people, 
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Figure 6: Net replacement rate after 5 years of unemployment, single people, 













































































































































































































































Minimum income support is of particular importance to individuals who cannot rely on more 
generous insurance benefits. However, severe problems in terms of poverty arise if 
minimum income support is not available or unsuitable in providing poverty relief.   
2.1.3.  Progressive taxation  
Apart from unemployment benefits, progressive taxes also contribute to automatic 
stabilisation, since lower income stemming from reduced earnings as a consequence of a 
reduction in wages or working-time are taxed less heavily than normal earnings. The 
income stabilisation coefficient TAU from Table A9, in the appendix, can be taken as an 
average measure of the progressiveness of the tax and contribution system referring to all 
income groups. Continental European and Scandinavian countries with well developed 
welfare states rank at the top, whereas Mediterranean and Central European countries 
show a less progressive element.  
 
44 




Table 5: Income stabilisation coefficients  
   
Denmark  0.558 
Belgium  0.527 
Germany  0.481 
Hungary  0.476 
Austria   0.439 
Sweden  0.420 
Netherlands  0.397 
Finland  0.396 
Luxembourg  0.374 
France  0.370 
Ireland  0.363 
United Kingdom  0.352 
Italy  0.346 
Slovenia  0.317 
Portugal  0.303 
Poland  0.301 
Greece  0.291 
Spain   0.277 
Estonia  0.253 
Source: see Table A9, in the appendix.  
2.1.4.  Automatic and discretionary stabilisation 
Automatic stabilisers in terms of social protection have the major advantage of providing 
income replacement immediately, i.e. when unemployment starts to rise, to those 
integrated into the benefit systems. While means-tested income support is generally 
available as a basic social security net in most EU Member States, unemployment insurance 
systems are more exclusive, as they do not equally protect each type of worker. The extent 
of unemployment risks and the ‘quality’ of social protection provided to different socio-
economic groups do not coincide, and in general, those most affected are the least 
protected. Hence, a dualised pattern of socia l  p r o t e c t i o n  a p p l i e s .  H o w e v e r ,  a n  o p t i m u m  
system of social protection should try to avoid this double disadvantage. 
A discretionary expansion of benefit generosity or easing access to benefits can play a 
substantial role in reaction to crises. However, discretionary changes to benefit systems or 
the creation of new benefits may take some time and may be more difficult to administer 
and deliver, in particular if new groups are to be integrated or new benefits created – or if 
fiscal restrictions are considered. 
During the current crisis, policy-makers have implemented a number of discretionary 
reforms to social protection systems as Table 6 shows. The first phase of discretionary anti-
crisis interventions was indeed characterised by a number of reforms strengthening the 
current unemployment insurance benefit system, in particular by easing access or 
improving benefit generosity for non-standard workers who had been made redundant. A 
number of countries have also expanded public measures encouraging working-time 
flexibility, in particular short-time work schemes, to prevent dismissals. This does not 
preclude, however, that subsequent reforms in a phase of austerity will lead to further 
dualisation in the sense that benefit cuts may address non-standard workers, i.e. workers 
with ‘atypical’ contracts, more than social security systems of the core workforce.  
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Furthermore, activation policies aimed at labour market (re)integration have so far, at 
least, been reinforced rather than reversed. In particular, most countries have emphasised 
job placement and publicly funded training within the framework of active labour market 
policies.  
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Table 6: Discretionary measures  



















































































































































































































































*  *  +  *  +
+ 
        *  *  *    *  *  *    +  +    *    +  +        16 
Improving job placement 
and investing in re-training 
*  *  +  +  +
+ 
  +  +  +  ++  *  *    *    +  *  +  *    *  *  +  *  +
+ 





      *  +
+ 
+    *  +    *                *  *      *  +  +  13 
Reinforcing activation  *  +
+ 
*  *  *    +
+ 
*  +  *  *      +
+ 
*    *    *  *      *  ++  +  +    19 
Supporting employment by 
cutting labour costs 
+  +    +
+ 
+    +    +  +      *  *  *  *    ++  *    *  +  *  *  +  ++  +  20 
Revising EPL in line with 
flexicurity 
  *        *            *    *                            4 
Enhancing education and 
life-long learning 
  *    *  *                  *          *    *          *    7 




*    *  +
+ 
    +  *  *  *    +
+ 
  *    *    +  *  +  *    *  *  *  ++  8 
Mitigating the impact of 
financial crisis on individuals 
  *  *      *  *    +
+ 
*  *  *    *  *  +      *    *        *    *  15 
Others  *    *  *            *      *  *          *      ++      *  *    11 
++ highly significant measures taken, + somewhat significant measures taken, *measures taken, EU-27 column: number of countries which implemented the corresponding measure. 
Source: European Commission, 2009a; OECD, 2010b. 
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2.2.  Quantitative impact: Automatic stabilisers and discretionary 
measures  
KEY FINDINGS 
  The tax and transfer system determines the way in which a given unemployment 
or income shock to gross income translates into a change in households’ 
disposable income. The impact of automatic stabilisation on individuals and the 
economy can be simulated based on a model incorporating individual data 
available for most EU Member States and the US. It incorporates unemployment 
benefits, social insurance contributions and progressive income taxes.   
  Due to the more progressive tax system and the more elaborated welfare state, 
the extent of automatic stabilisation in the EU is significantly larger than in the US. 
While the tax system stabilises disposable income most after an income shock, 
automatic stabilisation through unemployment benefits is most important when 
unemployment rises. 
  There are marked differences in the extent of automatic stabilisation across EU 
Member States. In the case of an income shock, stabilisation is strongest in 
Denmark, where automatic stabilisers cushion 56 per cent of the shock. Belgium, 
Germany and Hungary also have strong automatic stabilisers. The lowest values 
are found for Estonia, Spain and Greece. Regarding an unemployment shock, the 
stabilisation effect is largest in Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, reaching about 60 per cent and more. Scandinavian and Continental 
European countries have significantly larger mechanisms of automatic stabilisation 
than Southern and Central European countries.  
  When the crisis spread across the continent, European governments responded 
with discretionary policy to a varying extent, reaching about 1.3 per cent on 
average, but making up to more than 2 per cent of GDP in Finland, Spain, the 
Czech Republic and Sweden. Social policy played an important role in almost every 
national stimulus package and, on average, represented about two thirds of 
discretionary measures. 
  Macroeconomic simulations show that, with a certain time lag, discretionary social 
policy action has a stabilising effect on GDP, basically mirroring the size of the 
stimulus. Discretionary social policy measures implemented in response to the 
crisis accounted for 1.07 per cent of GDP in 2008 for the years 2009 and 2010. 
The cumulated multiplier for these discretionary expenditures amounts to 0.85. 
Every euro directed to discretionary social policy measures in the wake crisis 
resulted in an additional 85 cents GDP. Countries which implemented significant 
measures have grown faster. Since GDP benefits are distributed unequally, the 
cumulated multiplier is smaller in major European economies and larger for small 
countries. A coordinated policy in the European Union has a larger effect than 
single Member State action.  
  Benefits from a discretionary social stance are equally observable on labour 
markets. Employment rises significantly and unemployment declines. According to 
our estimations, the social policy stimulus packages in 20 EU Member States 
created 330,000 new jobs at the peak of their effect. The decline in unemployment 
is slightly lower. The discretionary measures’ expansionary effects have spared 
300,000 people from unemployment. A coordinated European social policy 
approach clearly makes a difference for national labour markets. 
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2.2.1. Automatic  stabilisation 
Throughout Europe, the current economic and financial crisis has had a severe impact on 
incomes and employment. While the magnitude of the shocks is usually measured at the 
macro level, the resulting welfare effects depend not only on the total size of losses but 
also on their distribution across different groups of society and the cushioning effect of the 
tax benefit system. This chapter investigates to what extent the tax and transfer systems in 
Europe (and the US) protect households at different income levels and in different 
European countries against income losses and unemployment. In particular, we analyse the 
role of automatic stabilisers, which are widely seen to play a key role in stabilising demand 
and output. 
Automatic stabilisers are usually defined as those elements of fiscal policy which mitigate 
output fluctuations without discretionary government action (see, e.g., Eaton, J. and Rosen, 
H.S.). Despite the importance of automatic stabilisers for stabilising the economy, ‘very 
little work has been done on automatic stabilisation [...] in the last 20 years’ (Blanchard, 
O.). However, in the current crisis, it is especially important to assess the contribution of 
automatic stabilisers to overall fiscal expansion and to compare their magnitude across 
countries. Previous research on automatic stabilisation has mainly relied on macro data. 
However, these approaches raise several issues, in particular the challenge of separating 
discretionary actions from automatic stabilisers in combination with identification problems 
resulting from endogenous regressors. Exceptions based on micro data are Auerbach, A. 
and Feenberg, D. for the US and Mabbett, D. and Schelkle, W. for the EU-15. More 
comparative work based on micro data has been conducted on the differences in the tax 
wedge and effective marginal tax rates between the US and European countries (see, e.g., 
Piketty, T. and Saez, E.; European Commission, 2010a). The workings of automatic 
stabilisers in an economic crisis have also been discussed in a recent report by the 
European Commission (European Commission, 2010b), which refers to the results by Dolls, 
M. et al, which are the basis of this chapter. 
In this chapter, we combine these two strands of the literature to compare the magnitude 
and composition of automatic stabilisation between the US and Europe based on micro data 
estimates. We analyse the impact of automatic stabilisers using microsimulation models for 
19 European countries (EUROMOD) and the US (TAXSIM). The microsimulation approach 
allows us to investigate the causal effects of different types of shocks on household 
disposable income, holding everything else constant and therefore avoiding endogeneity 
problems (see Bourguignon, F. and Spadaro, A.). We can hence single out the role of 
automatic stabilisation, which is not possible in an ex-post evaluation (or with macro data), 
as it is not possible to disentangle the effects of automatic stabilisers, active fiscal and 
monetary policy and behavioural responses, such as changes in labour supply or disability 
benefit take-up. 
We run two controlled experiments of macro shocks to income and employment. The first is 
a proportional decline in household gross income by 5 per cent (income shock). This is the 
usual way of modelling shocks in simulation studies analysing automatic stabilisers. 
However, economic downturns typically affect households asymmetrically, with some 
households losing their jobs and suffering a sharp decline in income and other households 
being much less affected, as wages are usually rigid in the short-term. We therefore 
consider a second macro shock where some households become unemployed, so that the 
unemployment rate increases such that total household income decreases by 5 per cent 
(unemployment shock). We show that these two types of shocks and the resulting 
stabilisation coefficients can be interpreted as an average effective marginal tax rate 
(EMTR) for the whole tax benefit system at the intensive (proportional income shock) or 
extensive (unemployment shock) margin.  
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As our measure of automatic stabilisation, we extend the normalised tax change (Auerbach, 
A. and Feenberg, D.) to include other taxes as well as social contributions and benefits. Our 
income stabilisation coefficient relates the shock absorption of the whole tax and transfer 
system to the overall size of the income shock. We take into account personal income taxes 
at all government levels, social insurance contributions and payroll taxes as well as 
transfers to private households such as unemployment benefits.
12 Computations are 
conducted according to the tax benefit rules which were in force before 2008, in order to 
avoid an endogeneity problem resulting from policy responses after the start of the crisis. 
Furthermore, we identify how much weight current pre-crisis tax benefit systems put on 
different income groups to protect them from income losses. In the next step, we compare 
the effects across countries in order to evaluate the cushioning effect of different welfare 




The extent to which automatic stabilisers mitigate the impact of income shocks on 
household demand essentially depends on two factors. Firstly, the tax and transfer system 
determines the way in which a given shock to gross income translates into a change in 
disposable income. For instance, in the presence of a proportional income tax with a tax 
rate of 40 per cent, a shock on gross income of EUR 100 leads to a decline in disposable 
income of EUR 60. In this case, the tax absorbs 40 per cent of the shock to gross income. A 
progressive tax, in turn, would have a stronger stabilising effect. The second factor is the 
link between current disposable income and current demand for goods and services. If the 
income shock is perceived as transitory and current demand depends on some concept of 
permanent income, and if households can borrow or use accumulated savings, their 
demand will not change. In this case, the impact of automatic stabilisers on current 
demand would be equal to zero. Things are different, however, if households are liquidity 
constrained. In this scenario, their current expenditures do depend on disposable income, 
so that automatic stabilisers play a role. In this chapter, however, we will concentrate on 
the first factor: the stabilisation of disposable income after shocks on gross income. More 
information on the measurement of automatic stabilisation is provided in the Appendix (see 
pages 162-167). 
 
Microsimulation using TAXSIM and EUROMOD 
We use microsimulation techniques to simulate taxes, benefits and disposable income 
under different scenarios for a representative micro-data sample of households. Simulation 
analysis allows us to conduct a controlled experiment by changing the parameters of 
interest while holding everything else constant (cf. Bourguignon, F. and Spadaro, A.). We, 
therefore, do not have to deal with endogeneity problems when identifying the effects of 
the policy reform under consideration. 
Simulations are carried out using TAXSIM - the NBER’s microsimulation model for 
calculating liabilities under US Federal and State income tax laws from individual data - and 




12 We abstract from other taxes, in particular corporate income taxes. For an analysis of automatic stabilisers in 
the corporate tax system, see Devereux, M.P. and Fuest, C.; and Buettner, T. and Fuest, C. 
13 For more information on TAXSIM see Feenberg, D.R. and Coutts, E. or visit http://www.nber.org/taxsim/. For 
further information on EUROMOD see Sutherland, H., 2001a, 2007. There are also country reports available with 
detailed information on the input data, the modelling and validation of each tax benefit system, see 
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod. The tax-benefit systems included in the model have been 
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The models can simulate most direct taxes and benefits, apart from those based on 
previous contributions, as this information is usually not available from the cross-sectional 
survey data used as input datasets. Information on these instruments is taken directly from 
the original data sources. Both models assume full benefit take-up and tax compliance, 
focusing on the intended effects of tax-benefit systems. The main stages of the simulations 
are the following. First, a micro-data sample and tax-benefit rules are read into the model. 
Then for each tax and benefit instrument, the model constructs corresponding assessment 
units, ascertains which are eligible for that instrument and determines the amount of 
benefit or tax liability for each member of the unit. Finally, after all taxes and benefits in 
question are simulated, disposable income is calculated. 
 
Scenarios 
The existing literature on stabilisation so far has concentrated on increases in earnings or 
gross incomes to examine the stabilising impact of tax benefit systems. In light of the 
current economic crisis, there is much more interest in a downturn scenario. Reinhart, C. 
and Rogoff, K., 2009, stress that recessions following a financial crisis have particularly 
severe effects on asset prices, output and unemployment. Therefore, we are interested not 
only in a scenario of a uniform decrease in incomes but also in an increase of the 
unemployment rate. We compare a scenario where gross incomes are proportionally 
decreased by 5 per cent for all households (income shock) to a scenario where some 
households are made unemployed and therefore lose all their labour earnings 
(unemployment shock). In the latter scenario, the unemployment rate increases such that 
total household income decreases by 5 per cent as well in order to make both scenarios as 
comparable as possible.
14 
The increase of the unemployment rate is modelled through re-weighting of our samples.
15 
The weights of the unemployed are increased while those of the employed with similar 
characteristics are decreased, i.e., in effect, a fraction of employed households is made 
unemployed. With this re-weighting approach, we control for several individual and 
household characteristics that determine the risk of becoming unemployed. The implicit 






validated against aggregated administrative statistics as well as national tax-benefit models (where available), and 
the robustness checked through numerous applications (see, e.g., Bargain, O.). 
14 Our scenarios can be seen as a conservative estimate of the expected impact of the current crisis (see Reinhart, 
C. and Rogoff, K., 2009 for effects of previous crises). The (qualitative) results are robust with respect to different 
sizes of the shocks. The results for the unemployment shock do not change much when we model it as an increase 
of the unemployment rate by 5 percentage points for each country. It would be further possible to derive more 
complicated scenarios with different shocks on different income sources or a combination of income and 
unemployment shock. However, this would only have an impact on the distribution of changes which are not 
relevant in the analysis of this chapter. Therefore, we focus on these two simple scenarios in order to make our 
analysis as simple as possible. One should note, though, that our analysis is not a forecasting exercise. We do not 
aim at quantifying the exact effects of the current economic crisis but of stylised scenarios in order to explore the 
built-in automatic stabilisers of existing pre-crisis tax-benefit systems. Conducting an ex-post analysis would 
include discretionary government reactions and behavioural responses (see, e.g., Aaberge, R. et al. for an 
empirical ex-post analysis of a previous crisis in the Nordic countries) and we would not be able to identify the role 
of automatic stabilisation. 
15 For the re-weighting procedure, we follow the approach of Immervoll, H. et al., 2006, who have also simulated 
an increase in unemployment through re-weighting of the sample. Their analysis focuses on changes in absolute 
and relative poverty rates after changes in the income distribution and the employment rate. 
16 Cf. Deville, J.C. and Särndal, C.-E., and DiNardo, J. et al. This approach is equivalent to estimating probabilities 
of becoming unemployed (see, e.g., Bell, D.N.F. and Blanchflower, D.G.) and then selecting the individuals with 
the highest probabilities when controlling for the same characteristics in the re-weighting estimation (see Herault, 
N.). 
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US vs. Europe 
We start our analysis by comparing the US to Europe. Our simulation model includes 19 
European countries which we treat as one single country (i.e. the ‘United States of 
Europe’). All of them are EU Member States, which is why we refer to this group as the EU, 
bearing in mind that some EU Member States are missing. We also consider the countries 
of the euro area and refer to this group as ‘EURO’. Figure 6 summarises the results of our 
baseline simulation, which focuses on the income tax, social insurance contributions (or 
payroll taxes) paid by employees and benefits. Consider first the income shock. 
Approximately 38 per cent of such a shock would be absorbed by automatic stabilisers in 
the EU (and the euro zone). For the US, we find a slightly lower value of 32 per cent. This 
difference of just six percentage points is surprising in so far as automatic stabilisers in 
Europe are usually considered to be drastically higher than in the US.
17 Our results qualify 
this view to a certain degree, at least as far as proportional income shocks are concerned. 
Figure 7 shows that taxes and social insurance contributions are the dominating factors 
which drive in case of a uniform income shock. Benefits are of minor importance in this 
scenario. 
 
Figure 7: Decomposition of stabilisation coefficient for both scenarios – US vs EU 
 
 
In the case of the unemployment shock, the difference between the EU and the US is 
larger. EU automatic stabilisers now absorb 47 per cent of the shock (49 per cent in the 
euro zone), whereas the stabilisation effect in the US is only 34 per cent. This difference 
can be explained with the importance of unemployment benefits, which account for a large 
part of stabilisation in Europe in this scenario. Table A8 in the appendix shows that benefits 
alone absorb 19 per cent of the shock in Europe compared to just 7 per cent in the US. 
                                                 
17 Note that for the US, the value of the stabilisation coefficient for federal income taxes only is below 25 per cent, 
which is in line with the results of Auerbach, A. and Feenberg, D.). 
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The results for the stabilisation coefficient vary considerably across countries, as can be 
seen from Figure 8 (and Tables A7 and A8 in the appendix).  
In the case of the income shock, we find the highest stabilisation coefficient for Denmark, 
where automatic stabilisers cushion 56 per cent of the shock. Belgium (53 per cent), 
Germany (48) and, surprisingly, Hungary (48) also have strong automatic stabilisers. The 
lowest values are found for Estonia (25 per cent), Spain (28) and Greece (29). With the 
exception of France, taxes seem to have a stronger stabilising role than social security 
contributions. In France, social security contributions are progressive and therefore have an 
important role for disposable income stabilisation. 
 
Figure 8: Decomposition of income stabilisation coefficient for both scenarios – 
country ranking 
 
In the case of the unemployment shock, the stabilisation coefficients are larger for the 
majority of countries. Again, the highest value emerges for Denmark (82 per cent), 
followed by Sweden (68), Germany (62) Belgium (61) and Luxembourg (59). The relatively 
low value of stabilisation from (unemployment) benefits in Finland compared to its 
neighbouring Nordic countries might be surprising at a first glance but can be explained 
with the fact that Finland has the least generous unemployment benefits of the Nordic 
countries (see Aaberge et al., 2000). Hungary (47 per cent) is now at the EU average due 
to the relatively low level of unemployment benefits which are important for disposable 
income stabilisation in case of an unemployment shock. At the other end of the spectrum, 
there are some countries with values below the US level of 34 per cent. These include 
Estonia (23 per cent), Italy (31), and, to a lesser extent, Poland (33). 
With regards to personal income tax, it is surprising that the values for the US (federal and 
state level income tax combined) are higher than the EU average. To some extent, this 
qualifies the widespread view that tax progressivity is higher in Europe (e.g., Alesina, A. 
and Glaeser, E.L. or Piketty, T. and Saez, E.).  
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Of course, this can be partly explained by the considerable heterogeneity within Europe. 
But still, only a few countries like Belgium, Germany and the Nordic countries have higher 
contributions of stabilisation originating from the personal income tax. 
 
Stabilisation of different income groups 
Table A9 shows that in the case of the proportional income shock, the stabilisation 
coefficients are an increasing function of the income quantiles. This result is due to higher 
changes between market and disposable income for high income groups. It is worth 
mentioning that even a proportional tax would yield increasing coefficients for higher 
quantiles, i.e. progressivity of the income tax is not required for this result.  
In contrast to the increasing stabilisation by income quantile for the income shock, 
stabilisation results for the unemployment shock follow a somewhat different pattern as 
demonstrated in Table A10. Here, with the exception of some Eastern and Southern 
European countries, we also find high stabilisation for the lowest income groups. As the 
unemployment shock is modelled through re-weighting of our sample, taking into account 
individual characteristics of the unemployed, a large part of the newly unemployed comes 
from lower income quantiles. The fact that tax and transfer systems in countries such as 
Estonia, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia or Spain provide only weak stabilisation 
for low income groups can be explained by rather low unemployment benefits in these 
countries.  
Automatic stabilisers and openness of the economy 
It is a striking feature of our results that automatic stabilisers differ significantly within 
Europe. In particular, automatic stabilisers in Eastern and Southern European countries are 
much weaker than in the rest of Europe. One factor contributing to this is that government 
size is often positively correlated with per capita incomes, at least in Europe. The 
stabilisation of disposable incomes will therefore be higher in high income countries, just as 
a side effect of a larger public sector. 
But differences in automatic stabilisers across countries may also have other reasons. In 
particular, the effectiveness of demand stabilisation as a way of stabilising domestic output 
is smaller, the more open the economy. In very open economies, domestic output will 
depend heavily on export demand and higher demand by domestic households will partly 
lead to higher imports. Clearly, openness of the economy has a number of other 
implications for the tax and transfer system, including the view that more open economies 
need more insurance against shocks as argued, e.g., by Rodrik, D. Figure 8 depicts the 
relationship between income stabilisation coefficients and openness as measured by the 
ratio of exports plus imports over GDP. As Figure 8 shows, it is not the case that more open 
economies have weaker automatic stabilisers, the correlation is even positive (0.57). Our 
results thus support the hypothesis of Rodrik, D.: that income stabilisation is higher in 













Figure 9: Income stabilisation coefficient and openness of the economy 
 
Cluster analysis 
In order to compare the clustering of countries with respect to the different measures of 
automatic stabilisation and controlling for several variables, we conduct a hierarchical 
cluster analysis to group countries that have similar characteristics across a set of 
variables. When performing a cluster analysis, a number of technical decisions have to be 
made. First, all variables have been standardised from 0 to 1 using z-scores, to prevent the 
results being driven by large absolute values of some variables. Our method of grouping 
the countries is the common Ward's linkage, which combines such clusters which minimally 
increase the squared sum of errors. Our results will be illustrated in a ‘dendrogram’, which 
graphically presents the information concerning which observations are grouped together at 
various levels of (dis)similarity. At the bottom of the dendrogram, each observation is 
considered as its own cluster. Vertical lines extend up for each observation. At various 
(dis)similarity values these lines are connected to the lines from other observations with a 
horizontal line. The observations continue to combine until, at the top of the dendrogram, 
all observations are grouped together. The height of the vertical lines and the range of the 
(dis)similarity axis give visual clues about the strength of the clustering. In our case, the 
measure for the distance between cases is the common ‘squared Euclidean’. Generally, long 
vertical lines indicate more distinct separation between groups, short lines more similarity, 
respectively.
18  
We perform a cluster analysis on the basis of the stabilisation coefficients for the income 
and unemployment shock combined with inequality in market income and the ratio of direct 
to indirect taxes. The dendogram is shown in Figure 10. In accordance with the classical 
typology of welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, G., and Ferrera, M.), the dendogram 
groups Continental and Nordic countries to the left and Anglo-Saxon, Southern and Eastern 
European countries to the right. The US, not included in the figure, clearly also belongs to 
the Anglo-Saxon countries.  
                                                 
18Note that the general clustering results presented here are robust to different linkage or dissimilarity measure 
specifications. We report the results for the most common combination found in the literature. 
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The former group is characterised by a rather high level of income stabilisation, modest 
inequality in market income and an important role of direct taxes and SIC, whereas 
countries from the latter group tend to rank at the other end of the spectrum. 
 
Figure 10: Cluster analysis 
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have used the microsimulation models for the tax and transfer systems 
of 19 European countries (EUROMOD) and the US (TAXSIM) to investigate the extent to 
which automatic stabilisers cushion household disposable income in the event of 
macroeconomic shocks. Our simulations focus on the personal income tax, employee social 
insurance contributions and benefits. We find that the amount of automatic stabilisation 
depends strongly on the type of income shock. In the case of a proportional income shock, 
approximately 38 per cent of the shock would be absorbed by automatic stabilisers in the 
EU. For the US, we find a value of 32 per cent. Within the EU, there is considerable 
heterogeneity, and results range from a value of 25 per cent for Estonia to 56 per cent for 
Denmark. In general, automatic stabilisers in Eastern and Southern European countries are 
considerably lower than in Continental and Northern European countries. 
In the case of an unemployment shock, which affects households asymmetrically, the 
difference between the EU and the US is larger. EU automatic stabilisers absorb 47 per cent 
of the shock, whereas the stabilisation effect in the US is only 34 per cent. Again, there is 
considerable heterogeneity within the EU. 
These results suggest that social transfers, in particular the rather generous systems of 
unemployment insurance in Europe, play a key role in the stabilisation of disposable 
incomes and explain a large part of the difference in automatic stabilisers between Europe 
and the US. This is confirmed by the decomposition of stabilisation effects in our analysis. 
In the case of the unemployment shocks, benefits alone absorb 19 per cent of the shock in 
Europe compared to just 7 per cent in the US, whereas the stabilising effect of income 
taxes (taking into account state taxes in the US as well) is similar.  
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To some extent, this qualifies the view that automatic stabilisers are larger in Europe than 
in the US. This is only true for countries like Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany or 
Sweden because taxes and social security contributions are higher in these countries. 
An important result of our analysis is that automatic stabilisers are very heterogeneous 
within Europe. Interestingly, Eastern and Southern European countries are characterised by 
rather low automatic stabilisers. This is surprising, at least from an insurance point of view, 
because lower average income (and wealth) implies that households are more vulnerable to 
income shocks. One explanation for this finding could be that countries with lower per 
capita incomes tend to have smaller public sectors. From this perspective, weaker 
automatic stabilisers in Eastern and Southern European countries are a potentially 
unintended side effect of the lower demand for government activity including redistribution. 
Another potential explanation, the idea that more open economies have weaker automatic 
stabilisers because domestic demand spills over to other countries, seems to be 
inconsistent with the data, at least as far as the simple correlation between stabilisation 
coefficients and trade to GDP ratios is concerned. 
2.2.2.  The role of discretionary measures  
This chapter discusses the impact of discretionary social policy measures on 
macroeconomic development. In a first step we present an overview of the fiscal stimuli of 
all EU-27 countries. Some countries, which have been particularly active in the field of 
social policy, will be discussed in more detail. In a second step, we simulate the 
macroeconomic impact of the stimulus packages and present the results. The focus hereby 
lies on changes in GDP, employment and private consumption as well as on the effect of 
coordinated pan-European measures compared to single country discretionary policy. We 
find that social policy plays an important role in stabilising the economy. Additionally, 
coordinated policy is more effective in terms of the multiplier for almost all countries. 
 
Overview of social policy measures in Europe 
European politics responded quickly to the economic crisis which unfolded after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers in August 2008 by implementing stimulus packages to stabilise the 
economy. In February 2009, the stimulus programmes were already designed and agreed 
on by national governments (Saha, D. and von Weizsäcker, J.: 1ff). Only two countries, 
Spain and the United Kingdom, had employed stabilising measures as early as 2008. Both 
countries had had substantial problems in their housing sectors, where the crisis originated 
in its early stages. When the crisis spread across the continent, European governments 
responded with discretionary policy; social policy played an important role in (almost) every 
national stimulus package. Many Member States directed large fractions of overall stimulus 
measures to discretionary social policy (European Commission, 2010: 47; see Table 7 
below).  
Table 7 presents a summary of the size of discretionary social policy packages implemented 
in the 27 member countries of the European Union during 2009 and 2010. The table is split 
into two parts: since sound quantitative figures have been available for only 16 countries, 
these countries constitute the upper part of the table. For these countries, the policy efforts 
for 2009 and 2010 are presented both in absolute numbers and in per cent of the 2008 
GDP. In addition, they are decomposed in revenue and expenditure measures. For the 
other 11 countries, we used information obtained from the European Commission 
(European Commission, 2009a).  
 
 




Table 7: Aggregate discretionary social policy in the European Union for 2009 and 
2010 
 
 in billion 
euros 




measures in % 
of 2008 GDP 
expenditure 





Belgium  5.29  1.53  1.03  0.50  0.96 
Germany  39.07  1.57  1.24  0.33  0.53 
Greece  1.04  0.43  0.00  0.43  0.69 
Spain  26.42  2.43  1.66  0.77  0.68 
France  5.50  0.28  0.13  0.15  0.43 
Italy  3.31  0.21  0.00  0.21  0.65 
Netherlands  7.34  1.23  1.12  0.11  0.80 
Austria  4.54  1.61  1.35  0.26  0.90 
Portugal  1.02  0.61  0.00  0.61  0.77 
Slovak 
Republic  0.71  1.10  0.61  0.49  0.95 
Finland  4.93  2.68  2.39  0.29  0.84 
Euro zone  99.18  1.07       
Czech 
Republic  2.98  2.14  2.01  0.14  0.66 
Denmark  3.98  1.71  0.68  1.02  0.67 
Sweden  7.35  2.47  1.73  0.74  0.88 
United 
Kingdom   12.34  0.76  0.59  0.17  0.45 
Poland  1.18  0.40  0.31  0.09  0.22 
unweighted average 16 
countries  1.32  0.93  0.40  0.69 
unweighted average 11 euro 
countries  1.24  0.87  0.38  0.75 
   
labour market  purchasing power 
of households   
Estonia      0.50  0.00   
Ireland      0.20  0.80   
Latvia      0.00  0.60   
Malta      0.00  0.40   
Romania      0.00  0.10   
Slovenia      0.80  0.00   
Bulgaria      0.00  0.00   
Cyprus      0.00  0.00   
Lithuania      0.00  0.00   
Luxembourg      n.a.  n.a.   
Hungary      0.00  0.00   
Source: OECD, 2009d, European Commission, 2009a. 
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According to this document, four countries, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary and Lithuania, 
completely refrained from implementing discretionary social policy measures during the 
crisis. Figures for Luxembourg were not available. Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Romania 
and Slovenia implemented expansionary policies. Policies have been subsumed under either 
labour market or purchasing power of household measures. The range for both is between 
0.1 and 0.8 per cent of GDP for 2009 and 2010. The European Commission reports 
significant labour market policies for Estonia and Slovenia. Considerable purchasing power 
measures have been implemented by Ireland, Latvia and Malta (European Commission, 
2009a: 21).
19 
In the euro area as a whole, the total stimulus for discretionary social policy measures 
amounts to roughly EUR 100 billion which is equivalent to 1.07 per cent of GDP in 2008. 
Large contributions in absolute terms come from Germany (EUR 39 billion = 1.57 per cent 
of GDP) and Spain
20 (EUR 26.4 billion = 2.43 per cent of GDP). Relative to domestic output 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain opted for a strong 
social policy response to the crisis. The corresponding numbers are 1.61 per cent of GDP 
for Austria, 1.53 for Belgium, 2.68 for Finland, 1.23 for the Netherlands and 1.1 for 
Slovakia. These countries clearly reveal a preference for policy measures on the revenue 
side. Tax cuts for low income groups and families, as well as cuts in social security 
contributions, generally account for a large share of overall social policy stimulus packages. 
Among the euro countries with large policy impulses, only Belgium, Slovakia and Spain 
were significantly active on the expenditure side, with measures of about 0.5 per cent of 
GDP. 
The remaining countries of the euro area did not implement large-scale discretionary 
policies (Saha, D. and von Weizsäcker, J.; OECD, 2009a). Measures in France amounted to 
0.28 per cent of GDP, equally distributed on the revenue and the expenditure side. The 
three Mediterranean countries, Italy, Greece and Portugal show a common pattern. Policies 
on the expenditure side, consisting of transfers towards various groups which were affected 
by the crisis, account for the whole social policy stimulus. 
Outside the euro area Sweden and Denmark, two countries with a long and strong welfare 
state tradition, but also the Czech Republic, implemented significant packages, close to or 
even above 2 per cent of GDP. The Czech government has focused on the revenue side; 
Denmark and Sweden, on the other hand, have exhibited a preference for direct social 
policy through expenditure measures (as opposed to indirect revenue measures). The 
corresponding figures are 1.02 per cent of GDP for Denmark and 0.74 for Sweden, which 
mark the upper bound of the sample. The measures in the United Kingdom amounted to 
0.76 per cent of GDP, which equals roughly GBP 11 billion, and ranks third in absolute 
numbers. Poland’s discretionary social policies amounted to 0.4 per cent of GDP, with a 
clear focus on the revenue side, just as in the case of the United Kingdom. 
 
19 The EC document also lists specific social policies, but they are not quantified, hence the vague description. 
Furthermore documents on the stimulus packages in the European Union (OECD, 2009a, European Commission 
2009a, Saha, D. and von Weizsäcker, J.) are not consistent on various occasions. The most detailed report on this 
subject is from the OECD (cf. OECD, 2009a), which therefore forms the basis of the simulations carried out later in 
this chapter. 
20 Since Spain and also the United Kingdom have been severely affected by a sharp decline in housing markets 
from the early stages of the crisis on, these two countries implemented discretionary social policy measures 
already in 2008, which are included here.  
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For the 16 countries in the European Union with available data, the unweighted average of 
total social stimulus measures in 2009 and 2010 is 1.32 per cent of GDP. As previously 
mentioned, the focus is on revenue measures, which on average amount to 0.93 per cent 
of GDP. Discretionary social policies on the expenditure side, on the other hand, only 
amount to roughly only 0.4 per cent of GDP. For the whole sample, the unweighted share 
of social policy measures in total stimulus efforts is 69 per cent. 
For the 11 countries in the euro area, the respective values are 1.24 per cent regarding 
total measures, whereby 0.87 per cent is directed to revenue measures and 0.38 to 
expenditure measures. The social policy share of total stimulus efforts is slightly higher at 
75 per cent.  
According to the classification of different types of welfare states, the following 
observations can be made. The Scandinavians have implemented the largest social policy 
packages and, with the exception of Finland, they have also put considerable weight on the 
expenditure side. Discretionary social policy in the Continental European welfare states 
exhibits a larger focus on revenue measures and is not as substantial relative to GDP as in 
Scandinavia. It is striking, however, that France implemented only very moderate 
measures. In the Anglo-Saxon welfare states the social policy stance was in comparison 
much less expansionary. The share of social policy measures in total stimulus efforts in the 
UK is small. Ireland completely refrained from a social policy stimulus. In the 
Mediterranean countries discretionary policies have been small and based exclusively on 
the expenditure side. The exception is Spain, where a broad and substantial social policy 
stimulus package was implemented. For the countries which became EU Member States in 
2004 (EU-10), it is notable that the majority of them refrained from implementing 
discretionary social policies. In Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, where policy held 
an expansionary stance, measures vary considerably.
21 
Selected country examples 
The following paragraphs highlight the composition of social policy in those countries which 
have been particularly active in this field.  
In absolute terms the biggest social policy impulse comes from Germany. The two stimulus 
packages address the needs of vulnerable groups both by measures on the revenue and on 
the expenditure side. On the revenue side direct taxes are cut by increasing the basic tax-
free allowance and lowering the entry tax rate by one percentage point. This measure 
amounts to EUR 8.9 billion for 2009 and 2010 and supports low income groups. 
Furthermore, the contributions to the social security systems have been significantly 
reduced, by EUR 17.5 billion for the same period (OECD, 2009a: 18). 
On the expenditure side there are higher permanent and temporary transfers, as well as 
increased government consumption through active labour market policy measures. 
Temporary transfers consist of subsidies for social security contributions for firms 
participating in the short-time working scheme and one-off payments for households with 
children. In combination with permanently higher child benefits and higher tax-free child 
allowances these measures amount to EUR 5.3 billion in 2009 and EUR 3.6 billion in 2010.  
Higher government consumption due to increased resources for the public employment is 
dedicated to activate and train the (newly) unemployed. This adds another EUR 3.5 billion 
to the German social policy stimulus, which amounts to roughly EUR 39 billion in total, 
equal to 1.57 per cent of the 2008 GDP and accounts for 53 per cent of Germany’s total 
stimulus. 
 
21 For Slovenia no detailed information was available. 
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As mentioned before, Spain had already passed a stimulus bill earlier than most European 
countries. The bursting of the housing bubble had severely affected the country since 
summer 2007. Hence, direct tax cuts have accounted for an EUR 18 billion impulse from 
2008 till 2010. The bulk of the measures consist of an increased tax credit targeted at low 
income households (OECD 2009a: 34). Household and business transfers totalling to EUR 
5.2 billion for the same period, with 2.8 billion effective in 2008 and 1.2 billion in the 
following two years. Business transfers include liquidity support and wage subsidies.  
Direct government consumption is aimed at increasing public sector wages and enhancing 
public employment services. These measures constitute a further impact of EUR 3 billion, 
so that total Spanish measures amount to roughly EUR 26 billion, equal to 2.43 per cent of 
GDP and 68 per cent of Spain’s total stimulus. 
A country which has been particularly active in the realm of social policy is Sweden. Public 
employment has been increased, in 2009 and 2010, by channelling resources into the 
education sector, specific authorities as well as into public employment services. These 
measures amount to 21 billion Swedish Krona (equivalent to EUR 2 billion)
22. Further 
expenditure via transfers amounting to SKK 2.5 billion (EUR 0.23 billion) have been 
directed to the unemployed, retirees and students. Expenditure measures thus amount to 
0.74 per cent of GDP. 
Direct taxes and social security contributions have been reduced in various ways. A SKK 30 
billion tax credit (EUR 2.8 billion) has been targeted at low income groups; business taxes 
and social security contributions have been decreased by SKK 12 billion (EUR 1.1 billion); 
and other direct tax cuts, for example for pensioners, amount to roughly SKK 15 billion 
(EUR 1.4 billion). Total measures account for SKK 78 billion (EUR 7.3 billion), roughly 
equivalent to 2.5 per cent of the 2008 GDP and to 88 per cent of Sweden’s total 
discretionary policies (OECD, 2009a: 35). 
Denmark’s discretionary measures rank highest relative to GDP among all members of the 
European Union. The Danish government has placed emphasis on the expenditure side, 
with increased spending aimed at public employment. This measure amounts to DKK 15.6 
billion (EUR 2.1 billion). Together with Sweden, Denmark is the only country which has 
significantly counteracted the decline in employment by offering more public sector jobs. 
Increased transfers, including higher pension payments, add another DKK 2.2 billion (EUR 
0.3 billion) to the 1.02 per cent of GDP directly spent on social issues (OECD, 2009a: 15). 
Belgium also introduced a well-balanced social policy impulse. Measures on the expenditure 
side include an increase in unemployment benefits, electricity bill subsidies and a general 
adaptation of social benefits. They amount to roughly EUR 1.6 billion, equal to 0.5 per cent 
of GDP. This figure compares favourably to most other European nations. On the revenue 
side, various tax reductions plus the indexation of brackets correspond to approximately 
EUR 3 billion, which gives a total Belgian discretionary effort of 1.53 per cent of GDP 
(OECD, 2009a: 12). The country’s total stimulus almost entirely consist in social policy 
measures, their fraction is 96 per cent of overall efforts. 
Among the EU-10, the Czech Republic has implemented the largest social policy stimulus by 
far. The major share consists of lower social security contributions (CZK 74 of 79 billion or 
2.8 of EUR 3 billion). Employee contributions have been cut by 1.5 per cent and employers 
of low wage workers have also received support (OECD 2009a: 14). These measures 
account for 66 per cent of the total stimulus in the Czech Republic. 
 
 
22 For all conversions from national currencies to euro, average exchange rates for 2009 have been used. 
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Simulation of the effects of social policy measures 
This section presents the results of our simulations which estimate the macroeconomic 
impact of the social policy measures described in the previous section. The data for 20 EU 
Member States were analysed using the Oxford World Economic Model (Oxford Economic 
Forecasting). This model is particularly suited for an analysis of coordinated stimulus policy 
in Europe because it is able to identify cross-border spill over effects. Hence, a comparison 
between nationwide and coordinated European policy efforts is possible. 
In the first step, the data on the social policy stimulus packages obtained from the OECD 
(OECD, 2009a) were adjusted for the Oxford model in order to shock the corresponding 
variables both on the revenue and the expenditure side. These simulations were carried out 
inversely. Since the base version of the Oxford model already includes the stimulus 
measures, a scenario without them was simulated. This makes it possible to account for the 
difference, which is the positive effect stemming from the expansionary social policy.  
The first round of simulations showed that the Oxford model inherently generates a rise in 
the interest rate in response to an expansionary fiscal policy. Since monetary policy in 
Europe has been accommodative throughout the crises, this tightening effect was 
corrected. In our simulations, the interest rates were kept constant with respect to the 
baseline solution.  
The outcomes of the second round of simulations confirm the results of the studies on 
multipliers, which were discussed in chapter 1 of this report. When monetary policy is 
accommodative, the impact of discretionary social policy (and of fiscal policy in general) is 
significantly higher than with passive or tightening monetary policy.  
Tables 8 to 11 present the results of the simulations. The impact of social policy measures 
on GDP, private consumption, employment and unemployment is shown for the period from 
2010 until 2012. For reasons of applicability, the amount of the stimulus packages was 
divided and added quarterly to the model (e.g. EUR 1 billion of additional transfers in 2009 
was implemented as EUR 250 million each in Q1 – Q4 2009)
23. Hence the full impact of the 
packages comes into effect from the last quarter of 2010 onwards. Therefore significant 
impacts are observable with a lag. They begin in 2011 and generally culminate in 2012.  
The tables are designed to reflect the positive feedback mechanism of a coordinated 
European counter-cyclical social policy. For every year the number in the first column 
indicates the outcome of the national policies assuming that the rest of the European Union 
refrains from additional spending. The number in the right column shows the results for a 
European wide coordinated policy effort in each country. The suggestion that coordinated 
policy in the European Union has a larger multiplier effect is confirmed. Due to the spill-
over mechanisms, there are some effects even in countries which refrained from 
implementing any discretionary social policy. 
 
23 This is a simplification due to the complexity which is involved in simultaneously estimating and comparing the 
impact of 16 countries’ stimulus packages. The real world pattern according to which discretionary social policies 
were implemented is different and could not be accurately reproduced in the model.  
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Table 8: GDP effects of expansionary social policy 




































































































































































































EURO  -  0.20  -  0.30  -  0.40    0.90  0.84 
GERMANY  0.30  0.30  0.40  0.50  0.40  0.60  1.10  1.40  0.89 
FRANCE  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.20  0.71 
ITALY  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.30  1.43 
UK  0.00  0.10  0.10  0.20  0.20  0.30  0.30  0.60  0.79 
AUSTRIA  0.30  0.40  0.30  0.50  0.40  0.60  1.00  1.50  0.93 
BELGIUM  0.20  0.30  0.20  0.30  0.10  0.30  0.50  0.90  0.59 
BULGARIA  -  0.00  -  0.00  -  0.10  -  0.10   
CZECH  0.10  0.20  0.20  0.60  0.10  0.30  0.40  1.10  0.51 
DENMARK  0.50  0.50  0.60  0.70  0.60  0.90  1.70  2.10  1.23 
FINLAND  0.70  0.90  0.60  0.90  0.70  1.20  2.00  3.00  1.12 
GREECE  0.10  0.10  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.10  0.10  0.30  0.69 
HUNGARY  -  0.20  -  0.50  -  0.20  -  0.90   
IRELAND  -  0.10  -  0.20  -  0.40  -  0.70   
NETHERLA
NDS  0.10  0.30  0.30  0.50  0.30  0.60  0.70  1.40  1.14 
POLAND  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.20  0.10  0.20  0.10  0.50  1.24 
PORTUGAL  0.10  0.20  0.20  0.30  0.10  0.40  0.40  0.90  1.46 
ROMANIA  -  0.00  -  0.00  -  0.00  -  0.00   
SLOVAKIA  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.20  0.00  0.40  0.36 
SPAIN  0.30  0.40  0.50  0.60  0.70  0.80  1.50  1.80  0.74 
SWEDEN  0.20  0.30  0.50  0.70  0.70  1.00  1.40  2.00  0.81 
 
 
                                                 
24 The cumulated multiplier indicates the growth effect of every euro spent on discretionary social policy when the 
measures have developed their full impact in the model. A cumulated multiplier of 1.23 means that EUR 1 billion 
ultimately yields EUR 1.23 billion additional output. 
IP/A/EMPL/ST/2009-07 PE 451.484Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                
Impact of discretionary measures on GDP 
Table 8 depicts the stabilising impact of discretionary social policy on GDP. Unfortunately 
not all countries of the EU-27 are included in the Oxford World Economic Model.
25 For the 
vast majority of countries where results were obtained, they implicate significant benefits 
from discretionary social policy, both from a single country perspective and even more in a 
coordinated European scenario.
26  
In the single country scenarios, the GDP effects for the whole sample are proportionate to 
the total stimulus. Countries which relied more on expenditure measures, such as 
Denmark, Spain or Sweden, experience a greater impact on GDP. 
Regarding the benefits of the coordinated social policy stimulus, three patterns are clearly 
visible among the Member States. In all cases, the effect on GDP is larger than in the single 
country scenario. In the four major European economies, Germany, France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom, the additional growth effects from discretionary social policy range 
between 0.1 and 0.2 per cent of GDP. The results for Spain are similar. 
Germany, which implemented the largest social policy stimulus package, is also the country 
which receives the highest benefits from a coordinated policy, among the four big 
countries. Our results are consistent with the simulations conducted by other institutes 
(Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose, 2010: 35). The Halle Institute for Economic 
Research (IWH) found that total stimulus measures culminate in a 1 per cent higher GDP. 
Since social policy amounts to roughly 60 per cent of total stimulus (cf. EC 2009: 15), our 
results are within the same range. When the GDP effects from expansionary social policy 
from 2010 to 2012 are cumulated, German GDP in 2012 is 1.4 per cent higher. This implies 
that once the measures have entirely worked their way through the model, the cumulated 
multiplier is around 0.9. 
The individual stimulus packages in France and Italy had no significant impact on their 
macroeconomic variables. However, the two countries benefit from their European 
neighbours policies. Although the GDP effect looks quite small, these gains protect several 
thousand people from unemployment. 
The results for the United Kingdom are moderate because only a small part of the overall 
stimulus package qualifies as social policy. This also complicates comparisons with 
simulations from other institutions, which calculate an effect on GDP of up to 1.5 per cent 
(Barrell, R. et al.: 42). Our simulations peak at 0.3 per cent of additional GDP in 2012. 
When the benefits are cumulated over the years, Britain’s GDP in the coordinated scenario 
is 0.6 per cent higher, yielding a cumulated multiplier of roughly 0.8. 
In Spain, benefits from discretionary policy rise from 0.4 per cent of GDP in 2010 to 0.8 per 
cent in 2012, in the coordinated scenario.
27 The cumulated effect amounts to 1.8 per cent 
of GDP in 2012, hence the cumulated multiplier is about 0.75. 
The second pattern which emerges from our results concerns countries which either did not 
implement discretionary measures at all (such as Greece, Hungary and Ireland) or where 
policies did not show any considerable results in the single-country scenario (e.g. Poland 
and Slovakia). Generally, there is a benefit from the stimulus programmes of their 
European neighbours, up to 0.4 per cent (Ireland in 2012) or 0.5 per cent (Hungary in 
2011) of GDP.  
 
25 Results are missing for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Cyprus. 
26 Bulgaria and Romania are the exception. They did not implement any substantial stimulus packages themselves 
and according to the simulations, they do not gain from the measures of their 25 European partner countries. 
27 Unfortunately, no comparable study came to our attention so far. 
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If these expansionary impacts are cumulated, GDP in 2012 is 0.9 per cent higher in 
Hungary and 0.7 per cent higher in Ireland, due to expansionary social policy measures in 
other EU countries. For Poland the respective number is 0.5, for Slovakia 0.4. 
A third group comprises countries which significantly gained growth from their own policies 
and also benefited substantially from the stimuli of the rest of the European Union. The 
three Scandinavian countries Denmark, Finland and Sweden, and also Austria, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and the Czech Republic qualify for this group.  
The Scandinavian countries, where some of the largest social stimulus packages were 
implemented, also exhibit the highest economic benefits. When total measures are in effect 
in Denmark (i.e. 2011), they add 0.6 per cent to GDP for the two following years. The 
positive contribution of European wide social policy amounts to 0.1 per cent of GDP in 2011 
and to 0.3 per cent in 2012. Simulations from De Økonomiske Råd (the Danish Economic 
Council) calculate positive growth effects from direct tax and public consumption measures 
of 1.1 per cent of GDP in the first year, and 0.6 per cent in the second.
28 The figures 
compare fairly well to our calculations. De Økonomiske Råd finds peak effects of 1.1 per 
cent of GDP; our corresponding result amounts to 0.9 per cent of GDP. The level of 2012 
GDP in Denmark is 2.1 per cent higher than without discretionary policy. Every Danish 
krona spent on social policy thus ultimately yields 1.2 krona of additional income. 
Finland and Sweden also accrue substantial benefits both from their own social policy 
stimulus and from the one of European neighbours. In Finland, benefits peak at 1.2 per 
cent in 2012 in the coordinated scenario. The cumulated effect on the level of GDP in 2012 
is 3 per cent, implying a cumulated multiplier of roughly 1.1. In Sweden, the additional 
growth effects reach their maximum in 2012 at 1 per cent of GDP. The cumulated growth 
effects for the same year amount to 2 per cent, implicating a cumulated multiplier of 0.8. 
For Austria, the impact of total measures is 0.3 per cent of GDP in 2011 and 0.4 per cent in 
2012. The European discretionary efforts add 0.2 per cent additional growth every year. 
Simulations by the Austrian Institute of Economic Research WIFO (Breuss, F. et al., 2009: 
680) yield slightly higher results. For the tax reform supporting household incomes (which 
accounts for the major part of the country’s social policy package), effects of 0.4 per cent 
of GDP in the first and 0.6 per cent in the second year are calculated. The cumulated 
effects on growth amount to 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2012. 
In Belgium, the GDP gains due to social policy amount to 0.3 per cent every year in the 
coordinated scenario. These result in a cumulated GDP level for 2012 which is 0.9 per cent 
higher than without discretionary measures. The corresponding cumulated multiplier is 
comparatively low, at roughly 0.6. 
The Netherlands gain additional growth amounting to 0.5 per cent in 2011 and 0.6 per cent 
in 2012 according to the calculations. The impact on the GDP level in 2012 is 1.4 per cent, 
implying a cumulated multiplier of roughly 1.1. 
For the euro area as a whole, the GDP gains are 0.2 per cent in 2010, expanding to 0.3 per 
cent in 2011 and peaking at 0.4 per cent in 2012. Thus we expect the level of GDP in 2012 
to be 0.9 per cent higher than without the coordinated social stimulus effort. The 
corresponding cumulated multiplier effect is roughly 0.85, which matches with the results 
obtained for the major European economies. 
 
28 This information was courteously provided by Mr. John Smidt from De Økonomiske Råd. 
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The conclusions regarding the GDP effects of the social policy stimulus programmes in the 
European Union are straightforward. Every country which implemented significant 
measures grows faster, even in the single country scenario. Furthermore for every country, 
the coordinated policy impulse has positive effects on GDP.  
These gains are however unequally distributed among  large and small EU-member 
countries. The coordinated stimulus boosts growth more in smaller than in larger countries.  
Impact of discretionary measures on consumption 
In the next step, the repercussions of expansionary social policy on consumption will be 
considered. Since the biggest contribution to total demand comes from private 
consumption, it is of particular interest to ask to which extent private consumption 
expenditure can be stabilised through discretionary social policy. As can be seen from Table 
9, a clear pattern according to which the benefits are distributed across countries, fails to 
emerge from our analysis.  
Some countries which based their discretionary social policies on a balanced approach 
between revenue and expenditure measures exhibit a substantial consumption increase. 
This is the case for Belgium, Denmark, Spain and Sweden. When the effects peak in 2012, 
private consumption is 1.4 per cent higher in Belgium, 2.4 per cent higher in Denmark, 1.8 
per cent higher in Spain and 2.7 per cent higher in Sweden than in the baseline scenario. In 
Slovakia, where the social stimulus package has a similar structure, there is almost no 
positive impact on consumption. 
There are countries, however, where the implemented discretionary policies were centred 
on revenue measures and which consequently also accrue significantly higher private 
consumption. Austria, Finland and the Netherlands qualify for this category. Private 
consumption is increased by 1.7 per cent in Austria, 2.9 in Finland and 1.1 in the 
Netherlands at the height of the repercussions. The Czech Republic deviates from this 
pattern. The expansionary revenue measures amount to over 2 per cent of GDP but 
consumption increases peak at only moderate 0.8 per cent in 2011. The reason is that the 
country’s revenue policy consists in temporarily reduced social security contributions (cf. 
OECD, 2009a: 14), and hence, there is no direct link to disposable income. A country 
whose social stimulus is located solely on the expenditure side, which also benefits from 
higher consumption, is Portugal. The effects amount to 0.6 per cent in 2012. Major 
economies like Germany and the United Kingdom exhibit more moderate increases in 
private consumption than their smaller European neighbours. The respective numbers are 
0.8 for Germany and 0.4 for the United Kingdom, when increases peak in the coordinated 
scenario. 
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Table 9: Private consumption effects of expansionary social policy 


































































































EURO  -  0.40  -  0.50  -  0.60 
GERMANY  0.60  0.70  0.80  0.80  0.70  0.80 
FRANCE  0.00  0.00  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10 
ITALY  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
UK  0.10  0.10  0.20  0.20  0.30  0.40 
AUSTRIA  1.00  1.10  1.40  1.50  1.60  1.70 
BELGIUM  1.20  1.20  1.30  1.40  1.30  1.40 
BULGARIA  -  0.00  -  0.00  -  0.00 
CZECH  0.40  0.40  0.50  0.80  0.10  0.40 
DENMARK  1.20  1.10  2.00  2.00  2.20  2.40 
FINLAND  1.40  1.70  2.00  2.60  2.20  2.90 
GREECE  0.10  0.10  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.10 
HUNGARY  -  0.00  -  0.40  -  0.40 
IRELAND  -  0.00  -  0.10  -  0.10 
NETHERLANDS  0.40  0.40  0.70  0.80  0.90  1.10 
POLAND  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.20  0.10  0.30 
PORTUGAL  0.30  0.40  0.50  0.60  0.50  0.60 
ROMANIA  -  0.00  -  -0.10  -  -0.20 
SLOVAKIA  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.10 
SPAIN  0.70  0.80  1.40  1.40  1.70  1.80 
SWEDEN  0.70  0.70  1.50  1.70  2.20  2.70 
 
In general, the results suggest that additional gains from coordinated European policy are 
relatively small when private consumption is considered. On the contrary, results for GDP 
and employment (see below) indicate significant cross-country spill-over effects. When 
private consumption is considered, the benefit from EU-wide policy coordination is less 
pronounced. An interesting fact is that contrary to GDP and employment, consumption 
expenditure reacts to discretionary policy with a comparatively small lag. Effects are 
already substantial in 2010, and in 2011, they are quite close to the peak.  
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Since the majority of revenue measures were targeted at low income households, this is 
not surprising. They high propensity of these households to spend additional income 
entirely creates an instantaneous effect on private consumption.  
Impact of discretionary measures on employment 
In the final step, we discuss the stimulus packages’ impact on the European labour 
markets. We thereby focus on increases in total employment and decreases in 
unemployment. The corresponding figures are shown in Tables 10 and 11, respectively. 
These figures help to gauge the overall effects of stimulus measures on European labour 
markets. The quantitative results represent approximations and have to be interpreted with 
caution, especially with respect to figures referring to single countries.  
When the attention is directed to the overall impact, significant positive effects for total 
employment are visible for the EU (represented by the 20 Member States the simulations 
are effectuated for). In the coordinated policy scenario, 112,000 new jobs are created by 
the expansionary social stance as early as in 2010. In 2011, when the stimulus reaches its 
full effect, the number of new jobs climbs up to 237,000 and culminates in 330,000 new 
working places in 2012. The difference to the single country scenario is very sizeable, and 
amounts to more than 135,000 jobs at the height of the expansionary effects.  
The bulk of new jobs are created in the euro area, where two thirds of the overall increases 
take place. Outside the euro area, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Poland and Denmark 
account for substantial absolute employment increases. Since employment and the reaction 
of labour markets are a major concern in the context of the recent crisis, the results for 
single countries will now briefly be discussed.  
In the previous discussion, it was noted that the four major European economies plus Spain 
accrued only moderate benefits from coordinated European policy as far as GDP was 
considered. When we focus employment, the results show that additional production, even 
when it seems comparatively small, creates several thousand jobs. Hence, the coordinated 
European social policy approach clearly makes a difference for national labour markets. 
In Germany almost 20,000 additional workplaces are created by 2011 through spill-over 
effects. The increase in employment of around 45,500 in the single country scenario is 
elevated to 67,000. In 2012, the European wide expansionary efforts account for more than 
32,000 new jobs, with a total of 91,900 more people employed than in the baseline 
scenario. Similar results are found for the United Kingdom. At the height of the 
expansionary impulse of social policy, the cross-border spill-over effects almost double the 
number of new jobs from 30,200 to 54,900.  
In the three remaining major economies, the European policy impulse creates new 
opportunities for roughly 10,000 people. This impact is observable in 2012, when the 
expansionary effects culminate. The corresponding numbers for France are – 1,900 in the 
single-country case and 6,000 in the coordinated scenario. In Italy, employment rises from 
1,470 in the single case to 13,000 in the coordinated scenario. In Spain, the number of 
jobs increases between 43,500 and 52,400.  
There are several other countries whose labour markets benefit substantially from the 
coordinated approach of social policy.
29 The most impressive example is Poland, where 
employment in 2012 surges from 4,600 in the single case to 17,600 in the coordinated 
scenario. Similarly, the number of new jobs almost doubles in the Netherlands, Belgium 
and the Czech Republic. In the Netherlands, employment increases from 6,100 to 11,700.  
 
29 Again only figures at the peak of effects will be discussed.  
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In Belgium, the corresponding numbers are 4,800 and 8,900; and in the Czech Republic, 
2,300 and 4,500. Sweden, on the other hand, benefits from a high increase in absolute 
numbers: new jobs in 2012 rise from 15,800 in the single case to 23,200 in the coordinated 
scenario.  
 
Table 10: Employment increases through expansionary social policy 


































































































EURO  -  85251  -  152298  -  218604 
GERMANY  21410  27060  47550  67000  59790  91950 
FRANCE  -869  2070  -1489  3970  -1959  5910 
ITALY  870  4620  1300  7950  1470  13060 
UK  3849  7560  17100  32730  30260  54990 
AUSTRIA  4432  5287  4475  6158  5565  8069 
BELGIUM  3399  4240  4132  6355  4844  8912 
BULGARIA  0  191  0  381  0  308 
CZECH  1653  3074  2945  9235  2330  4549 
DENMARK  4581  5012  6121  7690  7738  10975 
FINLAND  5307  7302  4847  6931  6117  9939 
GREECE  1560  2199  687  2216  *  2853 
HUNGARY  0  1461  0  6406  0  2303 
IRELAND  0  783  0  1451  0  2649 
NETHERLANDS  1451  2637  4323  8008  6102  11770 
POLAND  1230  3480  2830  14260  4660  17610 
PORTUGAL  2694  3630  4047  7070  4580  9757 
ROMANIA  0  646  0  603  0  -2215 
SLOVAKIA  *  443  *  939  *  1295 
SPAIN  20910  24980  29380  34250  43480  52440 
SWEDEN  3724  5372  9150  13424  15826  23264 
Total  79283  112047  146242  237027  193859  330388 
* The employment increases generated by the model are negligible. 
 
A view on unemployment (see Table 11) yields by and large the same results. The decrease 
in unemployment is slightly smaller than the increase in employment, which is due to the 
fact that not every new job is taken by a currently unemployed person.  
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Table 11: Unemployment decreases (in 1000s) through expansionary social policy 


































































































EURO  -  85251  -  152298  -  218604 
GERMANY  21410  27060  47550  67000  59790  91950 
FRANCE  -869  2070  -1489  3970  -1959  5910 
ITALY  870  4620  1300  7950  1470  13060 
UK  3849  7560  17100  32730  30260  54990 
AUSTRIA  4432  5287  4475  6158  5565  8069 
BELGIUM  3399  4240  4132  6355  4844  8912 
BULGARIA  0  191  0  381  0  308 
CZECH  1653  3074  2945  9235  2330  4549 
DENMARK  4581  5012  6121  7690  7738  10975 
FINLAND  5307  7302  4847  6931  6117  9939 
GREECE  1560  2199  687  2216  *  2853 
HUNGARY  0  1461  0  6406  0  2303 
IRELAND  0  783  0  1451  0  2649 
NETHERLANDS  1451  2637  4323  8008  6102  11770 
POLAND  1230  3480  2830  14260  4660  17610 
PORTUGAL  2694  3630  4047  7070  4580  9757 
ROMANIA  0  646  0  603  0  -2215 
SLOVAKIA  *  443  *  939  *  1295 
SPAIN  20910  24980  29380  34250  43480  52440 
SWEDEN  3724  5372  9150  13424  15826  23264 
Total  79283  112047  146242  237027  193859  330388 
* The employment increases generated by the model are negligible. 
For the 20 EU Member States in the sample, the number of unemployed people declines by 
105,000 in 2010 in the coordinated scenario. This figure doubles to 216,000 in 2011, when 
the social policy stimulus develops its full effect and peaks at roughly 300,000 in 2012. The 
difference to the single country scenario is again highly significant. At its peak it amounts 
to more than 130,000 people. The bulk of the decrease in unemployment is again 
concentrated in the euro area.  
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When the individual countries are considered, the decline in unemployment corresponds to 
the increase in employment.
30 The major economies in Europe benefit significantly in 
absolute numbers when unemployment is concerned. The decrease amounts to several ten 
thousand people in policy-active countries like Germany and the United Kingdom. In France 
and Italy, spill-over effects terminate unemployment spells for several thousand people. 
Smaller countries which benefit relatively strongly are Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and the Czech Republic. 
 
Conclusions 
Our simulations indicate that active discretionary social policy yields substantial benefits for 
the EU. Social policy measures increase output and they have a positive impact on 
employment and consumption. The spill-over effects across countries which can be 
observed in our simulations provide a strong rationale for a coordinated and simultaneous 
policy intervention. The positive effect of a coordinated policy approach is, however, 
unequally distributed among small and large economies: as we would expect due to the 
comparatively smaller weight that foreign trade has on the domestic economy in large 
countries, the latter benefit less than smaller ones from fiscal stimuli implemented in 
neighbouring countries. 
For the euro area as a whole, the cumulated GDP effects estimated with the help of the 
Oxford World Economic Model amount to 0.9 per cent for the period 2010-2012. 
Discretionary social policy measures implemented in response to the crisis accounted for 
1.07 per cent of GDP in 2008 for 2009 and 2010. Accordingly, the cumulated multiplier for 
these discretionary expenditures amounts to 0.85. In other words, every euro directed to 
discretionary social policy measures in the wake crisis resulted in 85 cents of additional 
GDP. Since GDP benefits are distributed unequally, the cumulated multiplier is smaller in 
major European economies and larger for small countries.  
Benefits from a discretionary social stance are equally observable in labour markets. 
Employment rises significantly and unemployment declines. According to our estimations, 
the social policy stimulus packages in 20 EU Member States created 330,000 new jobs at 
the height of their effect. The decline in unemployment is slightly lower. The discretionary 
measures’ expansionary effects have spared 300,000 people from unemployment. 
A positive impact which our simulations do not reflect is the reduction of uncertainty on an 
economy wide level which discretionary social policy induces. Well-targeted discretionary 
measures can be particularly valid in this respect. Households can be insured against 
income or wealth losses, which in turn diminishes their uncertainty, stabilises their 
expectations and hence smoothes their spending behaviour. Since private household 
consumption is by far the largest component of GDP, we can expect positive employment 
effects as a result. This aspect is, however, not modelled in our simulations and thus we 
cannot quantify the extent to which the reduction of uncertainty contributed to contain the 
rise in unemployment during the crisis. 
To our knowledge, this is the first estimation of the stabilizing effects of discretionary social 
policy on a European wide level. Our results fall in line with simulations conducted on a 
nationwide level by other Institutes (Breuss, F. et al., De Økkonomiske Råd, Horn, G. et al., 
Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose). However, a study for all 27 European Union 
Member States could not be implemented, mainly due to the fact that comprehensive data 
on stimulus packages in Europe is not available. 
 
30 The fact that unemployment decreases in some small countries are larger than employment increases stems 
from rounding errors. Standard result tables in the Oxford WEM list unemployment decreases in thousands, 
whereas figures on employment can only be extracted individually and are given in absolute numbers.  
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Our results nevertheless imply that in the difficult task to provide stabilisation in the face of 
the severest economic crisis since the Great Depression, discretionary social policies 
implemented in the European Union clearly play a vital and positive role.  
Uncertainty and the beneficial effects of social policy 
Private household’s expectations are an important determinant of macroeconomic 
development. Social protection systems and discretionary social policy influence these 
expectations especially in periods of severe economic disruptions. Social policy insures 
individuals against various economic risks and therefore diminishes uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is not measurable per se but there are indicators which can serve as a proxy. 
Since uncertainty is likely to increase savings, variations in household saving rates can be 
interpreted as a reflection of prevailing uncertainty. The IMF indicates that precautionary 
savings can dampen economic recovery after a severe financial crisis: ‘History suggests 
that these forces tend to be long lasting following financial crisis, entailing sluggish 
recoveries after periods of sharply contracting activity’ (IMF, 2009b: 3). In the World 
Economic Outlook from April 2009 (IMF, 2009a: 111), data on household saving rates in 
the course of severe financial crises are presented. The authors observe an increase of 5 
percentage points in households’ savings (as a share of GDP) with respect to pre-crisis 
levels within two years.  
Household savings data for the major European economies (cf. OECD, 2009d: 293) show a 
substantial increase in savings rates from 2008 onwards.
31 On average, the increase 
amounts to 3.3 percentage points in two years. The main determinants for the increase in 
savings rates are firstly the marked rise in unemployment and secondly the negative wealth 
effect on consumption after the bursting of the real estate bubble in some economies; both 
developments dampen private households´ expectations.  
In Germany, however, private savings increased only moderately, with the share of 
household savings on GDP increasing from 11.2 per cent in 2008 to 12.3 per cent in 2010. 
Although the German economy suffered heavily during the current crisis due to the collapse 
of world trade, households did not significantly change their saving and consumption 
behaviour. It seems plausible to attribute this achievement to the social protection system 
in general and to innovative  discretionary social policy in particular. The comprehensive 
short-time working scheme which prevented income losses for over one million households 
was a very important measure in this respect (for a detailed analysis see the case study on 
Germany in chapter 3). Thus uncertainty has been contained and expectations have been 
stabilised. Accordingly, private consumption remained stable.  
In order to quantify the positive effect of this macroeconomic success, we conduct two 
simulations which analyse in a counterfactual way the macroeconomic effects of the stable 
savings rates. In the first scenario, we assume an increase of German savings rates in 
analogy to the pattern in other EU Member States.
32 In the second scenario, German 
saving rates rise following the pattern implied by the IMF study (IMF, 2009a: 111). In the 
simulations, we implement a build-up in savings rates by quarter to quarter steps during 
2008 and 2009 and assume this continues throughout 2010 and 2011. The corresponding 




31 In some countries, saving rates began to surge in 2007, e.g. Spain and Sweden.  
32 The 16 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Spain and United Kingdom. Due to availability of more 
recent data, we recalculated the ‘EU-mean scenario’. The sample now consists of 16 countries because of data 
availability and because not all 27 Member States are modelled in the Oxford World Economic Model. 
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Table 12: Effects of increased uncertainty and precautionary saving in Germany 
 
2010    2011   















On GDP  -0.6  -1.1  -0.9  -1.6  -1.5  -2.7 
             
On Consumption  -2.1  -4.0  -2.9  -5.5     
             
On 
Unemployment 
(in thousands)  44.5  80.3  105.0  179.4     
 
The strongest effects are observed concerning private consumption. In the EU-mean 
scenario, private consumption outlays in Germany are 2.8 per cent lower in 2010 and 2.9 
per cent lower in 2011 than in the baseline. When private saving rates rise even further 
according to the IMF scenario, German consumption declines by 4 per cent in 2010 and 5 
per cent in 2011. 
These declines have a severe impact on total output. GDP in Germany declines by 0.6 per 
cent in 2010 and 0.9 per cent in 2011 in the EU-mean scenario. This would yield a 
cumulated output loss of 1.5 per cent. (1.1 per cent in 2010, 1.6 per cent in 2011 and a 
cumulated total output loss of 2.7 per cent in the IMF scenario). As a consequence of these 
dampening effects on economic activity, unemployment rises significantly (by 105,000 and 
179,400 people, respectively).  
These results confirm the relevance of social protection systems and innovative social 
policy. Without the insurance against income loss, which the German short-time working 
scheme effectively provided, uncertainty and precautionary savings in Germany could have 
been rising as strong as in other EU countries. Our simulations provide evidence that – by 
stabilising the savings rate – discretionary social policy also stabilised macroeconomic 
development and the labour market. Higher savings rates and precautionary savings would 
have further aggravated the crisis in Germany.  
 





  Discretionary measures work best when timely, temporary and targeted. While 
automatic stabilisers set in immediately, discretionary policy has to be timely, 
which means it has to be designed and initiated immediately when the economic 
downturn appears. When the policy is enacted too slowly, it risks acting not as an 
a-cyclical stabiliser, but as a pro-cyclical enhancer.  
  Discretionary policy experiences two lags: first, an outside lag which captures the 
time between the implementation of policy and its results. This lag is not very 
large if the policy is correctly targeted. The second lag is more important, the 
inside lag. This lag represents the political process of identifying the economic 
problem and formulating a response. The duration of this lag is unpredictable as it 
depends not only on economic facts but also on political considerations. It is 
essential that discretionary measures are lasting and contingent in order to assure 
consumers that they will not face a sudden loss of income. Lasting in this case 
means the measures need to last as long as the recession, contingent means that 
it must also be possible to extend or expand them. However, measures must also 
expire at some point to allay fears about long-term fiscal stability. 
  Taking the perspective of a policy cycle, we can identify three elements of the 
inside lag: The recognition lag represents the time it takes for a government to 
recognise a problem and start developing a policy response. In the current crisis, 
the recognition lag seems to be small, a period of about two months. The second 
lag within the policy process is the decision lag. If we take early September 2008 
as our reference point for the end of the agenda-setting process, we can derive 
that the policy formulation process took between one (Germany’s first stimulus) to 
five months (Finland, Czech Republic). Even if we would estimate a considerable 
implementation lag of six months, stimulus would still come into effect around 
June 2009 for the European countries, still very well within the period of economic 
distress and thus fully acting as counter-cyclical policy. It seems safe to state that 
in general European stimulus was enacted timely to act as a stabiliser against the 
crisis.  
  Case studies show that several countries prolonged the lifespan of some measures 
beyond the limit that was first set. Even so, it is important to note that most 
measures were initiated with time limits or budgetary limits in place, guaranteeing 
their temporary nature as prolonging them could only be done by making a new 
discretionary decision. 
  Discretionary measures related to objective parameters or existing automatic 
stabilisers tend to be easier to implement and show smaller time lags than fully 
discretionary measures. Stimulus related to automatic stabilisers is easy to 
maintain but also easy to phase out. Projects of a continued nature such as 
education and ensuring employability, initiated by stimulus measures, may prove 
more difficult to end as policy-makers may fear the loss of systems considered 









2.3.1. Timeliness  and the policy cycle 
Timeliness  
As was mentioned in the general considerations of economic stabilisation, fiscal stimulus 
has been and still remains a source of controversy between scholars. Economists have 
pointed out since the 1970s that fiscal stimulus was an inadequate way to deal with 
economic cycles, as it would create more distortions than actual benefits (Feldstein, M.; 
Blinder, A.S.; Taylor, J.B.). For them, the key to a successful a-cyclical policy lies within the 
use of monetary policy. The only way fiscal stabilisation could be applied was through the 
use of automatic stabilisers, as these evaded the problems that coincide with discretionary 
fiscal policy. Coutinho, L. quotes the most frequently heard drawbacks as the inflexibility of 
fiscal policy to be changed in a timely fashion, the potentially small impact of temporary 
measures and the fact that such policy is often used for political goals. Since automatic 
stabilisers come into effect automatically, adapt automatically to have the highest potential 
effect and do not need a policy decision, the problems associated with discretional 
stabilization are avoided.  
Other economists oppose this school of thought. While they acknowledge the problems, 
they do not see them as a sufficient reason to abstain from using discretionary measures 
intended on stabilisation. They see discretionary policy as an adequate tool as long as it 
adheres to the three T’s: Timely, Temporary and Targeted (Hubic, A. et al.). These three 
characteristics are the basic conditions which any discretionary policy needs to fulfill in 
o r d e r  t o  m a k e  s u r e  t h a t  i t  i s  a l s o  e f f e c t ive. Research shows that when the economic 
downturn is exceptional, as well in depth as in length, greater benefits can be expected 
from the use of discretionary policy (Blinder, A.S.; Gros, D.). The financial crisis obviously 
meets these conditions, both with respect to the depth as well as to the length of the 
recession.  
We will not discuss the targeted characteristic of discretionary policy here. We will only say 
that discretionary policy needs to be targeted at groups with a high marginal propensity to 
consume in order for the multiplier to have an effect. Discretionary social policy aims at 
weak-income groups and is therefore already targeted by definition. Instead, we will focus 
on the time-related aspects. When stabilising, discretionary policy has to be timely, which 
means it has to be initiated immediately when the economic downturn becomes apparent. 
When the policy is enacted too slowly, it risks of acting not as a counter-cyclical stabiliser, 
but as a pro-cyclical enhancer. It would boost the economy at a time when it is no longer 
necessary, deepening the next economic downturn as the business cycle continues. It is 
therefore important to analyse whether the discretionary response by the European 
governments to the crisis has been enacted timely to stabilise the recession. Discretionary 
policy also needs to be temporary, it may not be enacted permanently. Discretionary policy 
means additional budget deficits and continued policy would raise doubts about fiscal 
sustainability. The crowding out effect might smother economic recovery by eliminating 
private investment trough higher interests rates (Hubic, A. et al.). 
It seems natural that policy has to be enacted timely. In practice, however, this proves to 
be more difficult then might be expected. Economists wary of discretional policy correctly 
point out that there might be significant lags for a policy to be enacted and implemented. 
In fact, discretionary policy experiences two lags: first, an outside lag which captures the 
time between the implementation of policy and its results. This lag is by all not very large if 
the policy is correctly targeted. It cannot obtain results faster than automatic stabilisers, 
but it is for example faster than the use of monetary policy (Blinder, A.S.).  The second lag 
is more important, the inside lag.  
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This lag represents the political process of identifying the economic problem and 
formulating a response. The duration of this lag is unpredictable as it depends not only on 
economic facts, but also on political considerations.  
Outcomes may vary over political systems and ideological disputes. The shorter the lag, the 
better the discretionary measures help in stabilising the economy. The current crisis has 
prompted more attention as to how discretionary measures could be more automated in 
order to bypass the political bargaining process that might cause the policy not to be 
enacted timely. Baunsgaard, T. et al. suggested the use of economic trigger indicators for 
GDP or unemployment which would trigger automatic tax or expenditure policies. 
The term temporary deserves a more thorough analysis. As mentioned earlier, the optimal 
stimulus for this financial crisis would have to be ‘timely, large, lasting, diversified, 
contingent, collective and sustainable’ (Spilimbergo, A. et al., 2008). The term lasting 
seems to contrast with the condition for discretional stimulus to be temporary. Also various 
economists find that temporary measures do not per se produce significant effects, 
depending on the sort of consumers. Rule-of-thumb consumers produce an effect as they 
spend their extra income. Other consumers might save more, thus eliminating the potential 
economic benefit (Hubic, A.). The explanation of these contradictions is found within the 
concept of uncertainty. When people receive additional benefits for duration shorter than 
the time they perceive the recession to last, they will refrain from additional consumption.  
Therefore, it is essential that discretionary measures are lasting and contingent in order to 
assure consumers that they will not face a sudden loss of income. Lasting in this case 
means the measures need to last as long as the recession, contingent means that it must 
also be possible to extend or expand them. The uncertainty of their future will otherwise 
make consumers anticipate and encourage them to build up safeguards by saving their 
additional income. However, measures must also expire at some point to allay fears about 
long-term fiscal stability. ‘Moreover, the literature on the quality of public finances, by 
stressing the negative relationship between government size and economic growth, at least 
beyond a certain minimal size, adds weight to the argument that spending increases should 
be temporary’ (ibidem, 12). 
With the knowledge of these two conditions of social discretional policy, needing them to be 
timely and temporary, we will further analyse how and if these conditions were met in the 
different stimulus programmes of the European governments in response to the Financial 
Crisis. Have these governments responded timely? Did significant lags occur and where 
precisely could it be found? Are the enacted discretionary measures temporary or lasting? 
As the crisis seems to be fading questions about the unwinding of stimulus programmes 
and decreasing government deficits are equally relevant to assess the policy response 
within Europe. 
 
The policy cycle  
To decide on fiscal stimulus is a policy decision. As such, it follows the policy cycle as shown 
below. The policy cycle is a tool often used to analyse the political process (Bridgeman, P. 
and Glyn, D.). 
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Figure 11: The policy cycle 
 
Source: HuWY (itc.napier.ac.uk). 
 
We can use the policy cycle to analyse how timely governments have responded to the 
crisis. All governments have announced at some time the stimulus measures they would or 
would not take in order to counter the effects of the economic downturn. While this is very 
important and useful information, this single moment in time does not capture the timing 
when measures actually came into effect, while this is exactly the information that is 
necessary to evaluate the timeliness of the discretionary policies. Therefore, we use the 
policy cycle to evaluate the entire decision making process.  
The policy cycle consists out of four stages. First, there is the stage of agenda setting. In 
this stage, policy must first be noticed and placed on the political agenda in order to start 
its way through the political process. We must study when European governments were 
first made aware of the problem and started to treat it as a genuine problem that needed to 
be addressed. Once the problem is placed on the agenda, the second stage starts. Policy 
formulation is often considered the most interesting part of the policy cycle. It is this stage 
where policies are identified, alternatives are gathered and analysed and finally a decision 
tool is applied. It is at the end of this stage that we can place the public announcements of 
stimulus packages throughout Europe. Then the third stage sets in, the implementation 
stage. Between the announcements of policy and the actual start an administrative, but 
nonetheless also politicised, stage sets in with the consequence that it can take a lot of 
time before policy is truly activated. The last stage consists of evaluation of policy, 
assessing its merits and flaws and adjusting it to be more effective. Most, if not all, 
European countries have since reached this stage. 
The duration of this entire process captures the inside lag of discretionary policy. As this lag 
is one of the important arguments against discretionary policy, we will conceptualise it 
further, dividing it into separate lags in the stages of the policy cycle. Economists often 
divide the inside lag into two separate lags (Sawyer, M.): the recognition lag and the 
decision or implementation lag. In order to be able to follow the policy cycle, we will make 
a difference between the decision lag, which is mostly a political lag and the 
implementation lag which reflects the political-administrative process to make a policy 
come into effect. Each stage, except the last one, will thus have its own lag. Agenda setting 
will correspond with the recognition lag, policy formulation with the decision lag and policy 
implementation with the implementation lag. 
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As the current crisis was recognised early on as a worldwide economic problem, we expect 
to find little evidence of a substantial recognition lag. We will look at government 
announcements to search for a decision lag. The most interesting, however, the 
implementation lag, is difficult to research for each country as it corresponds closely with 
local political procedures. We will focus on some countries case by case to see whether it 
can be considered as a considerable delay. 
2.3.2.  Timing of stabilising measures 
A typology  
There are two distinct forms of stabilising measures to counter downturns (or upturns) in 
the economic cycle. One is the use of automatic stabilisers, the other the use of 
discretionary measures. We will define them here and try to create a typology that allows 
us to study whether certain measures have different outcomes in relation to timing.  
Automatic stabilisers are typically based on five components: income tax, corporate tax, 
social security contributions, indirect taxes and unemployment benefits. They are 
considered automatic, since they do not require a discretionary decision of any kind to 
come into effect; and they adjust automatically depending on economic conditions. As 
such, they change revenues and expenditures of governments and stabilise changes in the 
cyclical stance of the economy. Since each country has its own interrelated system of 
automatic stabilisers, an absolute definition is not possible. The effectiveness can therefore 
only be measured in reference to outcomes and the behaviour of the variables. 
Discretionary measures are all those measures that explicitly need a discretionary decision 
in order to be enacted. However, this definition covers a large group of measures as not all 
decisions are of the same nature and gravity. For example, it may be a contested and long 
deliberated decision to decide on the allocation of a large investment fund, while a decision 
to adjust pensions can be based on external parameters, making a decision unbiased and 
easier to make. We will try to capture these differences by splitting up discretionary 
decisions into three different categories. Automatic stabilisers are the easiest decisions, as 
they require no decision at all, and so we will define these categories by the level of 
difficulty to make a discretionary decision. 
The first category we define is one which contains the so-called semi-automatic stabilisers. 
These decisions can be considered as semi-automatic policy adjustment. It captures a 
continuum for the improvement of policy based on new information (Bhadwal, S. et al.). 
Discretionary measures are semi-automatic when the decision is based upon objective 
outside parameters, such as the unemployment rate or GDP changes. Once a certain limit 
is reached, policy-makers should automatically decide to enact certain measures. Since this 
response is decided in advance, the difficulty to make this decision is limited and the 
adjustment can be considered as almost automatic. However, the decision remains 
discretionary.  
The second category contains those discretionary measures related to automatic stabilisers. 
This category is not taken from the literature but based on the observation of several 
stimulus packages. All of them are discretionary decisions, but often they are temporary 
adjustments of automatic stabilisation mechanisms. Therefore, this category is based on 
the same five components as automatic stabilisers listed above. Since the systems for 
these measures are already in place and only rates or additional contributions need to be 
defined, we deem this category of measures more difficult than semi-automatic stabilisers 
but still less difficult than the use of new fully discretional measures. 
The third and last category consists of fully discretional measures. These measures are not 
based on the expansion or adjustment of existing programmes of stabilisation.  
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They are new and need to be completely designed, meaning that they must pass every step 
of the political process. As such, we predict t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  a l s o  t a k e  m o r e  t i m e  t o  b e  
developed and implemented. 
With this typology, we can study the inside lag of the policy process in more detail, trying 
to find differences in the lags experienced in the decision process of the different European 
stimulus packages.  
Automatic stabilisers and timing  
When automatic stabilisers are considered, timing is of no relevance. The definition of 
automatic stabilisers entails that they come into effect automatically, without the need for a 
decision. That makes them invulnerable to policy lags, as the policy process is completely 
bypassed. As discussed above, automatic stabilisers need to be measured in terms of 
outcomes. In the previous section (2.2.1.), the different stabilisation coefficients are 
calculated, showing the percentage of stabilisation they provide in the different European 
countries.  
Discretionary measures and timing  
Almost all European countries enacted large stimulus programmes consisting of various 
discretionary measures. In the following section, we will try to uncover the lags that these 
programmes experienced to be enacted. As the data available varies in source and detail, it 
is not possible yet to do a full mathematical analysis of the timely nature of the fiscal 
response. We will try to bring as much data together in order to obtain a first qualitative 
look at the timeliness of measures enacted throughout the EU. As this research focuses on 
the social stimulus measures taken by the European governments all data will be applied to 
this whenever possible. At several points, due to the availability of material, the entire 
stimulus will be used as reference. Since social stimulus represents almost 70 per cent of 
the total stimulus throughout the EU, the chance of distortions is unlikely.  
Timely measures 
The stimulus packages in different European countries were proposed between September 
2008 and March 2009. To study the inside lag of these packages, we must look at the lags 
that this inside lag represents, the recognition lag, the decision lag and the implementation 
lag.  
The recognition lag represents the time it takes for a government to recognise a problem 
and start developing a policy response. Even though the effect of the crisis did not affect 
each European country at the same time, the magnitude and consequences of the crisis 
were so large that we consider awareness to have started almost at the same time. The 
financial crisis started at the end of 2007, but its consequences for Europe only started to 
seep through in the third quarter of 2008. The crisis at that point seemed a US crisis with 
important effects abroad but still not a global crisis, as it is referred to now. In the course 
of 2008, several European banks ran into problems pushing the availability of credit on the 
European agenda. It is difficult to set an exact date as to when Europe became aware of 
the need for the creation of a substantial stimulus to counter the effects of the economic 
downturn. However, there are certain events and dates which can be safely seen as eye-
openers that could not have been ignored. These are the fall of Leman Brothers on 
September 15, 2008, the 700 billion-dollar bailout in the United States during the same 
month, and the collapse of the entire Icelandic banking system early October 2008. These 
events cover a time span starting in September 2008 until the beginning of October 2008.  
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W h i l e  t h i s  d o e s  n o t  h a v e  t o  m e a n  t h a t  e v e r y government started to take steps in the 
development of a stimulus package – as not deciding on a stimulus package is also a 
decision - , it does mean that at this point no government could be ignorant to the problem 
posed by the crisis. It also gives us a time frame to obtain an interval for the recognition 
lag. The recognition lag seems to be small, a period of about two months.  
The full effect of the crisis on the economy became apparent late 2008. Initial forecasts 
expected a substantial decrease in growth but not an outright depression. The awareness 
started in the summer of 2008, with a focus in September 2008. As expected, the 
magnitude of the crisis made it hard to ignore, minimising the recognition lag almost 
equally for every European country. 
The second lag within the policy process is the decision lag. How long did it take before 
European governments proposed their stimulus packages? Table 13 shows the size of the 
social stimulus packages in the 2008 GDP of 16 European countries discussed in previous 
sections, together with the date of announcement of these packages and the financial 
spread of measures throughout 2008-2010 as a percentage of the total (not only social) 
stimulus package. It is important to note that the date of announcement does not 
correspond with the date the packages were enacted. At the date of announcement, the 
political bargaining reached a compromise, but it had yet to pass through legislature and 
administration in order to become active. When there is more than one date marked, this 
means more packages were decided on during a later moment: several countries adapted 
additional packages during late 2009 and even 2010. However, these are not taken into 
account, as they are based on information not available at the start of the crisis. Only the 
initial response concerns us in this table.   
 
80 




Table 13: Size and timing
33 of social discretionary stimulus packages 
Country 
Stimulus 
size in % 
2008 GDP 
Timing  2008  2009  2010 
Austria  1.61  NA  0  84  16 
Belgium  1.53  Dec 11, 2008  0  60  40 
Czech 
Republic 
2.14  Feb 16, 2009  0  66  34 
Denmark  1.71  NA  0  33  67 
Finland  2.68  Jan 30, 2009  0  47  53 
France  0.28  Dec, 2009  0  75  25 
Germany 
1.57 
Oct 1, 2008 
 Jan 12, 2009 
0  46  54 
Greece  0.43  /  …  …  … 
Italy 
0.21 
Nov 29, 2008 
 Feb 3, 2009 
0  15  85 
Netherlands  1.23  Nov 21, 2008  0  51  49 
Poland  0.40  Dec 1, 2008  0  77  23 
Portugal  0.61  Dec 13, 2008  0  100  0 
Slovak 
Republic 
1.10  Jan 28, 2009  0  42  58 
Spain  2.43  Nov 28, 2008  31  46  23 





Nov 24, 2008 
15  93  -8 
EU-stimulus  /  Nov 26, 2008  /  /  / 
Source: OECD 2009a, EC 2009a, own data. 
 
The earliest packages were adopted by the United Kingdom and Germany at the end of 
September and the beginning of October 2008; the latest were Finland and the Czech 
Republic at the end of January and beginning of February 2009. All other countries fall 
within this 4-month interval, with most countries announcing their plans at the end of 
November or beginning of December. The EU itself took up the case for a coordinated 
stimulus in November, pledging an EU-wide stimulus in December 2008. If we take early 
September as our reference point for the end of the agenda-setting process, we can derive 
that the policy formulation process took between one (Germany’s first stimulus) to five 
months (Finland, Czech Republic).  This interval represents the decision lag experienced in 
the response to the crisis. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to obtain data for the implementation dates of all these 
packages. Since most of them still have to undergo the process of legislative approval and 
administrative implementation after their announcement, the implementation lag might be 
considerable in several cases.  
Even without knowledge of the implementation lag, we might still try to give a provisional 
answer to the question if measures were enacted timely to counter the crisis and not to 
create a pro-cyclical effect. The stimulus packages itself are spread out over a number of 
years, mostly 2009 and 2010. Only the UK and Spain had planned to enact measures in 
2008. In the case of Spain, this mainly consists of tax cuts and measures to counter the 
national housing bubble in April 2008, making these measures less relevant as a response 
to the effects of the crisis which were only felt later on.  
                                                 
33 Division of discretionary measures are based on the full fiscal stimulus package. 
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As most money has been directed to flow into the economy in 2009 and 2010, the obvious 
question is whether the economic downturn will still be in effect. Initial forecast from the 
IMF (2008a) predicted recovery by the end of 2009.  
However, this concerns an end of the recession and not a return to pre-recession 
standards. Other studies show that a credit crunch generally needs a recovery time of 2.5 
years, while a housing bubble only recovers after 4.5 years (Claessens, S. et al.). The 
effects of the recession are said to last well into 2010 and later. Eurostat data still shows a 
further rise of unemployment figures throughout Europe (Germany being the exception) 
well into 2010. GDP growth rate has been estimated at 1 per cent for 2010 the EU-27 and 
only 0.9 per cent for the euro area after a loss of 4.2 per cent in 2009.  
Even if we would estimate a considerable implementation lag of six months, stimulus would 
still come into effect around June 2009 for European countries, still very well within the 
period of economic distress and thus fully acting as counter-cyclical policy. It seems safe to 
state that in general, European stimulus was enacted timely to act as a stabiliser against 
the crisis. 
Temporary measures 
Now that we have established the European stimulus to be timely, we need to address the 
q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  i t  i s  a l s o  t e m p o r a r y .  T a ble 13 has shown the spread of the proposed 
stimulus packages, indicating that they as a whole would only last until the end of 2010. As 
such, the discretionary measures seem to be temporary. Of course, this only displays the 
intention of governments at the time discretionary packages were announced. The case 
studies will show that several countries prolonged the lifespan of some measures beyond 
the limit that was first set. Even so, it is important to note that most measures were 
initiated with time limits or budgetary limits in place, guaranteeing their temporary nature, 
as prolonging them could only be done by making a new discretionary decision. 
Of course, governments cannot keep running deficits to stimulate the economy. Corsetti, G, 
identifies the three phases of a recession. After the phase of economic downturn and 
government response, the third phase has or is about to set in, one of fiscal consolidation 
and contraction. Several governments are discussing or have already started to cut 
expenditures in order to consolidate government budgets and end deficits. The UK has 
already started a programme of deficit reduction, effectively ending its stimulus to the 
economy. Greece, as a result of its large budget deficit, has been forced into strict 
austerity, but it has also been unable to decide on a stimulus package because of the same 
budget deficit. While fiscal consolidation is necessary and to be approved as means to avoid 
undermining long-term macro-economic stability (Corsetti, G.), questions about timing are 
crucial. Once again, the field of economics is divided on a swift retrenchment of 
government budgets, some applauding consolidation and urging governments to strict 
austerity, while other see an early contraction as a sure way to smother economic 
recovery. Countries within the euro zone will also have less favourable macro-economic 
result of contraction policies than those outside of it, since they have no direct control over 
the exchange rate and monetary policy (Hjelm, G.). 
2.3.3.  Case study: Belgium compared to the Netherlands 
To delve deeper into the time-related aspect of the discretionary stimulus packages, we 
present a double case study of Belgium and the Netherlands, analysing their stimulus 
packages, the timeliness of the measures taken and the unwinding of the stimulus in 
general. The two countries make interesting cases as both are comparable in size but have 
a different state organisation and exhibit significant differences in social security systems 
and the functioning of the labour market. Belgium is a federal state divided in effect by two 
language groups. Coalition governments are regularly formed by five or more parties.  
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The Netherlands, in contrast, has a unitary state with coalitions generally based on three 
parties. Notable social differences are the systems of unemployment benefits and the 
unemployment rate.  
Belgium is the only country with an unlimited duration on benefits, while unemployment 
benefits in the Netherlands have a maximum duration of 38 months, albeit the payment 
rate is higher in the Netherlands. Structural unemployment is also higher in Belgium than in 
the Netherlands, with a rate of 7.0 and 2.8 per cent, respectively, before the crisis in 2008. 
This list of differences is not exhaustive, but they may act as explanatory variables to the 
timing and contents of stimulus packages in both countries. 
Both countries were at the fore when the financial crisis hit Europe. Several Belgian banks 
had to be bailed out because of large stocks of toxic assets. On September 28, 2008 the 
Dutch and Belgian governments both nationalised parts of Fortis Bank, after which Belgium 
also had to nationalise Dexia on October 1. As a result, we place the end of the agenda 
setting process for both countries in September, as we can be sure that both governments 
were made aware of the problems posed by the financial crisis. At that moment, the next 
stage of the policy process sets in, the formulation of a policy response. The Dutch 
government was the first to announce a stimulus package containing measures supporting 
the economy on November 21. Three weeks later, Belgium’s federal government followed 
with its own stimulus package. In the Netherlands, the first package was followed by a 
second, which was passed through parliament on March 25, 2009. The Belgian first 
economic recovery law was passed a little later, on April 7, 2009, with a second law later in 
June. 
 
Table 14: Policy cycle for general stimulus packages in Belgium and the 
Netherlands 
  Belgium  Netherlands 
Agenda setting  Late Sept, 2008  Late Sept, 2008 
Policy formulation  Sept – Dec, 11 2008 
Sept, 2008 - Nov 21, 2008 
(Mar, 2009) 
Implementation 
Dec 11, 2008 – Apr 7/Jun 25, 
2009 
Nov 21, 2008 – Apr, 2009 
Inside lag(min.)  27-39 weeks  10 - 27 weeks 
Exit strategy?  December 31, 2010 
Apr 1, 2010 
Jul 11, 2011 
Source: own data. 
 
Table 14 shows the policy cycle for both countries. It is safe to assume that both countries 
started of the policy process at the same time, making a comparison additionally valuable. 
Of course, one must not forget that this comparison is based on an aggregated view of the 
total stimulus package. As a reference point for the start of the implementation stage we 
have taken the moment stimulus measures passed parliament either as an announcement 
of cabinet measures or as legislation. Individual measures may be enacted faster or slower, 
as not all are required to be translated into legislation. We will make a comparison on some 
of these specific measures later. 
The comparison shows that it took the Netherlands about eight weeks to decide on an initial 
set of stimulus measures, a few weeks faster than the Belgian government, who needed 11 
weeks. However, one has to be aware of the fact that the Belgian package was far more 
extensive and complete, while the complete Dutch package was only presented in March 
2009, 26 weeks after the events in September. Comparing the implementation of social 
stimulus measures is a far more difficult matter.  
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The first Belgian economic recovery law came into effect on April 7, 2009. A second, 
containing addition matters concerning employment and the labour market was 
promulgated on June 25, 2009. Most measures were contained within these law proposals 
and set a clear date for implementation resulting in an implementation lag of about 17 
weeks after announcement of the first package.  The initial Dutch measures, however, were 
mostly cabinet measures that did not require approval by law, meaning that they came into 
effect almost immediately.  
The start up of special job centres, for example, was initiated in November and was 
declared fully operational in the beginning of March, well before the first Belgian recovery 
law came into effect. Other non-social discretionary measures, such as investment 
programmes, were only approved by law in July 2009.  
Neither stimulus was too late to have its effect as a stabilising tool in the economy, as the 
crisis and its effects lasted well into 2010. That being said, the Dutch approach seems to 
have been more efficient in responding timely. Explaining the causes of this difference 
would entail a far more detailed study, but the availability of tools, cabinet measures 
versus laws, matters. It is also possible that the complexity of the Belgian government took 
its toll on the response time needed to implement its stimulus package. One must also 
keep in mind that the efficiency of the measures does not guarantee their effectiveness. 
 
The Belgian social stimulus 
Table 15: Social stimulus measures taken by the Belgian government
34 
Typology  Measures  Duration 
Budget in 
€ mio 
Cutting (corporate) Labour costs: 
- lower contributions on team and night 
labour 
- lowering general social charges 










Flexible working time: 
- expansion temporary unemployment: 
higher benefits, broader application 







- increase of workers’ pensions 
- increase in Family/age benefits 
- increase in welfare envelope 












- fast indexation of tax scales 











measures  Energy discounts: 
- onetime discount EUR 30/household 







Source: Belgian recovery plan ‘Herstel het vertrouwen’ law, June 25, 2009, own data. 
 
The Belgian stimulus package consists almost entirely of social stimulus measures. Almost 
96 per cent of the stimulus measures proposed in December were social measures 
(European Commission, 2009a). Another set of social measures was added in June 
specifically targeting employment, adding further to the measures already in place.  
                                                 
34 This table is based on the recovery laws of April 7 and June 25, 2009. Some measures have since been 
expanded or extended.  
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Table 15 gives an overview of the social stimulus undertaken by the Belgian Federal 
government. The measures were categorised in accordance with the typology developed 
earlier. When possible, the duration and the cost of each measure are displayed. It 
immediately becomes apparent that the stimulus adopted existed primarily of the 
temporary alteration of existing automatic stabilisers, temporarily slashing social 
contributions, expanding benefits and applying existing systems on broader groups.  
Most measures were taken in the first package implemented on April 7, 2009, but in June 
the temporary unemployment formerly only available to workers also became available for 
clerks
35; methods to reduce work time and workers premium for dismissal were added. 
These new measures were directly introduced as legislation. None of the cost estimates 
have been found; and hence, the number and the relative cost of full discretionary 
measures is very limited in comparison. In general, the Belgian government clearly aimed 
at the stabilisation of consumption by guaranteeing sufficient income and cutting labour 
costs to avoid full unemployment and loss of skills. 
It is not clear, however, if all of the measures indicated to be temporary will prove to be so. 
Apart from the explicit mention of outplacement regulation becoming permanent and the 
absence of duration in the lowering of social charges for researchers, each measure was 
mentioned in function of its cost per year applied. Several measures had already been 
extended, each time for several months, but since the effects of the crisis can still be felt, it 
is not yet possible to conclude if some measures - apart from the two mentioned above - 
will remain in effect indefinitely.  
The Dutch social stimulus 
The initial Dutch social stimulus package consisted for about 80 per cent out of social 
measures (European Commission, 2009a). Since later on many investment projects were 
added, this percentage has significantly lowered in the meantime. Most measures fall into 
the category of fully discretionary measures. As such they are completely additional to 
automatic stabilisers. The Dutch government has clearly focused its efforts on specific 
project concerning education, employability and innovation added with a reduction in labour 
costs by using part-time unemployment. The duration seems clearly to be spread over 
2009 and 2010, making the measures temporary in nature, but it is not clear when 
measures will end precisely, since some projects do not seem able to experience sudden 
cut-offs.   
 
 
35 Social security systems in Belgium still differentiate between workers and clerks. 
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Table 16: Social stimulus measures taken by the Dutch government
36 




related to automatic 
stabilisers 
Part-time unemployment 





Focus on youth unemployment 






Aid for debt relief  2009-2010  80 
Stimulating profession education 
(internships, education) 
2009-2010  250 
High-tech top projects and 
researchers 
2009-2010  280 
Full discretionary 
measures 
Extension of ending programmes 
on innovation (FES) 
2009-2010  96 
218 
Source: Dutch policy agreement ‘Samen Werken, Samen Leven’, own data. 
 
Comparison of the Belgian and Dutch stimulus packages 
When the two social stimulus packages are compared clear differences emerge. While the 
Belgian package puts its emphasis on the use of discretionary measures related to 
automatic stabilisers, the Dutch package uses far more fully discretionary solutions. There 
are no clear explanations for this significant difference. Once again the complexity of 
governments may account for the difference as the Belgian government tends to use 
existing systems perhaps to avoid more difficult discussion on creating completely new 
measures. The Belgian social stimulus also exceeds the Dutch one not only relative to the 
total stimulus but also in absolute costs.  
Concerning the policy cycle, the typology of the social stimulus might explain part of the 
difference in timeliness between the two countries. Automatic stabilisers are anchored in 
legislation, making changes more time consuming. The Dutch government on the other 
hand could pass its fully discretionary measures far more quickly, either because it did not 
require passing legislation or because its measures did not have to be studied and 
remodelled to fit in with existing legislation. 
It would be interesting to see whether the temporary nature of the stimulus undertaken is 
easier to uphold in Belgium or in the Netherlands. Stimulus related to automatic stabilisers 
is easy to maintain, but also easy to phase out. Projects of a continued nature such as 
education and ensuring employability, initiated by stimulus measures may prove more 
difficult to end as policy-makers may fear the loss of systems considered valuable for 
society.  
                                                 
36 Based on measures taken in November 2008 and the plan presented in March 2009 in which those measures 
were incorporated. 
37 Part-time unemployment and the system of tendering was conceived under the same budget. 
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Part-time unemployment as special case 
Part-time unemployment or short-time work is a standard case of reducing labour costs for 
firms in times of crisis (see also section 2.1.1.). In the Netherlands, the system was 
designed especially for the crisis. The work time of employees could be reduced by 20 to 50 
per cent for a period of 13 weeks. This arrangement can be extended three times, each 
time for a period of 13 weeks, unless the end date exceeds a fixed end-date for all users. 
The Belgian system is called crisis ‘time credit’ and a similar system was already in place 
enabling workers to work part-time or invest time in family or study without immediate loss 
of income. A new form was invented to act as a stabilising measure during the crisis. Work 
time could either be reduced by 20 or by 50 per cent. There is not fixed time restriction as 
it depends on the conditions firms are facing such as a continued loss of revenue.  
The systems are comparable in nature but not in size. At its peak in the Netherlands, 
around 40,000 workers received part-time unemployment benefits. In contrast, only about 
2,010 workers in Belgium used this crisis time credit in 2009. However, the numbers 
cannot be compared directly, as Dutch workers received those benefits for at least 13 
weeks, whilst the duration of Belgian workers shortened work time varies. However, 
Belgium also used temporary unemployment and regular time credit, accounting for 
279,000 and 118,000 employees, respectively, in the course of 2009. 
 
Table 17: Use of part-time unemployment in Belgium and the Netherlands 
  Belgium  Netherlands 






Agenda setting  Sept, 2008  6.8  Sept, 2008  2.8 
Policy 
formulation 
May 20, 2009  8.3  Mar 25, 2009  4.3 
Implementation  Jun 25, 2009  8.0  Apr 1, 2009  4.5 
Proposed exit  Dec 31, 2009  8.2 
End Budget 
Jun 23, 2009 
4.7 
Extension  June 30, 2010  8.8  Apr 1, 2010  4.3 
  Sept 30, 2010  8.7  Oct, 2010  4.4 
  Dec 31, 2010  NA  Jul 1, 2011
38  NA 
Source: own data, Eurostat. 
 
 
Table 17 shows the policy cycle of the measures concerning part-time unemployment in 
both Belgium and the Netherlands, matched with the transition dates and unemployment 
rates at the time. In Belgium, this was an additional measure added to measures already 
taken in April 2009. A significant lag failed to occur in either country, as measures were 
quickly implemented.  
Most interesting are the proposed exit dates. Part-time unemployment in both countries 
was supposed to have already ended. In the Netherlands, it was in effect ended for a short 
period, as the allocated budgets had run out in June. The unemployment rates give a good 
indication of the state of the economy and the eventual need for further extension. It is 
clear that the unemployment rate in Belgium has not yet stabilised and is still growing. In 
the Netherlands, the unemployment rate has decreased for the moment.  
                                                 
38 Extension has been approved, but with several important changes for the applicants of the program. 
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The measure actually ended for most companies in April 2010. Only for those industries 
which face a long wait between orders and where the effects on the availability of work 
have only just come into play are still eligible to use the system. 
2.4. Fiscal  constraints 
KEY FINDINGS 
 
  In a sample of 19 European countries and the US, we find that both high budget 
deficits and debt levels before the start of the crisis had significantly negative 
effects on the size of discretionary measures taken during the crisis. At least some 
governments were constrained in their decision-making because of weak financial 
positions. Empirical research has shown that the relationship between government 
debt and real GDP growth is weak for debt/GDP ratios below a threshold of 90 per 
cent of GDP, but that growth rates fall substantially if government debt is above 
this threshold. 
  Taking into account that fiscal balances and debt levels have dramatically 
worsened in almost all advanced economies due to the economic crisis, an exertion 
taken in the last crisis is not repeatable in the near future. Debt levels are 
projected to remain on a high level and it will take a long time until pre-crisis 
levels are reached. Recent projections manifest that the aim of achieving 
sustainable public finances will be a long-term task, which will require fiscal 
discipline in the upcoming years. 
  A challenge for governments in Europe is to find the optimal consolidation path, 
i.e. to reach consensus about fiscal austerity. As each country starts from a 
different initial position in terms of debt and deficit levels and the state of the 
economy in general, each country should implement the policy which best fits its 
own conditions. Fiscal consolidation will be necessary when economic conditions 
start to improve. Projections indicate that lowering the gross general government 
debt-to-GDP ratio back to 60 per cent by 2030 in advanced economies would 
require improving the cyclically adjusted primary balance by 8.7 percentage points 
of GDP from 2010 to 2020. Less ambitious targets could have negative 
implications for economic performance.  
  Steady but gradual consolidation may be the strategy that has the lowest cost in 
terms of lost output. Recent policy measures indicate that this is indeed the 
strategy which European governments are going to follow. 
 
In this chapter, we first discuss to what extent governments have been constrained by high 
deficits and debt levels and large costs of automatic stabilisers during the economic crisis to 
enact fiscal stimulus packages. Second, we take an outlook to consider the medium and 
long-term sustainability of public finances and social protection systems. 
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2.4.1.  Explanations for differences in size of discretionary measures 
In this section, potential explanations for differences in size of fiscal stimulus packages are 
discussed to figure out whether financial constraints had an impact on the discretionary 
policy measures taken by governments during the economic crisis. For this analysis, it is 
crucial to account for different factors which might affect the size of the programmes in 
order to isolate the impact of budget deficits and debt levels. In the following, we highlight 
four potential factors which might had an impact on discretionary measures: (i) budget 
deficits and (ii) debt levels before the start of the economic crisis (2007), (iii) the size of 
automatic stabilisers and (iv) the openness of the economy and show how these factors 
affected real policy measures.  
In the debate on fiscal policy responses to the crisis, some countries have been criticised 
for being reluctant to enact fiscal stimulus programmes in order to stabilise demand, in 
particular Germany. One reaction to this criticism was to point to the fact that automatic 
stabilisers in Germany are more important than in other countries (see section 2.2), so that 
less discretionary action is required. This raises the general question of whether countries 
with weaker automatic stabilisers have taken more discretionary fiscal policy action to 
compensate for this. 
A further concern in the policy debate put forward by supporters of large and coordinated 
discretionary measures was that countries could limit the size of their programmes at the 
expense of countries with more generous fiscal policy responses. The central factor behind 
this hypothesis is the degree of openness of an economy. The more open an economy is, 
i.e. the stronger the economic ties with other countries are, the more likely it is that a 
country gains from other countries’ fiscal stimulus packages or, conversely, the more likely 
it is that own fiscal stimulus measures spill over to other countries. Hence, the idea behind 
this argument is that some countries might show a free-rider behaviour and profit from 
spill-over effects of discretionary measures (see also section 2.2.2.).
39  
Finally, it could simply be the case that governments have been financially constrained to 
enact large fiscal stimulus packages because of high budget deficits or debt levels before 
the start of the crisis. To shed some light on these issues, we run a multivariate regression 
of the four explanatory variables ‘budget deficit in 2007’, ‘debt level in 2007’, ‘size of 
automatic stabilisers measured by income stabilisation coefficient’ (see section 2.2.) and 
‘openness of the economy measured by the share of exports and imports to GDP’ on the 
size of discretionary measures taken during the economic crisis. In a sample of 19 
European countries and the US, we find that both high budget deficits and debt levels 
before the start of the crisis (2007) had significantly negative effects on the size of 
discretionary measures taken during the crisis. This is an interesting finding which indicates 
that at least some governments were constrained in their decision-making because of weak 
financial positions. Taking into account that fiscal balances and debt levels have 
dramatically worsened in almost all advanced economies due to the economic crisis (see 
Tables A11 and A12 in the appendix), one can conclude that such an exertion taken in the 
last crisis is not repeatable in the near future. 
Further, our analysis shows that more open economies have, on average, enacted smaller 
stimulus packages giving some support to the hypothesis that free-rider behaviour indeed 
played a role, at least to some extent (see Figure 15). Finally, there is no significant 
relationship between the size of automatic stabilisers and discretionary measures (see 
Figure 16).  
 
39 In that sense, a fiscal stimulus programme can be seen as a positive externality since potential positive effects 
are not limited to the country of origin. 
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Our finding of a small correlation between automatic stabilisers and discretionary measures 
qualifies the view that countries with lower automatic stabilisers have engaged in more 
discretionary fiscal policy action. 
Figure 12 shows debt and budget positions of European countries before the start of the 
economic crisis in 2007. Several countries already had a debt level above 60 per cent, 
among them France and Germany with levels slightly above 60 per cent, and Greece and 
Italy near (Greece) or above (Italy) 100 per cent. Empirical research (Reinhart, C.M. and 
Rogoff, K., 2010) has shown that the relationship between government debt and real GDP 
growth is weak for debt/GDP ratios below a threshold of 90 per cent of GDP, but that 
growth rates fall substantially if government debt is above this threshold.
40  These findings 
indicate that debt levels observed in Greece and Italy were rather unsustainable even 
before the start of the economic crisis.  
In the Greece case, a further aspect which should have caused serious worries is the large 
budget deficit which was as high as 5.1 per cent in 2007. A similar value (5.0 per cent) was 
observed in Hungary. At the other end of the spectrum, there were several countries with 
debt levels substantially below 60 per cent and balanced budgets or even budget surpluses. 
All Nordic countries belong to this group and also Continental European (e.g. Luxembourg 
or the Netherlands) and Southern/Eastern European countries (Spain or Estonia). 
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Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat. 
 
                                                 
40 According to Reinhart, C.M. and Rogoff, K., 2010, emerging markets face lower thresholds for external debt. 
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2.4.2.  Medium to long-term sustainability of public finances and social protection systems 
Tables A11 and A12 in the appendix show that the economic crisis and consequential policy 
responses – i.e. both automatic stabilisers and discretionary fiscal measures – yielded a 
structural break in budget deficits and debt levels in 2009/2010.
41 For example, Germany, 
which had reached a balanced budget in 2007 and 2008, failed to meet the Maastricht 
criterion of a 3 per cent upper deficit limit in 2009. Other countries, such as Spain, Greece, 
Ireland or the United Kingdom, were confronted with budget deficits of even above 10 per 
cent. Parallel to rising deficits, governments also faced increasing debt levels and the 
majority of euro area countries failed to meet the second Maastricht criterion, a maximum 
debt to GDP ratio of 60 per cent, as well.  
Projections of the IMF (Tables A13 and A14 in the appendix) indicate that deficits and debt 
levels are likely to reach a peak in 2010 (in some countries in 2011) before economic 
recovery and fiscal austerity will lead to declining deficits.  
However, debt levels are projected to remain on a high level, and it will take a long time 
until pre-crisis levels are reached. This is illustrated in Figure 13, which shows projected 
debt to GDP ratios and deficit levels for 2015. While only a few countries were confronted 
with debt levels above 70 per cent and deficits above 3 per cent in 2007, projections for 
2015 show that there is a large group of countries with debt and deficits levels close to 100 
per cent and 5 per cent, respectively. These projections manifest that the aim of achieving 
sustainable public finances will be a long-term task which will require fiscal discipline in the 
coming years. 
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Source: Own calculations based on IMF, 2010b. 
                                                 
41 A l t h o u g h  a c t i v e  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  m e a s u r e s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c  c r i s i s  c a n  b e  e a s i l y  q u a n t i f i e d ,  i t  i s  h a r d  t o  
disentangle how much of rising deficits can be attributed to automatic stabilisers because behavioural effects of 
economic agents, such as labour supply responses, have to be controlled for. 
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A challenge for governments in Europe will be to find the optimal consolidation path, i.e. to 
reach consensus about fiscal austerity. As each country starts from a different initial 
position in terms of debt and deficit levels and the state of the economy in general, one 
could argue that each country should implement the policy which best fits its own 
conditions. Nevertheless, in its latest ‘Fiscal Monitor’, the IMF, 2010b, tries to portray how 
austerity should look like both in advanced and emerging economies. A key message from 
this report is that fiscal consolidation will be necessary in the advanced economies once 
economic conditions start to improve. Projections indicate that lowering the gross general 
government debt-to-GDP ratio back to 60 per cent for advanced economies by 2030 (pre-
crisis median) would require improving the cyclically adjusted primary balance by 8.7 
percentage points of GDP over the period 2010-2020, from a projected deficit of 4.9 per 
cent in 2010 to a surplus of 3.8 per cent of GDP in 2020. For emerging economies, fiscal 
policy challenges are more modest. Further, it is pointed out that less ambitious targets 
could have negative implications for economic performance which is in line with the 
research finding of Reinhart, C.M. and Rogoff, K., 2010.  
How does the current situation look like in 2010? In the first half of 2010, government bond 
ratings deteriorated and sovereign debt premia substantially increased in certain European 
countries, exerting pressure on national governments to implement fiscal consolidation 
packages. Among these countries are Denmark (announced fiscal consolidation of EUR 3.2 
billion), Germany (EUR 80 billion), Greece (EUR 30 billion), Ireland (EUR 12 billion), Italy 
(EUR 24.9 billion), Portugal (EUR 2 billion), Spain (EUR 65 billion) and the United Kingdom 
(GBP 6 billion) (national sources). As fiscal consolidation can be achieved through tax 
increases and cuts in spending; which of these policies is more successful is a crucial 
question for policy-makers. It can be argued that in the current situation the size of public 
debt is too high to place the whole burden of the correction on higher taxes (Corsetti, G.). 
Moreover, recent research has shown that a gradual implementation of spending cuts has 
several desirable effects (Corsetti, G. et al.). Corsetti, G. et al. suggest that steady but 
gradual consolidation may be the strategy that has the lowest cost in terms of lost output. 
Recent policy measures indicate that this is indeed the strategy which European 
governments are going to follow. Detailed information on medium-term consolidation plans 
can be found in Table A15 in the appendix.  
Given beginning fiscal austerity in some countries and ambitious consolidation paths 
recommended by the IMF, what are the implications for social protection systems and their 
sustainability? First, changing demographic structures, particularly in advanced economies 
and hence in the majority of European countries, will cause spending pressures in the 
future. According to the IMF, 2010c, spending increases in health and pensions are 
projected, on average, at 4 to 5 percentage points of GDP in advanced economies over the 
next 20 years. Countries differ markedly in the necessary change of the primary balance to 
lower public debt below 60 per cent of GDP and in the increase in spending pressures for 
pensions and health. This relationship is shown in Figure 14. The majority of large 
economies of Western Europe have total health and pension spending increases above 3 
per cent of GDP from 2011 to 2030 which strengthen the fiscal adjustment pressure. 
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Figure 14: Illustrative fiscal adjustment and projected age-related spending 
increases in 2011-2030 (in per cent of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF, 2010c. 
Second, the IMF, 2010b, points out that health care constitutes the key challenge in 
stabilising age-related spending pressures since health care spending is projected to rise, 
on average, by 3.5 percentage points of GDP in 2010-30 in advanced economies. The IMF 
recommends that reforms should contain both supply and demand-side measures. For a 
comparison, pension expenditure is projected to rise by 1 percentage point of GDP in the 
same time period. The IMF recommends that pension reforms should focus on increases in 
statutory retirement ages, and, if needed, benefit reductions and increases in contributions. 
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Figure 15: Discretionary measures and openness of the economy 
  
Figure 16: Discretionary measures and automatic stabilisers (measure by the 
income stabilisation coefficient) 
   
94 








  There has been a dual-track or two-tier reform strategy during the last 30 years in 
Europe. These reforms in most cases did not change - and may have even 
tightened - rules for regular or open-ended contracts. Instead, reforms were 
carried out primarily by changing rules only for new hires, introducing a wide array 
of flexible, fixed-term types of contracts or expanding the scope of existing 
temporary contracts. These asymmetric reforms caused a dramatic increase of the 
use of fixed-term workers, which did not exist in most countries only two decades 
ago. 
  The share of temporary contracts steadily increased before the recession in 
countries with stricter employment protection. As it is clear from the picture, 
temporary contracts are overrepresented among young (those aged less than 35) 
and less educated workers (primary level). 
  However, temporary workers, in particular the young, experienced the majority of 
recession-related job losses, and hence this share has been falling in the recession. 
Four countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy and France) experienced an increase in the 
share of temporary workers who declare that the temporary contract was the only 
kind of contract at their disposal, regardless the nature of the job. 
  Figures suggest that younger people are much less covered than older workers 
both in non-dual and dual countries, but in the latter group the difference between 
the share of young and middle-aged covered is very high. This suggests that 
younger benefit recipients, who are also the more involved in temporary jobs, are 
the most exposed to unemployment-related poverty. 
  At the national level, some measures have been adopted during the last year, but 
looking at the data it really seems that further improvements urge on the 
unemployment benefits side because those most affected are the least protected. 
  What matters the most is the strong need of universal and unique unemployment 
benefit systems, in all European countries. Preliminary evidence suggests that 
social protection acts differently for different type of contracts, but there is no 
economic reason to have such discrimination. 
 
The spread of dual-track reforms 
The new version of the Social Reforms database, assembled by the Fondazione Rodolfo 
Debenedetti in cooperation with the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), documents the 
reforms that have occurred in Europe in the last 30 years in the fields of Employment 
Protection Legislation (EPL) and Non-Employment Benefits (NEB). The inventory indicates 
that 92 per cent of EPL regulatory changes involving a discrete change in the level of the 
overall index did not apply to workers with permanent contracts. In other words, there has 
been a dual-track (or two-tier) reform strategy during the last 30 years in Europe. 
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These reforms in most cases did not change — and may have even tightened — rules for 
regular or open-ended contracts. Instead, reforms were carried out primarily by changing 
rules only for new hires, introducing a wide array of flexible, fixed-term types of contracts 
or expanding the scope of existing temporary contracts.  
For instance, in Italy the ‘Treu Package’ in 1997 removed restrictions on the use of fixed-
term contracts and introduced temporary agency work without modifying the rules for 
open-ended contracts. 
Measures of labour market dualism 
As already documented in the last World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2010a), these asymmetric 
reforms caused a dramatic increase of the use of fixed-term workers, which did not exist in 
most countries only two decades ago. Countries with the strictest provisions for regular 
contracts experienced a boom in the share of fixed-term (temporary) contracts in total 
dependent employment. Indeed, the increasing use of temporary workers has not only 
resulted in dual-track, two-tier labour arrangements but has also blurred the boundary 
between dependent employment and self-employment.
42 
As we can appreciate from the OECD EPL index, the widely used measure of severity of 
employment protection legislation based on an assessment of national regulations, the 
reforms since 1990 (see table) have been broadly aimed at reducing dismissal costs, 
notably in countries that already had the strictest standards. The table below lists all 
European countries whose EPL reforms involved a change in the overall index exceeding 
two thirds of the cross-country standard deviation in the index in 1990. We observe also a 
converging path: the contemporaneous decline in the average of the overall index for 
European OECD countries and of the cross-country standard deviation of this indicator. 
Table 18: Severity of employment protection legislation in Europe, 1990 – 2008 




  1990  2008  1990  2008 
Belgium  3.15  2.18  1.68  1.73 
Denmark  2.40  1.50  1.68  1.63 
Germany  3.17  2.12  2.58  3.00 
Greece  3.50  2.73  2.25  2.33 
Italy  3.57  1.89  1.77  1.77 
Portugal  4.10  3.15  4.83  4.17 
Spain  3.82  2.98  3.88  2.46 
Sweden  3.49  1.87  2.90  2.86 
Mean (all European OECD 
countries) 
2.49  2.04  2.33  2.32 
St. Dev. (all European OECD 
countries) 
1.16  0.78  0.94  0.67 
Source: OECD; IMF, 2010a. 
                                                 
42 For a theoretical contribution to the literature on labour market reforms please see Boeri, T. 
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Moreover, Figure 17 suggests that the level in the EPL regular index is highly correlated 
with the share of temporary workers. In particular, in 2008 the correlation coefficient 
between the two variables is 0.81.
43 However, the measurement of dualism is a non-trivial 
exercise because the two-tier nature of these labour markets affects many dimensions, 
from the probability of transition between labour market status to wage differentials. As 
can be seen from the Figure 18, there is strong evidence that transition probability from 
temporary to permanent positions is once again correlated (negatively) with the severity of 
employment protection legislation (ρ=-0.72). 



















































1 2 3 4
EPL Regular Contracts Index - 2008
 
Source: OECD and Eurostat labour force statistics. 
 
                                                 
43 In Europe, labour market suffered the first decrease in unemployment around the second quarter of 2008. In 
most of the European countries, unemployment rates are still rising at the moment of writing this report. 
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1 2 3 4
EPL Regular Contracts Index - 2008
 
Source: OECD; European Union Survey of Income and Living Conditions 2004-2007 (longitudinal component). 
 
 
The wage premium also reflects the stronger bargaining power of regular workers and the 
fact that workers with flexible contracts are not covered by EPL and have little or no access 
to unemployment benefits in case of job loss. The premium can be estimated as the 
coefficient of a dummy variable on permanent contracts, in a (monthly) wage regression of 
male dependent employment, controlling for education and tenure: 
22
121 2 () ii i i i log w EDU EDU TEN TEN PERM u            i i , 
where i indexes individuals. The results, reported in the first column of Table 19, suggest 
that in dual countries, permanent contracts workers are paid from 44.7 (Sweden) to 10 per 
cent (Greece) more than workers on temporary contracts. Thereafter, we consider as dual 
countries France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden; non-dual countries are 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Ireland and United Kingdom. 
Finally, using the fRDB – IZA Social Reforms database, we can identify the percentage of 
EPL reforms which covered only part of the labour force (two-tier reforms) in the last 30 
years in European countries. The share of these reforms among the total of employment 
protection reforms varies consistently. However, half of the countries covered in the 
database have a share of two-tier reforms which is higher than 50 per cent (notably, Italy, 
Austria and Spain exceed 70 per cent). 
We can summarise in the following table, similar to that published by IMF, 2010a, the four 
main variables mentioned above through which we can measure labour market dualism. 
The wage premium (first column) can be compared with the share of fixed-term employees 
in total dependent employment in the second column, also reported in Figure 19.  
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The rankings between the two columns differ (the Spearman correlation coefficient between 
the two measures of dualism is 0.32), but the United Kingdom stands out as having the 
least disparity according to both measures. 
 

























Austria  20.1  8.9  47.4  84.6 
Belgium  13.9  8.8  40.4  75.0 
Denmark  17.7  7.8    55.6 
Finland  19.0  12.4  22.7  42.9 
France  28.9  13.7  13.6  41.2 
Germany  26.6  14.2    69.2 
Greece  10.3  12.9  31.3  53.8 
Ireland  17.8  9.0  46.3  38.5 
Italy  24.1  13.4  31.2  86.7 
Luxembourg  27.6  6.9  41.0   
Netherlands  35.4  16.6    43.7 
Portugal  15.8  22.2  12.1  35.7 
Spain  16.9  31.9  28.3  70.6 
Sweden  44.7  17.5    40.0 
United 
Kingdom 
6.5  5.8  45.7  16.0 
Sources: European Community Household Panel, European Union Survey of Income and Living Conditions and 
Eurostat labour force statistics, IMF, 2010a, and fRDB – IZA Social Reforms Database. 
*Estimated from matched records of the European Union Survey of Income and Living Conditions for 2004–07 
(last data available). 
Dual workers in times of recession 
The share of temporary contracts steadily increased before the 2008-2009 recession in 
countries with stricter EPL. However, temporary workers experienced the majority of 
recession-related job losses, and hence this share has been falling in the recession. The 
most representative country is Spain, in which the share of temporary workers declined by 
17 per cent during the period 2008 quarter 2 to 2010 quarter 1 (compared with 10 per cent 
for total employment); the same happened by almost 10 per cent in Italy (compared with 
3.5 per cent), by 7 per cent in France (compared with 2.2 per cent) and by 3.4 per cent in 
Germany (compared with an increase of 0.7 per cent in total employment).
44 
The following figures show the rise and fall of temporary contracts in some European 
countries from 2005 and 2009. Most of the countries experienced a drop in the mean share 
as a consequence of both the recession and of the severity of EPL for permanent contracts. 
                                                 
44 The source of these data is Eurostat Labour Force Survey database. Italian data on 2010 quarter 1 were not 
available at the time of writing the report; for this reason, we take into account the period 2008q2-2009q4. 
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However, if we look at Figure 20, which is based on quarterly data, it is clear that some 
countries still use temporary contracts to face seasonal variation in the demand (e.g., 
Sweden), while others do not. 
 
Figure 19: Share of temporary workers as a percentage of total dependent 
employment 
 
Source: Eurostat labour force statistics, 2005-2009. 
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Figure 20: Temporary workers as a percentage of dependent employment, 
quarterly data 
 
Source: Eurostat labour force statistics, 2005-2009. 
We have so far seen that some countries suffer an internal division of the labour market 
more than others: this phenomenon is relatively recent. As a consequence, there is a lack 
of empirical and theoretical studies on this subject, and due to scarce availability of data, 
there is still room to develop this argument. One of the main dimensions to be investigated 
deals with the characteristics of individuals holding a temporary contract. In this section, 
we try to shed some light on this issue using the information contained in the European 
Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions and on the last release of European Labour 
Force Survey micro database. 
The following figure illustrates the age and education level of workers. The reported 
measures are the odds ratio of temporary workers to permanent workers with respect to 
educational attainment (on the left) and age class (on the right). By construction, if the 
distribution of educational attainments and age classes were equal across the two worker 
groups, the ratios would add to 1. On the contrary, if the ratio is higher than 1, then 
temporary workers would be over represented. As it is clear from the picture, temporary 
contracts are overrepresented among young (those aged less than 35) and less educated 
workers (primary level). 
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Figure 21: Temporary workers: odds ratios by age and educational attainment 
 
Source: European Survey on Income and Living Conditions, 2008. 
 
Figure 22: Age distribution of temporary workers: variations before and during 
the crisis 
 
Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey, 2005-2008. 
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The age distribution of temporary workers changed slightly, on average, both before 
(average 2005-2007) and during the crisis (2008). What is really interesting is that the 
figure differs in dual and non-dual countries, as defined.
45 In the first group, the share of 
youngest workers having temporary contracts increased by 0.45 percentage points for 
those aged 20-24 and by 2.16 percentage points for those aged 15-19 in 2008, with 
respect to the 2005-2007 average. On the other hand, in non-dual countries the same 
share decreased respectively by 0.45 and 1.35 per cent. 
Focusing more on educational attainment, we built a measure of concentration of workers, 
based again on odds ratios, which consider both temporary contracts and unemployment 
incidence. The measure is the following: 
  Incidence of temporary workers: 
skill skill temp empl
temp empl
     ( 1 )  
  Incidence of unemployment:  
skill skill ul f
ul f
       ( 2 )  
where skill stands for primary, secondary or tertiary according to aggregated ISCED 
levels of education. 
In the following figure, we plot (2) (on the y axis) versus (1) (on the right axis). The result 
is hardly surprising: low skilled workers are highly concentrated in the top right quadrant, 
meaning that they are over represented among both unemployed and temporary workers. 
On the contrary, high skilled workers are mostly on the bottom left quadrant. 
                                                 
45 We consider as dual countries France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden. Non-dual countries are Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Ireland and United Kingdom. The European Labour Force Surveys released 
do not contain information on Netherlands. 
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Figure 23: Incidence of temporary workers and unemployed by educational 
attainment 
 
Source: European Survey on Income and Living Conditions, 2008. 
As will be further discussed, the lower human capital level which characterises temporary 
and unemployed workers raises serious concerns about the future growth of European 
countries and the consequent composition of their labour force. Workers with a low stock of 
human capital, low levels of training and long periods of inactivity would face major 
difficulties in re-entering the job market once the demand will rise again. 
Despite other major limits, the European Labour Force Survey also allows us to investigate 
an important aspect of dualism in Europe. In fact, it contains data on self-reported reasons 
for having a temporary contract. The following figures confirm prior evidence on labour 
market dualism. In particular, four countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy and France) 
experienced an increase in the share of temporary workers who declare that the temporary 
contract was the only kind of contract at their disposal, regardless the nature of the job.
46 
This figure is quite notable, and it clearly shows that in the last year temporary contracts 
are not used for the aim they have been created for. In general, this motivation explains 
more than 66 per cent of the motivations for having a temporary contract in these four 
countries plus Greece (82.9 per cent in Portugal, the maximum level, versus 15.9 per cent 
in Ireland, the minimum level). 
                                                 
46 The exact coding of the question is the following: ‘Person has temporary job/work contract of limited duration 
because: 1. It is a contract covering a period of training; 2. Person could not find a permanent job; 3. Person did 
not want a permanent job; 4. It is a contract for a probationary period; not applicable; no answer. 
104 




Figure 24: Temporary as only contract available, variations before and after the 
crisis 
 
Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey, 2005-2008. 
Dual workers and economic stabilisers 
A main concern regarding the use of temporary jobs, is the extent and the coverage of 
unemployment benefits, especially during recession periods. Some preliminary evidence 
suggests that the extent of unemployment risks and social protection do not coincide: 
national benefit schemes hardly cover former temporary workers with unemployment 
insurance. However, there is little empirical literature so far that covers this topic. Figari, F. 
et al. has recently analysed the extent of social protection using EUROMOD simulations in 
five European countries, while D’Amuri, F. has carried out an interesting analysis of the 
effects of the current crisis on the Italian labour market. 
The main reason why there is so little literature is a lack of data. In fact, Eurostat has yet 
to provide, at the time of writing this report, any longitudinal data on labour market 
variables. For this reason it is almost impossible to carry out any type of analysis based on 
micro data on flows from employment to unemployment status during the crisis and 
benefits recipients by type of contract. However, we know from above that some countries 
are more dual than others. So, we can analyse the coverage and extent of unemployment 
benefits both on age and on educational attainment dimensions, considering separately 
dual and non-dual countries. 
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Non-dual countries Dual countries
< 35y > 36y and < 55y > 55y
 
Source: European Survey on Income and Living Condition, 2008. 
The figure above suggests that younger people have much less cover than older workers 
both in non-dual and dual countries, but in the latter group the difference between the 
share of young and middle-aged covered is very high (around 10 percentage points, from 
27.5 to 37.2 per cent). This suggests that younger benefit recipients, who are also the 
more involved in temporary jobs, are the most exposed to unemployment related poverty. 
It is very likely that this problem has worsened during the current crisis, since the age 
distribution plotted in Figure 25 suggests that dual countries increased the use of 
temporary contracts for younger workers (Figari, F. et al.). 
A similar result can be obtained considering educational attainment. The histogram 
suggests once again that the mean coverage of unemployment benefits in dual countries is 
almost half than that of non-dual countries. However, it seems that workers are not 
discriminated among educational attainment, since the level of coverage does not differ too 
much between primary, secondary and tertiary level. 
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Figure 26: Coverage of unemployment benefits by education: non-dual and dual 
countries 
 
Source: European Survey on Income and Living Condition, 2008. 
OECD, 2009c, provides some interesting data on the level and generosity of unemployment 
benefits (net replacement rates) in OECD countries, already cited in section 2.1. On 
average, those countries considered as dualistic have a level of replacement rates which is 
above the OECD median, apart from Italy (which has the third lowest level on a five-year 
average unemployment spell basis). Unfortunately we are unable to match these data with 
any measure provided by Eurostat statistics. However, this suggests that for some 
countries there are problems not only with the coverage but also with the generosity of the 
programmes. At the national level, some measures have been adopted during the last year, 
but looking at the data it really seems that further improvements urge on the 
unemployment benefits side because those most affected are the least protected.
47  
A brief insight on Italian unemployment benefits system and dualism 
Using Italian Labour Force Survey, we are able to provide some further insights on social 
protection looking at the type of contract one year before the survey. This exercise gives 
some more accurate measure of how Italian social protection systems acts in case of 
unemployment. As a dual country, Italy is a very interesting case, and other national 
systems, such those of Spain, Greece or Portugal, are very similar, at least looking at the 
qualitative descriptions and the aggregate measures like those of OECD (see section 2.1.). 
In the following table, we report the coverage of unemployment benefits by contract type 
one year before the survey in the last three years (quarterly basis). On the contract side, 
we distinguish between three types of contract: permanent, temporary (or fixed-term) and 
other, meaning all the other types previous job (self employed, entrepreneurs and 
cooperative workers) and long-term unemployed. On the unemployment benefits side we 
considered together both ‘sussidio di disoccupazione’ and ‘indennità di mobilità’. 
 
                                                 
47 In Italy, the short-time work programme ‘Cassa Integrazione Guadagni’, which often acts as the main source for 
social protection even if its main purpose is that of helping firms when restructuring the production process, was 
extended in 2009 to some industries and categories of workers, including some groups of temporary workers, 
which were previously excluded (Italian law no 2/2009). 
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Table 20: Unemployment benefits coverage in Italy by type of contract one year 
before (%) 
  2007  2008  2009 
  q1  q2  q3  q4  q1  q2  q3  q4  q1  q2  q3  q4 
Permanent 
contract  20.4  19.1  20.1  16.8  13.5  9.8  22.5  20.7  18.9  24.0  22.9  21.5 
Temporary 
contract  0  0  2.9  0  4.1  2.1  2.7  5.8  0  3.8  4.8  1.9 
Other*  3.7  2.9  3.6  2.4  2.6  1.9  3.4  2.8  4.2  3.4  2.7  3.3 
Source: ISTAT Labour Force Survey, 2007-2009. Unemployed people without previous work experiences have 
been excluded from the calculations. * Other includes self employed (with and without employees), cooperatives 
workers and residual categories (including long-term unemployed). 
The table suggests that some improvement has been achieved in the last two years: the 
coverage of unemployment benefit programmes seems to be more constant overtime 
regardless the type of contract that the unemployed had one before the survey. In 
particular, former temporary workers are now partly covered while this rarely happened in 
2007. However, (large) problems still remain: the degree of social protection in Italy is 
small and limited to one type of unemployed, i.e. former permanent workers. Young 
workers, who are those more likely to have a fixed-term contract, do not usually have the 
possibility to accrue enough work experience, and therefore contributions to the social 
protection system, to be covered from unemployment risk. These data are worrisome and 
they suggest that much improvement is still needed to avoid that a large share of the 
population are exposed to poverty risk. 
Conclusions and policy implications 
The asymmetric structure of European labour market, and in particular in countries such as 
France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, has increased the responsiveness of 
employment and unemployment to production variations by allowing employers to hire 
temporary workers during the boom periods and to not confirm their contracts during 
recessions. IMF, 2010a, has already suggested that ‘a long expansionary period can result 
in a large “buffer stock” of temporary workers, whereas a long recession could significantly 
reduce their share in total employment’ (even though we have seen that this type of 
contract is still used to hire new young workers in dual countries). ‘This means that 
countries with more temporary workers could experience larger employment losses during 
a  r e c e s s i o n . ’  W e  h a v e  s e e n  t h a t  t h i s  i s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  l o w  c o v e r a g e  o f  
unemployment protection for these workers, and this is definitely the case of Italy and 
Spain. And moreover, ‘… temporary contracts can significantly increase employment during 
upturns. However, the heavy job losses associated with such contracts during the Great 
Recession have created strong pressure to phase out such arrangements.’ 
One way to make flexibility credible, and hence encourage more hiring during the recovery, 
is to reduce the dualism of labour markets by allowing for graded employment security, 
that is, dismissal costs in permanent contracts gradually increasing with tenure length. In 
particular, governments could promote entrance into the permanent labour market in 
stages, making job security provisions, in the form of mandated severance payments, 












Source: European Community Household Panel. 
An important policy issue related to these topics is the negative impact of temporary 
employment on human capital formation. Evidence from past recessions in European 
countries, as reported in Arpaia, A. and Curci, N., suggest that young workers were hit 
harder than any other group, and the descriptive evidence on young temporary workers 
herein raises some concern on how the youngest generation is going to be affected by the 
crisis. Moreover, past experiences suggest that fixed-term workers receive much less on-
the-job-training than permanent workers (Figure 27). Uncertainty and liquidity constraints 
that typically characterise recoveries from financial crises (IMF, 2010a) favour a larger use 
of temporary contracts because firms are discouraged from making long-term investments. 
The most similar experiences to the current situation occurred during the last decade in 
Japan and Sweden. These countries had a strong rise in the share of temporary contracts in 
the 1990s, contemporaneously to a financial boom. In particular, Japanese firms increased 
the relative share of dual labour force with negative effects on on-the job training, while in 
Sweden during the recovery from the crisis temporary work increased to become greater 
than before the crisis (from 10 per cent in 1990 to 16 per cent at the end of the 1990s). 
This means a new generation of workers could face a lack of adequate training in the wake 
of the Great Recession. 
What matters the most is the strong need of universal and unique unemployment benefit 
systems, in all European countries. Some preliminary evidence suggests that social 
protection acts differently for different type of contracts, but there is no economic reason to 
have such discrimination. The Italian case, which represents the typical case of a dualistic 
country, is essential in understanding how former temporary workers are more exposed to 
poverty risk, since they are not covered by social protection programmes. 
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Overall, dualism has increased the unemployment response during the crisis, since we have 
experienced more job losses than without dualism as in recent similar crisis. Furthermore, 
it has reduced the coverage of unemployment benefits, since the extent of unemployment 
risks and that of social protection mismatch. As a consequence, the European labour 
market and the European social protection system could be named ‘flexi-insecurity’ instead 
of flexicurity. Reforms in this field should be smart in reducing dualism without reducing 
employment growth during the recovery, i.e. extending the coverage of unemployment 
benefits keeping flexibility which is important mainly in the entry phase. 
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3. CASE  STUDIES   
The following section highlights a number of selected national cases exemplifying the 
interaction of automatic and discretionary stabilisation efforts in a given national 
institutional setting.  
3.1. Germany 
Germany was heavily affected by the steep decline in international trade due to the global 
crisis. This external shock led to a significant fall in orders and exports, particularly in core 
areas of the German production model, such as machinery and automobile manufacturing. 
However, despite its vulnerability due to the dependency on exports and the associated 
GDP decline of 5 per cent in 2009, unemployment has basically remained stable, as has the 
total employment rate.  
How can we explain this surprisingly resilient labour market performance (see Table 21)?  
Table 21: The different components of labour market reaction in Germany   
  2008  2009  2010 (medium 
projection) 
Real GDP (change in 
%) 
+1.0  -4.7  +3.0 
Total hours worked 
(change in %) 
+1.2  -2.5  +2.1 
Hourly productivity 
(change in %) 
-0.2  -2.2  +0.9 
Hours worked in full-
time (change in %) 
+1.1  -4.1  -0.6 
Short-time workers 
(1,000s) 
101  1,143  600 
Total employment 
(1,000s) 
40,276  40,271  40,400 
Total employment 
(change in %) 
+1.4  0.0  +0.3 
Unemployment rate 
(1,000s) 
3,268  3,423  3,239 
Unemployment rate 
in % 
7.8  8.2  7.8 
Source: Fuchs, J. et al., 2010b. 
On the one hand, it is a consequence of persistent growth in major parts of the private and 
public service sector, which could offset limited losses in export-oriented sectors such as 
manufacturing and logistics. On the other hand, the relative success of the German story is 
explained by the fact that the core labour market of skilled workers in manufacturing is 
covered by strong legal dismissal protection. Hence, layoffs are a rather expensive form of 
short-term adjustment and many firms developed an elaborate arrangement of internal 
flexibility (Möller, J.; Fuchs, J. et al. 2010a, 2010b; OECD, 2010a). Three elements are 
crucial for this strategy: 
1.  Internal flexibility: flexibility on the enterprise level (comprising in particular 
working-time arrangements and to a lesser extent also remuneration) is 
comparatively well developed in Germany (see Eichhorst, W. and Marx, P.). It has 
increased considerably over the past two decades, also as a lesson from previous 
crises in which layoffs led to the loss of skilled labour.  
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Thus, internal flexibility is particularly attractive for employers in manufacturing 
industries with high and specific skills that are difficult to replace.  
Internal flexibility was enhanced by developments in the framework of collective 
bargaining, but also by initiatives at the enterprise level. Most importantly, working 
time can be adjusted flexibly via working-time accounts. In these accounts, working 
hours can be accumulated over a relatively long time period. As this allows 
companies to react to changes in demand without hiring and firing, it favours a 
stability-oriented personnel policy and compensates for the effects of limited 
external flexibility (i.e. strict dismissal protection). In fact, the economic crisis was 
preceded by a boom period in German manufacturing, so that many working-time 
accounts showed large surpluses which could be balanced after demand collapsed. 
Surpluses in working-time accounts and overtime declined significantly in the crises 
and therefore made an important contribution to employment stability: whilst 
employment was virtually unchanged from late 2008 to late 2009, the total volume 
of hours worked declined by about 3 per cent. At the same time, the social partners 
made a contribution to managing the crisis. In previous years, German collective 
bargaining was increasingly decentralised via ‘opening clauses’. Such clauses allow 
for plant-level deviations from collective agreements, also in terms of remuneration. 
This was used in the current crisis by works councils to trade wage concessions 
against employment stability. Thus, many companies were allowed to adjust agreed 
wages or postpone wage increases. Moreover, the unions took a very pragmatic 
stance in sectoral wage bargaining and accepted real wage cuts in manufacturing.  
2.  The concentration of redundancies in the marginal workforce: over the past five 
years, manufacturing employers have increasingly relied on temporary agency staff 
to establish a flexible segment of the workforce, which can be swiftly adjusted under 
uncertain economic prospects. This is a consequence of various steps of de-
regulation that made agency work a particularly cheap and flexible type of 
employment in Germany. By now, there exist no limits for the length of assignments 
in user companies and agency workers can receive wages significantly below the 
rate agreed in collective agreements. So while tasks that require high firm-specific 
skills are still mainly performed by permanent workers with long tenure, agency 
workers are extensively used for routine tasks. This ‘dual’ model – even if highly 
questionable in normative terms - turned out to be very efficient for many 
employers. When the crisis began, employers started to reduce the use of agency 
workers drastically by about 300,000. Thus, employment decline could basically be 
limited to this category of workers. On a smaller scale, the same is true for fixed-
term contracts of which many have not been renewed in the crisis (Hohendanner, 
C.). 
3.  Heavy reliance on a public short-time work allowance: subsidisation of reduced 
working hours has been embodied in the institutional repertoire of the German 
unemployment insurance and active labour market policy system for a long time. 
For example, it played a major role in attempts to manage structural change in 
Eastern Germany after reunification. Afterwards it did not play a major role, except 
for specific sectors such as construction. However, in the current crisis it was of 
paramount importance. In 2009, 1.1 million workers (about 350,000 full-time 
equivalents) worked short-time, and thereby the short-time work or partial 
unemployment scheme made a major contribution to keep open unemployment low 
(see Figure 28). The OECD estimate of about 220,000 jobs saved suggests 
deadweight losses of about one third (OECD, 2010b). The major reason for this was 
that the scheme was substantially modified to cope with the crisis. As most changes 
are temporary, the effects should be partly seen as consequences of discretionary 
interventions rather than of automatic stabilisation.  
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The scheme was modified in three aspects: (i) the maximum duration for which 
hours not worked are reimbursed by the unemployment fund (at the regular 
replacement rate applicable in case of unemployment) was increased from 6 to 24 
months for 2009 (18 months in 2010); (ii) for cases of short-time work arising in 
2009 and 2010, employers are exempt from social security contributions for hours 
not worked: regarding employee contributions from the first day of short-time work, 
regarding employer contributions from the seventh month of reduced working time 
(or earlier in case of employer-provided training); and (iii) administrative 
requirements for firms entering this scheme were simplified considerably. 
In the German case, automatic stabilisation was mainly achieved through short-time work 
and working time adjustment – with short-time work as one, but not the only, component. 
A recent estimate for the years 2008 and 2009 suggests that about 25 per cent of all work 
time reduction was achieved by short-time work, while working time based on collective 
agreements contributed 40 per cent and less paid overtime as well as hours averaging in 
working time accounts 20 per cent each (Bach, H.-U. et al.). There was no heavy inflow 
into the relatively generous and universal benefit system which would have had an 
additional stabilising effect on the economy. Given the robustness of the German labour 
market, it comes as no surprise that discretionary action in terms of labour market and 
social policy was rather limited. Apart from the increased generosity of the short-time work 
scheme and eased access of agency workers to short-time work, discretionary policies put 
only some emphasis on strengthening the activation strategy directed towards the 
unemployed by announcing to hire additional staff for job placement agencies. Otherwise, 
activation policies were continued as before.  
Given the abrupt character of the crisis and the uncertainty of its duration, employers have 
been reluctant to dismiss skilled staff as long as partial unemployment is feasible and a 
recovery is expected. The German fiscal stimulus package has so far seemed to have had 
only a limited impact on the labour market (except for the expansion of the partial 
unemployment scheme). Further measures tried to stabilise consumer confidence, such as 
a marginal cut in income taxes and social security contributions, and a ‘cash for clunkers’ 
scheme implemented in 2009. Most recent figures on the development of GDP and exports 
show strong signs of recovery associated with further employment stability and new hirings 
occurring both in the temporary agency sector and in skills-intensive core manufacturing 
activities. Hence, German labour market performance in 2009 and 2010 was better than in 
earlier forecasts. Furthermore, working-time flexibility and complementary short-time work 
allowances have helped bridge the slump in manufacturing without endangering the skilled 
core labour force.  
Most recent policy action is addressing the issue of an increased need for budget 
consolidation. The government adopted a package implying some marginal cuts in social 
benefits. Furthermore, it was decided in spring 2010 to prolong the expanded short-time 
work scheme until early 2012, but again the exceptional and time-limited character of the 









































































































































































































































































Overview – the situation before the crisis 
When compared to the EU average, Austria is characterised by a high share of social 
expenditures on GDP (28 per cent against an average of 26.2 in 2007)
48. This difference is 
driven mainly by comparatively high spending on old age as well as on families. Also 
expenditure on unemployment relief – when set in relation to unemployment figures – is 
higher than in most other EU Member States. Expenditure consists mainly of monetary 
transfers and less of in-kind benefits. The major part of these transfers is based on an 
insurance principle, with some elements of universal provision (such as child benefits) and 
means testing (such as unemployment assistance and social assistance). As can be seen 
from Table A4 in the appendix, in the short period, net replacement rates of unemployment 
payments are rather low, especially for households without children. For prolonged 
unemployment spells, the Austrian replacement rates can, however, be found in the upper 
tier of the EU ranking (Table A5). This is mainly due to the possibility of claiming 
unemployment assistance, a transfer which is almost as high as the unemployment benefit 
and with no predefined maximal duration. Those who are not covered by unemployment 
insurance can claim a social assistance benefit. 
                                                 
48 EUROSTAT, preliminary data. 
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In the years prior to the 2009 crisis, the Austrian economy experienced a favourable 
development. Over the period 2005 to 2008, GDP growth rates averaged 3.2 per cent p.a. 
and unemployment fell from 5.2 to 3.8 per cent. Exports acted as a major growth driver, as 
Austria has a comparatively large, export-oriented manufacturing sector. Although over the 
last decade employment was created mainly in the service sector of the economy, 
manufacturing employment remained fairly stable between 2000 and 2008. Labour market 
flexibility is fairly high, especially with respect to work arrangements and working time. In 
spite of this generally favourable labour market environment, there is a stark contrast 
between a large, well-performing core of prime-age workers with at least upper secondary 
education and vulnerable groups of the workforce (OECD, 2009e). Employment rates of 
those aged above 50 are among the lowest in the EU, low-skilled workers face an above-
average risk of unemployment and large segments of the young population find it difficult 
to enter stable and continuous employment. The strong increase in female participation 
rates has been driven mainly by part-time work. Gender gaps in the labour market (hourly 
wages, number of hours worked, sector and occupation of employment) are very 
pronounced. Atypical forms of unemployment have been on the rise since the 1990s, with 
strong increases during the business cycle upswing which preceded the crisis. Over the 
years 2005 to 2008, marginal employment increased by 20 per cent (+47,150) and 
temporary agency work by 40 per cent (+20,450). 
Developments and automatic stabilization during the crisis 
In 2009, Austria experienced its severest economic crisis in 60 years, with a drop in GDP by 
3.9 per cent. Due to its strong reliance on export demand, the Austrian manufacturing 
sector was hit particularly hard by the steep decline in worldwide trade. Industrial 
production fell by over 14 per cent and employment in manufacturing by 6 per cent. Total 
(dependent) employment declined by 1.4 per cent in the course of 2009. Due to their 
strong presence in manufacturing, male employees were affected more than proportionally 
by the crisis. Male employment fell by 2.5 per cent, against 0.2 per cent for women. On a 
similar line, temporary agency workers suffered heavily from the consequences of the 
crisis. Temporary agency employment fell by 18 per cent in 2009 (11 per cent for women, 
20 per cent for men). Young workers were also affected severely, with employment of 
those aged 15 to 24 declining by -3.7 per cent.  
The economic crisis also impacted on the market for apprenticeships, with a steep decline 
in training slots at company level (Mahringer, H.). The decline in manufacturing 
employment continued throughout 2009; in 2010, its pace slowed down but employment is 
still expected to decrease on a n  a n n u a l  b a s i s .  A s  c a n  b e  s e e n  f r o m  F i g u r e  2 9 ,  t h e  
employment dynamic in the total economy reached its lowest point in the middle of 2009. 
Change rates continued to be negative until the beginning of 2010 and then turned 
positive, so that we expect to see a partial recovery to pre-crisis levels (2010: +0.8 per 
cent).  
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Figure 29: Unemployment and active dependent employment, percentage changes 




















































Similar empirical results can be observed with respect to unemployment (Mahringer, H.). 
Until mid-2008, unemployment had been declining, but then the trend was reversed and an 
increase was recorded in the fourth quarter. The unfavourable dynamic reached its peak in 
June 2009 (+33 per cent with respect to the previous year). On an annual basis, 
unemployment increased from 3.8 per cent in 2008 to 4.8 per cent in 2009 using the 
EUROSTAT definition and from 5.8 per cent to 7.2 per cent according to the national 
definition (+61,600 register unemployed including ALMP training measures). The 
unemployment rate for men increased by 1.8 percentage points (national definition), thus 
markedly more than for the workforce as a whole. Since March 2010, unemployment has 
been decreasing, and it is expected to reach 4.4 per cent (6.9 per cent by national 
definition) in 2010 (WIFO forecast). 
The crisis triggered automatic stabilisation mechanisms, primarily on the revenue side 
through a fall in tax revenues and social security contributions, and on the expenditure side 
through an increase in monetary social transfers. As shown in the tables, the reaction of 
different revenue and expenditure items is in line with the theoretical and empirical findings 
discussed in chapter 1 and section 2.2.1. of this report. Income and payroll taxes display a 
considerably higher elasticity with regard to changes in output than social insurance 
contributions. The gap in social insurance contributions with respect to the long-term trend 
(1988-2008) amounted to -2.8 per cent, against -15.6 per cent for tax revenues.  
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These figures have to be interpreted with caution, as it is difficult to disentangle the effects 
of automatic stabilisation from those resulting from active fiscal and monetary policy. Tax 
revenue was affected strongly by the tax reform of 2009, which had a volume of about EUR 
3 billion. This tax reform was a one-off discretionary measure and its volume can be 
subtracted from the 2009 revenue gap displayed in the table. By doing so, we can estimate 
the impact of automatic stabilisation on the revenue side (social security contributions plus 
taxes) of approximately EUR 4.8 billion, corresponding to 1.8 per cent of GDP. 
 








Gap with respect to 
long-term trend 
 
in %  in %  in %  in € bn  
Social insurance contributions  4.6  1.7  -2.8  -1.3 
Income and payroll taxes  5.4  -11.0  -15.6  -6.5 
Monetary social transfers  4.4  6.2  1.7  0.9 
Source: WIFO. 
In the crisis year 2009, total social monetary transfers increased by 6.2 per cent in nominal 
terms compared to 2008 and thus were 1.7 per cent above the long-term trend. This 
corresponded to an increase by EUR 3.1 billion from 2008 to 2009 and a gap of EUR 0.9 
billion compared to the long-term trend. Here too, it is difficult to distinguish between 
purely automatic stabilisation and behavioural responses like changes in benefit take-up. As 
can be seen from Table 23, the increase in transfers related to unemployment insurance 
(mainly unemployment benefits and unemployment assistance) contributed over EUR 0.7 
billion to the increase in monetary transfers (+21.6 with respect to 2008). This component 
can be interpreted as a purely automatic stabilisation of income in response to the labour 
market deterioration that took place in the crisis. 
Policy responses to the crisis and their effects 
Austria’s response to the economic crisis consisted of two stimulus packages and two 
labour market packages (Scheiblecker, M. et al.). The labour market packages targeted 
different groups of the workforce, with a special focus on employment stabilisation and 
qualification measures. Measures included an adapted short-time working scheme, easing 
of educational leaves, a community employment programme providing for the creation of 
jobs in community, church and welfare organisations, a subsidy for one-person companies 
for their first employee, an income supplementation programme, labour foundations 
(Arbeitsstiftungen) for intense upskilling and state-run training slots for the young. In 
2009, funds used for active labour market policies were 26.9 per cent higher than in 2008 
(Table 23). 
The adapted short-time working scheme was the most prominent labour market measure. 
It was already in place before the crisis but had been used scarcely. During the crisis its 
flexibility was enhanced and its duration prolonged first up to 18 and then to 24 months. At 
that stage employers were relieved of social security contributions after the sixth month of 
short-time work in order to enhance the attractiveness of the scheme (cf. BMASK, 2009b: 
3) The demand for short-time work was high: On an annual average, 42,900 workers were 
registered in the scheme, with a peak of 56,700 in April 2009. The two labour market 
packages further created explicit incentives for further education (educational leave, short-
time work combined with skills training).  
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Educational leave can presently be claimed after six months of employment, for two 
months up to one year. In 2009, around 4,900 workers claimed educational leave, on 
average, which is a remarkable increase of 3,300 in 2008 (cf. Mahringer, H.: 119). Both the 
short-time working scheme and the educational leave regulation were targeted at the crisis 
and – at least in their present form – are meant to be phased out between 2010 and 2011. 
 
Table 23: Expenditure on active and passive labour market policy 
 
2008  2009  Change 
 
in mio. €  in %  in mio. € 
Unemployment insurance  3,411.2  4,147.3  21.6  736.1 
Activating measures  882.2  1,119.5  26.9  237.3 
of which for short-time work  1.0  113.5  --  112.5 
Source: Austrian Labour Market Service. 
 
Young people represented a specific focus of the labour market packages. The new labour 
market foundation for youths was designed to help young job seekers who need to change 
their occupation. The foundation provided the necessary vocational training for up to 2,000 
unemployed youths to acquire new skills during the crisis (cf. BMASK, 2009b: 6). Within 
the ‘training guarantee’, additional state-run training slots were provided for youth 
apprenticeship seekers. The guarantee intends to offer publicly provided apprentice training 
outside the company level for young people unable to find a regular apprenticeship 
position. These measures were timely and helped to mitigate the impact of the crisis on the 
youngest segments of the workforce, highlighted by a striking increase in the number of 
those looking for an apprenticeship slot up to the summer of 2009. The policy response to 
the crisis included also a marked increase in training measures directed at skilled workers.  
In 2009, 64,100 people were participating in labour-market training schemes on average 
(+27 per cent with respect to 2008). The overall share of high-quality training was 
increased substantially (Mahringer, H.). 
The Austrian government also implemented policy measures on the revenue side in order 
to counteract detrimental effects of the crisis. The tax reform 2009 resulted in higher 
disposable incomes and included a family package, which specifically lowered the tax 
burden of families. The basic tax allowance was raised and the marginal tax rate reduced 
(cf. OECD, 2009e: 11). The tax allowance was elevated from EUR 10,000 to 11,000 of 
annual income. The entry tax rate was cut from 38.33 to 36.5 per cent (cf. 
Schratzenstaller, M.). The family package consisted of the following measures: a higher 
child tax credit, the introduction of a tax-free child allowance and of the deductibility of 
childcare costs. The tax-free child allowance amounts to EUR 220 annually per child. 
Childcare costs up to EUR 2,300 annually per child are henceforth deductible (cf. BMF, 10). 
These measures raised disposable income and thus had a positive effect on private 
consumption. Consumption was stabilised further by the labour market measures discussed 
in the previous section as well as by some measures that were implemented independently 
of the crisis at the end of 2008.
49 In 2009, private consumption was the only component of 
aggregate demand which did not decline. It grew by 1.3 per cent relative to 2008.  
                                                 
49 These measures included a thirteenth monthly payment of child benefits, an increase in the care allowance and 
preponement of the yearly pension rise. They were originally devised to strengthen the purchasing power and to 
counteract the spike in inflation in 2008.  
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According to Scheiblecker, M. et al. expansionary revenue measures raised consumption by 
0.8 per cent in 2009, which in turn increased GDP by 0.4 per cent and resulted in additional 
employment for roughly 5,400 people (cf. ibid). These calculations compare well with those 
carried out using an international macroeconomic model and presented in section 2.2.2. 
Conclusions 
  In Austria, the dramatic effects of the economic crisis on employment and 
income were mitigated considerably by automatic mechanisms built into the 
social protection system and by the timely implementation of ad-hoc 
(discretionary) measures. The quick adaptation of short-time work and 
educational leave schemes helped to stabilise employment. Arguably, the 
beneficial effects of these measures went primarily to more qualified segments of 
the workforce. Adjustments in working time (over and above short-time work) 
represented another crucial factor in the stabilisation of employment during the 
crisis. A comprehensive evaluation of labour market policy measures 
implemented in course of the crisis has yet to be carried out. Many measures 
have only been used scarcely or in another form before the downturn and 
therefore an evaluation of the recent experience could help expand the repertory 
of active labour market policies to be used in the future (cf. Mahringer, H.: 120). 
  At present, the outlook on the labour market is brightening up and forecasts of 
employment and unemployment dynamics are undergoing positive revisions. 
Nevertheless, the situation remains characterised by uncertainty, and it is still 
too early to assess properly whether (or to what extent) the crisis has had not 
only a cyclical but also a structural, and therefore long-lasting, impact on the 
Austrian labour market. The current employment dynamic is characterised by a 
strong upshot in agency work and part-time jobs. This highlights the key-role 
played by flexible work arrangements for the Austrian labour market. The wage 
development is moderate, suggesting that after 2009, 2010 will also be 
characterised by a negative wage drift (with respect to collective wage 
bargaining outcomes). 
  The lack of current data makes it difficult to assess the extent to which social 
inclusion was affected negatively by the crisis. Arguably, unemployment benefits 
and discretionary measures implemented during the crisis prevented a strong 
increase in the share of the population which was at risk of poverty in 2009. This 
might change in 2010 and in future years, as long-term effects of the crisis such 
as long-term unemployment and an increasing structural mismatch in the labour 
market might impact vulnerable groups heavily. Particularly older and unskilled 
workers who lost their job in the crisis, as well as young people, might face 
prolonged periods of unemployment, precarious employment and 
underemployment.  
  Most of the fiscal stimuli in Austria, especially in the area of social expenditures 
and income tax cuts, have permanent character, and therefore they will not 
automatically phase out as soon as the economic crisis is overcome. 
Discretionary changes in labour market policy were on the contrary primarily 
conceived as one-off measures that do not require a specific exit strategy. Even 
more than discretionary stabilisation expenditure, it is the loss of revenue due to 
automatic stabilisation which poses a challenge to budgetary balance.  
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The crucial question concerns the impact of the crisis on medium and long-term 
economic growth rates. If growth rates remain modest, the heavy burden placed 
by the strong reaction of automatic stabilisation mechanisms on the budget will 
have long-lasting effects. 
  The Austrian government has resolved to start budget consolidation in 2011. In 
accordance with their medium-term stability plan, the authorities plan to reduce 
the budget deficit step by step from 4.7 per cent of GDP (2010) to less than 3 
per cent of GDP in 2013. The coalition government has been reached a 
consensus in cutting public expenditures and increasing revenues in the relation 
of 60:40. On the expenditure side, the growth rates of social expenditures will be 
reduced considerably in the coming years. So far, only the upper limits of 
spending on unemployment, public pensions and family transfers have been 
reduced in the government’s medium-term financial framework, hence precise 
measures have not been agreed on; nor have measures on the revenue side 
been settled either. The 2011 budget proposal will be presented to the 
parliament in early December, 2010.  
3.3. Denmark 
The Danish economy is not only facing the impact of the global financial crisis and the 
decline in global trade, but also the unwinding of a boom in the domestic property market 
from 2004-2006. The Danish government has taken measures to steer the financial system 
through the crisis. Denmark has had a liberal-conservative government since 2001 and this 
has, accordingly, created a long period of consistency in the choice of political measures. 
An overall objective in economic policy has been to generate growth and create jobs, 
thereby improving the economic situation for all members of society. The government has 
also implemented many measures to ease pressures in the financial sector, along with a 
significant fiscal stimulus (see Table 7 above). There have been suggestions of labour 
market reforms to improve the efficiency of the labour market and to boost labour supply in 
the long-term. Denmark is well-known for its ‘flexicurity’ labour market model, with 
employment protection legislation implying a relatively high degree of job turnover 
combined with a generous unemployment program covering many workers. It is, however, 
difficult to identify policies directly aiming at improving the measures securing social 
protection for the weakest members of society. Denmark, however, has a fine mesh social 
security system, based on the Nordic welfare model.  
Risk of poverty measures have proved to be fine for a long time compared to many other 
countries. In this overview, we describe measure s  t h a t  h a v e  d i r e c t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
citizens in Denmark.  
Financial stability measures 
In October 2008, the government announced the Bank Rescue Package I Act. As a result of 
this political agreement it is possible to cover ordinary deposits by an increased deposit 
guarantee of DKK 750,000 with effect from 1 October 2010. On 3 February 2009, the Bank 
Rescue Package II Act was passed by the Danish parliament, under which all credit 
institutions in Denmark complying with the statutory solvency requirements were able to 
apply for state-funded capital injections. Bank Rescue Package II Act reduced the likelihood 
of a bank’s capital falling below statutory capital requirements and thus, the likelihood of 
using Bank Rescue Package I Act.  
In February 2009, it was decided that private firms could postpone payment of VAT and 
income taxes in order to improve non-financial corporations’ access to liquidity. The 
allowance to defer tax payments should help avoid the need for businesses to lay off staff. 
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In September 2009, DKK 4.2 billion was set aside (The Business Act) aimed at small and 
medium-sized enterprises, the goal of improving the export credit facilities, existing loan 
guarantee schemes and the access to venture capital, as well as promoting public-private 
partnerships to develop new market-based solutions for the welfare sector.   
In March 2009, households were granted the possibility to withdraw money from the 
compulsory private Special Pension savings scheme to alleviate their liquidity constraints. 
This allowance has the possibility to stimulate demand if the households spend the funds. It 
is very likely that especially credit-constrained households have spent their money on 
consumption. This is an attempt by the government to stabilise consumption through a 
cyclical downturn by encouraging the private sector to adjust their savings and dissavings 
on an intertemporal basis. Clearly, this may have a stimulating effect to the economy 
without putting a strain on the government balance. 
Fiscal stimulus 
As the financial crisis set in, Denmark had a relative advantageous fiscal starting point, 
which made it possible to conduct an expansionary fiscal policy.  
Denmark has the largest automatic stabilisers among the countries investigated in this 
study in the case of an income shock and in the case of an unemployment shock (cf. Table 
A6 and A7, respectively). The automatic stabilisers are high due to a generous 
unemployment insurance system and a high level of taxes and social contributions. To a 
certain extent, the automatic stabilisers are protecting the reaction on the economy when a 
shock such as the financial crisis started. The automatic stabilisers also work in the 
direction to dampen the impact of the discretionary policy measures that are taken. Figure 
30 graphs the actual government budget and a structural budget. The structural budget is 
derived by cleaning the actual budget of the impact of the business cycle, in terms of the 
gap of output and the gap of employment in relation to a situation where production takes 
place at full capacity. In a downturn, the government balance worsens due to both 
decreasing taxes and increasing government expenses. Figure 30 gives an impression of 
the effect of the automatic stabilisers in Denmark where the actual government balance is 
exhibiting greater fluctuations than if it had not been for the automatic stabilisers. 











































Source: Ministry of Finance, Økonomisk redegørelse, August 2010. 
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In response to the crisis, the government introduced a tax reform as a part of the Spring 
Package 2.0 Act, with effect from January 2010. When the Spring Package 2.0 Act was 
launched, the government presented calculations for the types of families presented in 
Table. 
Table 24: The impact on the disposable income of the government’s tax reform in 
2010 
 
    DKK  % 
A.  Lone parent with 1 child in a rented apartment. Wage income DKK 
250,000 
4,580  2.4 
B.  Lone parent with 1 child in a rented apartment. Wage income: DKK 
350,000 
4,970  2.0 
C.  Couple with 2 children in a rented apartment. Wage income: DKK 
500,000 
3,280  1.0 
D.  Couple with 2 children in a rented apartment. Wage income: DKK 
600,000 
3,950  1.0 
E.  Couple with 2 children in an owned apartment. Wage income: DKK 
600,000 
3,950  1.1 
F.  Couple with 2 children in a newly owned apartment. Wage income: DKK 
623,890 
3,630  1.0 
G.  Couple with 2 children in an owned apartment. Wage income: DKK 
700,000 
3,590  0.8 
H.  Couple with 2 children in an owned apartment. Wage income: DKK 
800,000 
9,970  2.1 





J.  Lone pensioner without supplementary income in a rented apartment  400  0.3 
K.  Couple of pensioners where one has supplementary pension (ATP) in a 
rented apartment  
1,400  0.8 
L.  Couple of pensioners where one has supplementary pension (ATP) in an 
owned apartment 
1,270  0.6 
M.  Single who receives unemployment insurance benefits in a rented 
apartment 
480  0.4 
Remark: The owners of houses have mortgages left from DKK 1,5 billion to 2,1 billion from family E to family I. 
Children are in a day care institution.  
 
All types of families gain from the tax reform in the short-run (i.e. the year 2010), but the 
financing measures to completely offset the budget impact of the tax cuts will be phased in 
so that the package will become budget-neutral. Among the financing measures are various 
green taxes such as electricity and heating that are affecting the poor families relatively 
ha r d e r . Thi s i s a l so the  ca se  fo r  the  chi l d  b e ne fi ts tha t  wi ll  b e  r ed uce d . F ur t he r m o r e , a  
political agreement has been made to fulfil the recommendation by the EU Council of 
ministers for finance and economy (ECOFIN). Denmark received a recommendation from 
the council in July 2010 as Denmark was among the group of countries within the EU with 
excessive budget deficits. The political agreement on restoration of the Danish economy is 
to consolidate the public finances during the years 2011 to 2013. The restoration 
agreement will take effect in 2011 increasing taxes, decreasing public expenses and 
reducing the period of receiving unemployment subsidies.   
The Economic Council of the Labour Movement (Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd) has 
presented calculations for three types of families organised within the Danish Confederation 
of Trade Unions (LO). They apply the model for a few types of families from the Ministry of 
Finance and define families consisting of two adults and two children of 5 and 8 years old.  
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The three types of families are all worker families and have the following income earnings: 
Type A: DKK 600,000 (DKK 300,000 per adult) 
Type B: DKK 520,000 (DKK 300,000 one adult; DKK 220,000 for the other adult) 
Type C: DKK 440,000 (DKK 220,000 per adult) 
All families will have positive effects in the short-term, as in the example calculations by 
the government in Table. Table shows the effects in the long-term until 2019 where the 
final financing measures will be fully implemented.   
 
Table 25: Effects in 2019 of Spring Package 2.0 and the restoration agreement for 
working family types  
  Spring package 2.0 












A  2,618  951  -1,181  -2,848 
B  1,518  -122  -2,292  -3,922 
C  397  -1,196  -3,402  -4,995 
Source: The economic council of the labour movement and the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions ‘LO families 
are loosing from the Spring Package 2.0 Act and the government’s plans for cut-downs’.  
 
All families gain from the tax reform in the short-term as shown in Table, but the working 
families will lose in the long-term once all the financing measures have been implemented, 
which is shown in Table. The working families are represented by different family types: A, 
B and C. Taking account of the financial measures to finance the government expenses 
within Spring Package 2.0 Act, it is only the wealthiest families (i.e. family type A) who will 
gain a positive effect. Calculations that also take account of the financing measures in the 
restoration agreement show that all family types will loose in the long-run.  
The tax reliefs imply that the median income will increase. The risk of poverty as a relative 
measure in proportion to the median income will imply that more people will be classified 
as being poor.  
Frontloading of investment has been another focus area for the government. Investment in 
infrastructure is an opportunity to foster green growth. In response to the crisis, the 
government has announced fiscal policies such as a ‘Green Transport’ initiative and a 
‘Green Growth’ initiative with measures focused on improving the environmental 
performance of the agricultural sector.  
The government also introduced a fiscal policy that provides up to DKK 1.5 billion to finance 
individual household investments in home renovation with a focus on energy-saving 
modifications. This is a little increase in the government expenses that brings an incentive 
to private households to spend money now instead of later on (i.e. to adjust their 
consumption on an intertemporal basis).   
Employment 
Denmark does not have a statutory minimum wage that covers the whole economy, but 
Denmark is characterised by having a high level of collective bargaining coverage. Thus, 
many workers are covered by a form of minimum wage which is negotiated by the partners 
(i.e. the Danish organisation for employees LO and the Danish employer organisation DA) 
at the sector level. Under LO, there is a cartel of unions, called CO-industry, that has a role 
in collective bargaining where they negotiate minimum wage levels with the employers.  
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Approximately 58 per cent have wage contracts based on minimal wages within the area of 
LO/DA that cover almost a quarter of all the people who have a job. The minimum wage 
that CO-industry negotiates with the employer organisation is influential in the labour 
market, but still the actual wage for people is typically higher than the minimal wages as 
the actual wage is negotiated at the workplaces. As the minimum wages are not prevalent 
for all employees, one has to be careful to interpret how close all employees within the 
minimum wage area are to achieve the at-risk-of-poverty threshold.  
The politicians have aimed at having no working poor to secure a difference between the 
minimum wages and the social contributions.    
The discretionary policies and accompanied monetary policies have had effects on the level 
of employment, which is presented in   
 
Table 26: Impact on employment of the economic policy since 2009 
Source: The Ministry of Finance, Økonomisk Redegørelse, August 2010. 
1,000 people  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 
Fiscal policy and effect of pensions  27  55  62  55  34  16  4 
Changes in interest since 2008  6  31  60  68  57  35  12 
Total effect  33  86  122  123  91  54  16 
 
The total impact of the policies for employment is calculated to be in the order of an 
increased employment of approximately 85,000 people in 2010 and 120,000 people in 
2011. Concurrently, with the implementation of the political agreement for restoration this 
impact will decrease, with the impact in 2015 estimated to be around 20,000 people more 
who are employed.  
The level of productivity in Denmark has been decreasing up to and especially during the 
financial crisis. The level of productivity is, however, improving due to the improvement in 
the production in the industry sector concurrently with a fall in the number of employed 
people. The Ministry of Finance estimates that the decrease in the employment due to the 
decline in production during the crisis may have come to an end.    
A labour market commission has provided recommendations to meet the government’s 
plans by improving the government budget by DKK 14 billion per year, requiring further 
measures to enhance labour supply once the economy begins to recover. There is a risk 
that the labour supply may be permanently reduced if newly-unemployed people from the 
crisis move into voluntary early retirement or disability pension. People over 60 who 
become unemployed face a small income reduction if they move into voluntary early 
retirement pension. The risk of this happening is more serious given the current 
demographic perspective, where the proportion of people who are active at the labour 
market is decreasing, something which is already pressuring the need for consolidation. 
The position in the population is gradually changing in more favour of abolishing voluntary 
early retirement pension.  
Unemployment 
According to EU statements, Denmark is among the countries that have the lowest 
proportion of people who are long-term unemployed in relation to the total labour force. 
The political agreement on restoration of the economy, introduced a reduction of the period 
where an unemployed person is eligible for unemployment benefits from 4 years to 2 years, 
which has the purpose to reduce the risk of a higher rate of long-term unemployment.  
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Besides a reduced period of entitlement to unemployment benefits, there are also 
corrections to the laws regarding sickness benefits and unemployment benefits. For all 
groups of transfers, the amounts have been reduced in real values since 1990, when it was 
politically decided to update the rates of the transfers by 0.3 per cent less than the average 
wage increases at the labour market to establish a pool for specific purposes to improve 
conditions for vulnerable people.   
Figure presents the gross level of unemployment (the dark blue line) and the registered 
level of unemployment (the light blue line). The difference between the two lines amounts 
to the number of people who are activated. 








Unemployed + Activated Unemployed
1,000 persons
08               09             10             11
 
Remark: The registered level of unemployment consist of people who receive unemployment benefits and people 
who receive welfare benefits and who are prepared to take on a job. The number of people is measured in full-
time person equivalents. The number of registered unemployed does not include students who apply for a study-
related job, unemployed who are not insured and who do not receive unemployment benefits, job-seekers who 
receive pensions and finally people who are in a period of notice. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Økonomisk redegørelse, August 2010. 
 
In Denmark there is an automatic increase in funding for Active Labour Market Programmes 
(ALMP) as unemployment rises, which is an example of an automatic fiscal policy. Thus, the 
ALMP are activated when an increase in unemployment as an indicator of a downturn is 
registered. There is a right-and-duty to participate in ALMP after 3 months of 
unemployment for all unemployed under 30 years. Youth unemployment has not been a 
problem in recent years where unemployment spells did virtually not last more than a year 
which was also the result of activation programmes (OECD, 2009g: 99).  
Researchers have been discussing the threat effect of the ALMP given the evidence from 
the actual figures of unemployment. It is thought that some individuals may favour the 
status of being unemployed instead of wanting to take on a job. There is evidence that the 
prospect of ALMP in itself induces unemployed people to seek more intensely for a job or to 
be more inclined to accept a job faster (Graversen, B.K. and van Ours, J.C., 2008a, 2008b, 
2009; Svarer, M. and Rosholm, M.). 
IP/A/EMPL/ST/2009-07 PE 451.484Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
3.4. Italy 
During the crisis, the Italian labour market performed worse than labour markets of other 
European countries. The heavy fall in GDP (-5 per cent in 2009) was not dissimilar to those 
of the UK and Germany (-4.9 per cent) and even worse than those of Spain and France (-
3.6 per cent and -2.5 per cent, respectively). All of these countries, apart from Spain, 
where the unemployment rate jumped in the second quarter of 2010 to the highest level in 
the last twelve years up to 20 per cent, outperformed Italy with regards to unemployment 
rate. 
The Italian unemployment rate rose by 2.5 per c e n t a g e  p o i n t s  f r o m  6 . 8  p e r  c e n t  i n  t h e  
second quarter of 2008 up to 8.5 per cent in the second quarter of 2010, and the total 
number of jobs lost amounted to 574,000. This figure is almost similar for the UK, smaller 
for France (+2.2 percentage points in the same period), while it has the opposite sign for 
Germany (-0.4 percentage points).  
What is of most concern are the prospects about future development in Italy. Firstly, the 
main scenario for the recovery forecasts a low GDP growth (0.9 per cent in 2010, IMF, 
2010d) with uncertain effects on the labour market. Once again, temporary jobs would 
increase in the short-term, and they will be the main channel through which new hires 
would occur (and actually this has already been observed in the last quarter). Most 
importantly, the short-time working programme to fight unemployment (Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni) has been partially misused. As we will see later in this section, CIG 
has also been implemented in 2009-2010 in a discretionary form (Cassa Integrazione 
Guadagni in Deroga), which extends the programme to those firms and workers who are 
not covered under the standard CIG programmes. CIGD goes far beyond the original aim of 
the programme, and it poses severe risks for those workers (atypical and fixed-term 
contract and apprentices) who can hardly be reinserted in the normal firm activity once the 
crisis is over, despite the relevance in terms of protection it provides for these workers. 
Table 27 illustrates the main labour market outcomes in the last two years. 
 
Table 27: Labour market outcomes during the crisis: 2008q2 - 2010q2 
  2008q2  2010q2  Variation  Variation, % 
Employed  23,434,345  22,914,791  -519,554  -2.22 
Fixed-term workers  2,443,000  2,200,380  -242,620  -9.93 
Atypical workers  471,000  423,618  -47,382  -10.06 
Self-employed  5,614,000  5,499,709  -114,291  -2.04 
Permanent workers  15,053,000  14,882,957  -170,043  -1.13 
Average hours worked  38.3  37.7  -0.6  -1.57 
Source: Istat, quarterly labour force statistics, 2008-2010. 
 
The huge job loss can be analysed under two main dimensions. On the contract side, 
consistently with the theory on dual labour market (Boeri, T. and Garibaldi, P.), the largest 
share of jobs destroyed is that of fixed-term contracts (around 40 per cent), followed by 
permanent contracts and self-employed workers (both at around 30 per cent). On the age 
side, the most hit category is that of young workers (people aged 15-24). The youth 
unemployment rate reached its 10 year maximum at 27.9 per cent in the second quarter of 
2010. Young workers are usually those most represented in the dual fraction of the labour 
market, which is the weakest and less protected. Dualism consequences in terms of poverty 
risk, less on-the-job training, wage differentials and pension prospects are clear in the 
literature (Boeri, T.; Bell, D.N.F. and Blanchflower, D.G., 2009; Mroz, T.A. and Savage, 
T.H.), and the strength with which the crisis hits young workers raises many doubts on 
both its short and long-term consequences. 
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Italian social protection is composed of three main schemes, unemployment benefits 
(‘Indennità di mobilità’), medium-term unemployment assistance (‘Indennità di 
disoccupazione’) and short-time workers wage supplementation (‘Cassa Integrazioni 
Guadagni’), as described in Anastasia, B. et al. and D’Amuri, F. 
The main programme of support for laid off workers is standard unemployment benefits 
(‘Indennità di disoccupazione’). As for all the other programmes, eligibility criteria are quite 
strict and as a consequence it is not universal. Workers need to have paid social security 
contributions for at least 53 weeks in the previous two years (a reduced requirements 
version of the programme is available for individuals who do not meet this eligibility criteria 
but who have paid at social contributions for at least 78 days in the last two years).
50  
Replacement rates amount to 60 per cent of the previous three-month wage (up to EUR 
1,073.25) for the first six months of unemployment and are decreasing in the length of the 
treatment (the scheme lasts for a maximum of 8 months, 12 for workers older than 50). 
Medium-term unemployment assistance (‘Indennità di mobilità’) is an income support 
scheme for permanent contract employees of medium-big firms, having at least one year of 
experience that is undergoing closure or a major restructuring. The programme lasts up to 
3 years if workers are older than 50 years (one year if younger than 40), and it can be 
extended for further 12 months when the firm is located in the south of the country. An 
extension of the programme has been approved in 2008 by the Italian government, and it 
covers those workers who are not eligible for standard unemployment benefits and who 
meet minimum eligibility criteria (having paid social security contributions for at least 52 
weeks in the previous three years, also coming from enterprises with fewer than 15 
workers). 
Both these main programmes are clearly non-universalistic, and in their standard version, 
do not cover micro-firm workers and part of small-firms workers as well, which in Italy 
amount to 57 per cent of total work force.
51 Moreover, younger workers are often excluded 
from these schemes because they do not meet eligibility criteria in terms of tenure. 
Finally, short-time workers wage supplementation schemes are wage subsidies for workers 
in construction and manufacturing sectors employed in firms with more than 15 workers, 
and more than 50 in the services sector (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria). Special 
wage supplementation (CIG Straordinaria) covers other sectors (including agriculture) and 
cases in which firms are undergoing closure or restructuring processes. However, eligibility 
for both programmes is rather strict, at least in non-crisis periods. A file must be submitted 
by the employer to the labour minister and the request must be formally approved. The 
subsidy scheme is not formally an unemployment benefit, but rather it is a wage subsidy 
for employees, providing 80 per cent of the wage for a maximum of 13 weeks, when the 
workers are partially or totally excluded from the production because of lower demand. 
Actual replacement rates tend to be lower since the maximum payable amount is EUR 
1,073.25 when gross monthly wage is above EUR 1,931.86, and EUR 892.86 for wages 
below this threshold. 
In 2008, the Italian government approved another wage subsidy programme (first created 
in 2003) on a completely discretionary basis (Cassa Integrazione in Deroga) that extends 
benefits for those workers employed in firms not eligible for standard treatments and also 
workers employed in non-standard contracts, and whose administration has been delegated 
to the Regions. Figure 32 describes the trend of CIG (ordinary, special and discretionary) 
and of unemployment rates during the crisis period. 
 
50 Other standard unemployment benefits schemes are available for worker in agricultural and construction 
sectors. 
51 Agricultural workers are not taken into account. Source ASIA-Istat, 2008. 
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Figure 32: Unemployment rate and CIG (as a % of the labour force) trends 
 
 
Source: Own calculations on hours allowances from CIG database, National Institute for Social Protection and 
Pensions – INPS 2008-2010, and labour statistics, ISTAT 2008-2010. 
 
Being one of the most dual countries, Italy suffers severe limitations on the unemployment 
benefits side. All programmes and means that Italian Social Protection system has at its 
disposal demonstrated to be adequate and sufficient in non-recession periods. However, 
they lack a simple and fundamental characteristic, universality, whose effects have turned 
out to be severe during the current crisis. 
On one hand, it is important to underline the positive effects that short-time programmes 
(i.e., CIG in its three different specifications) have had in limiting unemployment rate rise, 
similarly to what happened in Germany regarding public short-time work allowances 
(described in section 3.1.). In fact, as it is clear from Figure 32, the unemployment rate 
would have jumped as high as 11.3 per cent if we consider Full Time Equivalent workers.
52 
CIG, de facto, acted as the main automatic stabilizer for the Italian labour market during 
the crisis, although it is not. Its discretionary and non-universal nature limits both the 
effects and relevance of the schemes, and it does not allow for fighting unemployment 
through standard contemporary provision of benefits, on the one hand, and activation 
programmes and public employment services, on the other. 
The extensive use of these programmes in 2009 and 2010 could imply some difficulties in 
the next months when firms should restructure and with the risk that short-time workers 
will become unemployed.  
                                                 
52 These figures come from own calculations based on hours allowances from CIG database, National Institute for 
Social Protection and Pensions – INPS, and labour statistics from the Italian Labour Force Survey, ISTAT. 
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The negative effects of dualism and, generally speaking, the need of structural reforms in 
labour market (among the other sectors) have been addressed also in a recent IMF Country 
report of Italy (IMF, 2010d: 30): 
[...]Nevertheless, Italy's employment rate still remains among the lowest in Europe, 
productivity is lagging, and the labor market is split between highly protected workers with 
permanent contracts and ill-protected temporary workers. This gap needs to be bridged by 
making permanent contracts more flexible and temporary workers more protected while 
simplifying the labor market legislation. A second generation of labor market reforms is also 
needed to strengthen the link between wages and productivity, allow wages to better 
respond to regional differences, and foster adequate spatial mobility. 
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4.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
KEY FINDINGS 
  This study can show that GDP, employment and unemployment were affected 
positively by stabilisation. At the same time, the study has found large variation 
between EU Member States in their use of automatic stabilisers and discretionary 
fiscal stimuli with respect to social policy purposes.  
  Some social groups, such as young workers and those holding non-standard 
contracts, were particularly affected by a deterioration of labour market conditions. 
A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e y  o n l y  have limited access to social benefits. 
Hence, they experience a double disadvantage stemming from less stable jobs and 
less protection.  
  While automatic and discretionary measures can effectively stabilise the economy 
and the society, the fiscal constraints generated by stabilisation efforts have 
negative repercussions for economic and labour market d yna m i cs  i n the  fut ur e . 
Hence, one important issue is to find a plausible and timely exit strategy from anti-
cyclical stabilisation policies.  
  Establishing a proper system of automatic stabilisers reduces the need for further 
discretionary action and avoids time lags inevitable in case of discretionary fiscal 
stimuli. They limit the need for discretionary adjustment and help prepare for 
future volatilities.   
  Furthermore, policy-makers should now prepare social protection schemes for the 
future and overcome unequal access to social security. It is particularly important 
to ensure that non-standard workers, those with fixed-term contracts or only a 
short employment record, in particular young people and other labour market 
entrants, have access to sufficient social protection so that social exclusion is 
prevented.  
  Unemployment benefits as well as short-time work schemes should also help 
prepare workers for accelerated economic restructuring by raising employability. 
Hence, phases of unemployment or short-time work should effectively be devoted 
to further labour-market related training. 
  Discretionary action should be well-targeted and timely, but also temporary. A 
more rule-driven, quasi-‘automatic’ approach to discretionary action could be 
helpful in this respect, i.e. by referring to objective indicators when deciding on the 
introduction or maintenance of fiscal stimuli, in particular temporary social 
measures. 
  Most of the responsibilities for the design and the implementation of automatic and 
discretionary stabilisation still lie with the EU Member States. However, there is a 
role for the European level, in particular for the European Parliament, to (i) call 
Member States to make sure proper benefit systems are in place which do not 
exclude vulnerable groups, (ii) call Member States to emphasise the creation of 
viable automatic stabilisers, e.g. via some minimum requirements, and more 
‘automatic’ discretionary measures, and (iii) achieve a better coordination of 









The contribution of automatic and discretionary measures 
Both automatic and discretionary measures can stabilise the economy and thereby 
contribute to mitigating the societal consequences of a recession. Empirical evidence 
gathered in this study can show that this was and still is the case, also with respect to the 
current global economic crisis. ‘Firm policy interventions and automatic stabilisers 
embedded in European welfare states have limited the economic and social impact of the 
worst recession in decades’, as the 2010 Joint Report on Social Protection and Social 
Inclusion rightly states. This study can show that GDP, employment and unemployment 
were affected positively by stabilisation measures. At the same time, however, the study 
has found large variation between EU Member States in their actual use of automatic 
stabilisers and discretionary fiscal stimuli with respect to social policy purposes.  
Unequal access to social protection  
Furthermore, it is important to note that some social groups, such as young workers and 
those holding non-standard contracts, were particularly affected by a deterioration of 
labour market conditions. At the same time, however, they only have limited access to 
social benefits. In particular, unemployment benefits are sometimes found to be 
insufficient. This is particularly problematic if there is no effective minimum income support 
scheme. In fact, non-standard workers and younger labour market entrants experience a 
double disadvantage stemming from less stable jobs and less protection.  
Taking fiscal constraints seriously  
While automatic and discretionary measures can effectively stabilise the economy and the 
society, one has also to be aware of the fiscal constraints generated by stabilisation efforts 
which may have negative repercussions for economic and labour market dynamics in the 
future. Hence, one important issue is to find a plausible and timely exit strategy from anti-
cyclical stabilisation policies. This is not only of relevance for discretionary action, but also 
for the further development of automatic stabilisers. Public spending has to be contained, 
and at the same time, policies should be focused on measures which deliver medium and 
long-term benefits to the economy and the society.  
The need for structural adjustments of welfare state expenditure can be seen as a 
consequence of the crisis. If the crisis brings about a lower long-term growth path, this in 
itself is a cause for fiscal adjustment. These long-term effects as well as the budgetary 
strain caused by automatic stabilisation, which had a quantitatively higher impact than 
discretionary stabilisation, represent the crucial factors with respect to fiscal constraints.  
The future role of automatic stabilisers  
The study argues that automatic stabilisers inherent in unemployment and minimum 
income support schemes, but also short-time work allowances and progressive income 
taxation, can work without a significant time lag and also lead to timely phase out when the 
economy and the labour market recover. Unemployment benefits work as automatic 
stabilisers and can therefore act as major elements of stabilisation in the future as well. 
The same holds in particular for public short-time work subsidies which help stabilise 
employment and a trained workforce and thereby facilitate a dynamic economic 
development after crises.  
Hence, automatic stabilisers are of particular importance and should be developed in EU 
Member States, not in a uniform way, but taking into account the specific national 
economic and institutional context. Establishing a proper system of automatic stabilisers 
reduces the need for further discretionary action and avoids time lags inevitable in case of 
discretionary fiscal stimuli. They reduce the need for discretionary adjustment and help 
prepare for future volatilities.   
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Strengthening social protection  
Furthermore, policy-makers should now prepare social protection schemes for the future 
and overcome present inequality in social security. It is particularly important to ensure 
that non-standard workers, those with fixed-term contracts or only a short employment 
record, in particular young people and other labour market entrants, have access to 
sufficient social protection so that social exclusion is prevented.  
One element is the creation of general minimum income schemes for all working-age 
people. This should, of course, be based on a careful assessment regarding the appropriate 
benefit level and not lead to work disincentives. In order to avoid long-term benefit 
dependency through exclusion from work, proper activation measures have to be put in 
place including job search assistance and training. Minimum wages can have an important 
indirect effect by making paid work more attractive relative to out-of-work benefits and 
thus help avoid poverty traps. In addition, statutory minimum wages can be seen as a 
complement to in-work benefits and as an integral part of social protection systems 
comprising minimum income schemes. 
Furthermore, EU Member States should check whether and how access to unemployment 
insurance benefits can be made more general, in particular by assessing the role minimum 
employment or contribution conditions play in the case of young people, other labour 
m a r k e t  e n t r a n t s  a n d ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  p e o p l e  o n  n o n - s t a n d a r d  c o n t r a c t s .  S o m e  E U  M e m b e r  
States have already moved in this direction. They should refrain from making 
unemployment benefits more exclusive again in the imminent phase of fiscal austerity but 
try to develop a sustainable and fair system of social protection.  
Implication for incentives and costs  
All social benefits, including short-time work schemes, have cost implications in term of 
taxes and social insurance contributions. They also raise incentive issues which have to be 
discussed carefully. Automatic stabilisation is a positive feature of the welfare state, but 
there is a risk of prolonged passive support if not combined with activation and effective 
active labour market policies. Unemployment benefits, as well as a reliance on short-time 
work schemes, should also help prepare workers for accelerated economic restructuring by 
raising employability. Hence, phases of unemployment or short-time work should 
effectively be devoted to further labour-market related training.  
The role of discretionary action  
Discretionary action has its role to play, too, although there is always some delay in 
decision making and implementation. Discretionary action should be well-targeted and 
timely, but also temporary. Hence, there is a need for a clear exit strategy in order to avoid 
the risk of ineffective spending of public resources through prolonged subsidisation and 
eventually pro-cyclical impacts. Growing fiscal constraints will otherwise hamper the 
capacity of governments to counter future economic uncertainties.  
A more rule-based approach  
As temporary measures quite often tend to be prolonged, it is important that policy-makers 
assess the need for discretionary measures carefully and check regularly the justification 
for their existence. A more rule-driven, quasi-‘automatic’ approach to discretionary action 
could be helpful in this respect, i.e. by referring to objective indicators when deciding on 
the introduction or maintenance of fiscal stimuli, in particular temporary social measures. A 
rule-based approach to discretionary spending could refer to the development of (non-








Furthermore, based on findings from this study, a coordinated approach to fiscal stimuli, 
also in the social policy realm, has proven to be more effective than isolated national steps. 
Hence, there is the need for better coordination and collaboration for the future.  
National responsibilities and the role of the EU 
Most of the responsibilities for the design and the implementation of automatic and 
discretionary stabilisation still lie with the EU Member States. However, there is a role for 
the European level, in particular for the European Parliament, to  
1.  call Member States to make sure proper benefit systems are in place which do 
not exclude vulnerable groups, 
2.  call Member States to emphasise the creation of viable automatic stabilisers, e.g. 
via some minimum requirements, and more ‘automatic’ discretionary measures,   
3.  achieve a better coordination of discretionary anti-crisis measures, probably 
based on joint assessment of core economic indicators from which proper 
discretionary action is derived. 
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ANNEX 
Table A1: Unemployment insurance benefits, 2008 
Coverage of non-
standard work 
Payment rate (% 
of earnings 
base) 

















































































































































































































































days in  
27 months. 
C  yes  no  0  unlimit
ed 
60  50 (after 
one year) 









  E: 9 
months in 
15 months 







      yes  no                   
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Payment rate (% 
of earnings 
base) 


































































































































































































































  E+C: 12 
months in 3 
years. 
C  yes  yes  -  6  50  45 (after 3 
months) 















V  yes  voluntary  0  48  90  gross 
less 8 % 
SSC. 








  C: at least 
12 months 
in the last 
36 months. 














V  yes  voluntary  7  23  basic benefit 
(17 % of AW) plus 









--  --  none 
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Payment rate (% 
of earnings 
base) 










































































































































































































































months in 2 
years. 





















days in 14 
months or 
200 days in 
2 years. 
C  yes  no  6  12  basic benefit 
(19 % of AW). 










days in 4 
years. 






496,800  21  993,600  42 
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Payment rate (% 
of earnings 
base) 










































































































































































































































C  yes  no  3  15  Fixed amount 
(24 % of AW). 











weeks in 2 
years. 















C: at least 
12 months 
in the last 
18 months. 
C  yes  yes  0  9        1,692  30  2,172  38 
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Payment rate (% 
of earnings 
base) 































































































































































































































C: at least 
18 months 
in the last 
36 months. 














weeks in  
1 year. 

































C  yes  no  0  38  75  70 (after 2 
months) 
gross  16,272  37  46,774  107 
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Payment rate (% 
of earnings 
base) 
















































































































































































































































  E+C: 450 
days in  
24 months. 









E: at least 
12 months  
of the last 








C  yes  voluntary    12        12,433  62  26,323  131 
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Payment rate (% 
of earnings 
base) 



































































































































































































































  E+C: 3 
years in 4 
years. 









  E: at least 
12 of the 
last 18 
months. 







E: None,  
C: at least 
360 days in 
the last 6 
years. 
C  yes  no  0  24  70  60 (after  
6 months) 







  C: 360 
days in 6 
years. 
C  yes  voluntary  5  14  80  70 (after 
200 days) 



















week  C: 12 
months in 2 
years. 
C  yes  no  3  6  Fixed amount (9 % 
of AW). 
--  2,493  7  3,146  9 
148 





Payment rate (% 
of earnings 
base) 




















































































































































































































(1) Gross = gross employment income; SSC = (employee) social security contributions; Net = Gross minus income taxes minus 
SSC. 
(2) Where weekly earnings while in employment were below certain amounts, reduced rates of payment are made. If dependent adult is employed, 
supplement is reduced or suppressed depending on income level.  
(3) For employees with a temporary reduction of working hours there is also the CIG scheme which pays benefits of 80 % of average gross earnings for non-
worked hours. 
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Table A2: Unemployment assistance, 2008  










Social assistance  Minimum age 
Austria  yes  yes  family  UI  no limit  yes  No age limit 
Belgium  yes              yes    
Bulgaria  no  --  --  --  --  yes  -- 
Cyprus (no 2008)                   
Czech Republic  no  --  --  --  --  yes  -- 
Denmark  no  --  --  --  --  yes  18 
Estonia 
yes  yes  UI  270 days  yes  18 
Finland  yes  --  family  --  no limit  yes  17 
France 
yes  --  family 
UI and  




yes  25 
Germany  yes  yes  family  x  no limit  yes  15 
Greece 
yes  --  family  UI or 2 
every 3 months in 3 
instalments 
no  -- 
Hungary  yes  --  individual  UI  3 months  yes  18 
Ireland  yes  yes  family  --  no limit  yes  18 
Italy  no  --  --  --  --  no  -- 
Latvia  no  --  --  --  --  yes  -- 
Lithuania  no  --  --  --  --  yes  18 
Luxembourg                 yes  25 
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Social assistance  Minimum age 
Malta  yes  yes     indeterminate period  yes  -- 
Netherlands  no  --  --  --  --  yes  21 
Poland  no  --  --  --  --  yes  permanent benefit 
Portugal 
yes  --  family 
UI or 6 
in last 12 
12 (after UI) or 24  yes  18 
Romania  no  --  --  --  --  yes  18 
Slovak Republic  no  --  --  --  --  yes  -- 
Spain  yes  --  family  --  18  yes  18 
Sweden 
yes  --  individual 
6 or recent 
graduate 
14     -- 
United Kingdom  yes  yes  family  --  no limit  yes  18 
Source: OECD.  
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Table A3: Social assistance, 2007 
  Maximum amounts (in % of AW) 
 




Per child  Other 
Austria  15  8    4  Rent  -- 
Belgium  20  7  Depends on age and 
number of children. 
4-9    -- 
Czech  
Republic 
15  11  Depends on age of 
children. 
8-11    -- 
31  31  1st child.  10  Rent  --  Denmark 
20           
Finland  13  9  Depends on age and 
number of children. 




17  8  Of a lone parent.  8    -- 
    1st child of a couple.  5     
    2nd child of a couple.  5     
France 
    Additional child  7     
Germany  10  9  Depends on age of 
the children. 
6-8  Extra allowances for 
additional needs, 
rent, heating costs. 
-- 
Greece  --  --    --    -- 
Hungary  14  12  Depends on number 
of children. 
10-11    -- 
24  16    3  Adult dependant.  16  Ireland 
        Rent/mortgage 
interest payments. 
-- 
Italy  --  --    --    -- 
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  Maximum amounts (in % of AW) 
 
Head of  
household 
Spouse/ 
Per child  Other 
partner 
Netherlands  25  11    --  Supplement for lone 
parent. 
7 
Poland  18  --    --  Periodic assistance; 
temporary benefit 
depending on family 
situation. 
-- 
Portugal  14  14    7  Adult  10 
Slovak  
Republic 
8  6  1st child only, plus 
addition if more than 
4 children 







19  6    4  4th dependent 
person in household 
4 
12  8  Depends on age and 
number of children. 
7-10  Medical costs, 
transport, child care, 
etc. 
--  Sweden 
        Housing costs.   
9  5      Family premium.  3  United  
Kingdom  7           
Source: OECD.  
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  Table A4: Net replacement rates for six family types: initial phase of unemployment, 2008, at three different earnings levels  
  67 % of AW  100 % of AW  150 % of AW 








































































































































































































































































































































































































Luxembourg  83  82  90  90  89  93  85  82  89  91  89  92  73  72  81  78  75  82 
Portugal  78  75  91  79  77  91  84  78  92  82  78  92  84  78  90  84  78  90 
Latvia  80  76  93  75  73  94  83  80  92  78  75  93  84  82  91  81  79  92 
Netherlands  73  84  84  80  87  83  73  74  82  72  77  81  56  57  69  57  60  69 
Switzerland  82  83  89  84  84  89  72  73  82  87  88  88  72  71  80  82  81  87 
France  70  71  84  82  81  85  66  67  80  71  71  81  69  67  77  68  67  78 
Slovak Rep.  62  58  85  64  60  86  65  59  82  66  61  84  67  63  80  67  64  81 
Iceland  78  75  88  85  79  90  65  68  79  73  74  82  46  50  64  56  57  68 
Slovenia  76  83  88  82  86  92  64  73  79  86  86  81  45  52  63  66  65  67 
Norway  67  69  84  95  81  86  64  65  79  79  69  81  46  47  64  59  51  66 
Spain  77  74  89  76  75  89  61  61  77  76  75  87  42  42  62  54  53  70 
Lithuania  77  77  88  77  78  89  61  61  77  62  63  78  41  41  60  43  43  61 
Denmark  83  85  91  89  88  93  61  63  74  76  73  77  47  48  62  64  59  65 
Italy  73  73  85  76  73  89  60  62  78  71  69  79  44  45  64  55  54  66 
Germany  59  61  88  77  78  92  60  59  85  70  72  89  57  57  79  64  66  84 
Hungary  73  75  86  83  79  88  59  61  77  70  70  80  44  45  64  55  54  68 
Belgium  78  67  82  78  71  84  59  51  70  62  56  73  43  38  58  48  44  61 
Cyprus³  59  70  79  71  82  85  58  66  75  67  74  80  61  67  74  67  73  78 
Austria  55  57  81  69  71  85  55  56  77  66  67  81  42  43  64  51  51  68 
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67 % of AW    100 % of AW  150 % of AW 








































































































































































































































































































































































































Estonia  55  57  77  60  55  80  54  56  72  61  57  75  53  54  68  59  58  70 
Czech 
Republic 
60  66  79  76  72  84  53  58  74  67  61  78  50  51  69  55  52  72 
Finland  65  77  79  86  83  83  51  61  72  75  73  76  44  48  63  60  57  67 
Sweden  72  72  86  85  82  87  50  50  71  68  60  72  38  38  59  53  46  61 
Bulgaria  74  74  87  78  78  88  50  50  70  55  55  72  33  33  54  38  38  56 
Poland  66  67  71  84  59  75  45  46  58  64  46  62  31  32  45  44  33  49 
Romania  56  55  79  57  56  80  42  42  66  44  44  68  32  32  54  35  35  56 
Greece  54  58  69  67  71  81  40  42  58  50  52  68  27  29  46  35  36  54 
United 
Kingdom 
54  65  59  73  79  66  38  45  48  63  69  56  26  31  39  45  50  45 
Malta  48  64  73  70  70  77  36  49  60  58  58  65  25  34  49  42  42  52 
Ireland  42  66  71  65  74  76  31  48  59  56  59  64  23  36  49  44  46  54 
Note: Initial phase of unemployment but following any waiting period. No social assistance ‘top-ups’ are assumed to be available in either the in-work or out-of-work situation. Any 
income taxes payable on unemployment benefits are determined in relation to annualised benefit values (i.e. monthly values multiplied by 12) even if the maximum benefit duration is 
shorter than 12 months. See Annex A for details. For married couples the percentage of AW relates to one spouse only; the second spouse is assumed to be ‘inactive’ with no earnings 
in a one-earner couple and to have full-time earnings equal to 67 per cent of AW in a two-earner couple. Children are aged 4 and 6 and neither childcare benefits nor childcare costs 
are considered. Data for Cyprus and the Netherlands refer to 2007.  
Source: OECD tax-benefit models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives .  
 
155 
IP/A/EMPL/ST/2009-07 PE 451.484Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































No  0 %  100 %  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  No 
6 
months 
Yes  SSC 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































No  25 %  100 %  Yes 
Consult
ation 




Yes  None 
Adjusted 
UB (=full 
daily UB – 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































60 % of 
gross wage 
without 





























s are in 
training 
(see note) 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































nt benefit for 
temporary 
layoffs 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































70 % of 
UB or 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































n of 6 
months 
Yes 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































No  33 %  100 %  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
24 
months 




































                                         
Source: OECD, 2010b; Arpaia et al. 
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Table A6: Net Replacement Rates for six family types, 60 months of unemployment, 2008, at different earnings levels 
  67 % of AW  100 % of AW  150 % of AW 








































































































































































































































































































































































































Denmark  79  -  59  83  -  70  58  -  48  70  -  58  45  -  40  60  -  49 
Ireland  74  95  54  72  97  62  54  68  45  62  77  52  40  51  37  49  60  44 
Netherlands  73  89  53  72  87  56  53  64  44  57  67  47  37  46  35  42  49  38 
Belgium  69  67  75  82  75  78  52  51  64  65  59  67  38  38  53  50  46  57 
Austria  51  64  51  67  80  60  51  52  43  62  63  59  39  39  36  48  48  50 
Switzerland  69  86  50  79  89  56  47  60  41  58  67  46  32  39  32  40  45  36 
Finland  61  82  56  71  92  64  44  60  47  59  75  55  32  44  39  45  56  46 
Sweden  63  78  50  62  88  54  44  54  41  49  65  45  33  41  34  39  50  38 
Luxembourg  58  79  53  70  88  61  43  55  45  58  68  52  31  40  37  45  51  44 
Iceland  58  75  62  69  79  68  42  57  52  55  64  59  30  42  42  42  50  49 
Malta  55  58  57  68  71  64  41  45  47  56  59  54  29  31  38  41  43  44 
Norway  54  76  52  88  105  56  38  55  43  65  78  47  27  40  35  49  58  38 
United 
Kingdom 
54  65  50  73  79  65  38  45  41  63  69  54  26  31  33  45  50  44 
Germany  48  62  59  78  80  64  36  46  50  61  63  55  25  32  40  44  46  44 
Cyprus  53  79  50  81  104  51  36  54  41  56  72  42  26  39  33  41  52  34 
France  49  61  53  66  74  56  34  42  43  48  54  46  24  29  34  34  37  36 
Slovenia  47  69  56  80  86  73  33  51  46  73  78  61  23  37  37  56  59  50 
Czech Rep.  42  66  56  67  77  61  30  47  47  53  57  52  21  34  37  38  44  42 
Poland  35  49  52  63  57  61  24  34  42  48  44  50  16  23  33  33  32  40 
Hungary  30  55  50  62  70  58  23  43  44  51  59  52  17  31  37  40  46  44 
Spain  32  39  53  48  53  53  23  28  44  34  38  44  16  20  35  25  27  36 
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Latvia  34  38  53  40  38  57  23  26  43  29  28  47  16  18  34  20  20  38 
Slovak Rep.  27  42  54  49  55  58  19  29  44  36  39  48  13  20  35  26  29  39 
Estonia  27  36  53  38  48  57  18  25  43  28  35  47  12  17  34  20  25  38 
Portugal  24  47  52  54  73  55  17  33  43  40  52  47  13  23  35  30  38  38 
Bulgaria  24  36  50  56  61  54  16  24  40  39  43  44  11  16  31  27  30  35 
Lithuania  23  46  50  62  84  53  16  31  41  44  59  43  11  21  32  31  41  34 
Romania  12  21  51  27  33  53  8  15  41  19  24  44  6  10  32  14  17  35 
Greece  0  0  50  12  4  51  0  0  42  9  3  43  0  0  33  6  2  34 
Italy  0  0  53  0  0  63  0  0  45  0  0  54  0  0  36  0  0  45 
Note: After tax and including unemployment benefits, social assistance, family and housing benefits in the 60th month of benefit receipt. For married couples the per cent of AW 
relates to one spouse only; the second spouse is assumed to be ‘inactive’ with no earnings in a one-earner couple and to have full-time earnings equal to 67 per cent of AW in a two-
earner couple. The second spouse is assumed to be ‘inactive’ in the sense that she/he is not working and does not have a recent employment history. However, where receipt of 
unemployment benefit/social assistance is subject to activity tests (such as active job-search or being ‘available’ for work), these requirements are assumed to be met.  Children are 
aged 4 and 6 and neither childcare benefits nor childcare costs are considered. Data for Cyprus and the Netherlands refer to 2007.  
Source: OECD tax-benefit models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives. 
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Theoretical framework for the measurement of automatic stabilisation 
A common measure for estimating automatic stabilisation is the ‘normalised tax change’ 
used by Auerbach, A. and Feenberg, D. which can be interpreted as ’the tax system’s built-
in flexibility’ (Pechman, J., 1973; 1987). It shows how changes in market income translate 
into changes in disposable income through changes in personal income tax payments. We 
extend the concept of normalised tax change to include other taxes as well as social 
insurance contributions and transfers like e.g. unemployment benefits. We take into 
account personal income taxes (at all government levels), social insurance contributions as 
well as payroll taxes and transfers to private households such as unemployment benefits. 
Market income 
M





ii i i i YE Q I P O   i  (1) 
where   is labour income,   business income,  i E i Q i I  capital income,   property income, 




i Y  is defined as market income minus net 
government intervention    =: ii SB  ii GT
== (
DM M
ii i i i i YYG Y T S B    ) i  (2) 
where   are direct taxes,   employee social insurance contributions, and  i T i S i B  are social 
cash benefits (i.e. negative taxes).  
As said before, we focus here on the stabilisation of disposable income and ignore the 
second step, the stabilisation of demand. Throughout the rest of this report, we refer to our 
measure of automatic stabilisation as the income stabilisation coefficient 
I  . We derive 
I   
from a general functional relationship between disposable income and market income: 
=( , , , )
II M YT S B  .  (3) 
The derivation can be either done at the macro or at the micro level. On the macro 
level, the aggregate change in market income (
M Y  ) is transmitted via 
I   into an 
aggregate change in disposable income (
D Y  ): 
 =1
D M YY             (4) 
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However, one issue when computing 
I   with macro data is that this data includes 
behavioural and general equilibrium effects as well as discretionary policy measures. 
Therefore, a measure of automatic stabilisation based on macro data captures all these 
effects. In order to single out the pure size of automatic stabilisation, we compute 
I   using 
arithmetic changes ( ) in total disposable income (
D
i i Y   ) and market income (  

































I   measures the sensitivity of disposable income,  ,
D
i Y  with respect to market 
income, 
M
i Y . The higher 
I  , the stronger the stabilisation effect. For example,   
implies that 40 per cent of the income shock is absorbed by the tax benefit system. Note 
that the income stabilisation coefficient is not only determined by the size of government 
(e.g. measured as expenditure or revenue in per cent of GDP) but also depends on the 
structure of the tax benefit system and the design of the different components. 
=0 . 4
I 
The definition of 
I   resembles that of an average effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), which 
is usually computed in this way using micro data (Immervoll, H.). In the case of the 
proportional income shock, 
I   can be interpreted as the EMTR along the intensive margin, 
whereas in the case of the unemployment shock, it resembles the EMTR along the 
extensive margin (participation tax rate, see, e.g., Saez, E., 2001; 2002, Kleven, H.J. and 
Kreiner, C.; and Immervoll, H. et al., 2007). 
Another advantage of the micro data based approach is that it enables us to explore the 
extent to which different individual components of the tax transfer system contribute to 
automatic stabilisation. Comparing tax benefit systems in Europe and the US, we are 
interested in the weight of each component in the respective country. We therefore 
decompose the coefficient into its components which include taxes, social insurance 
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Further, it is possible to compute the coefficient for different income groups. For example, 
the income stabilisation coefficient for quantile   becomes:   q
  ,, ,
,, , =1 = =
DM D
qi qi qi qi

















Note that in the denominator, changes in market income for the total population are added 
up - as in equation (6). Hence, the sum of the five quantile coefficients yields the overall 
income stabilisation coefficient. 
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Table A7: Decomposition income scenario  
  FEDTax  StateTax  SIC  BEN  TaxSicBen 
Austria   0.294  0.000  0.139  0.006  0.439 
Belgium  0.382  0.000  0.131  0.014  0.527 
Denmark  0.455  0.000  0.086  0.018  0.558 
Estonia  0.228  0.000  0.021  0.004  0.253 
Finland  0.340  0.000  0.050  0.006  0.396 
France  0.153  0.000  0.181  0.036  0.370 
Germany  0.351  0.000  0.118  0.012  0.481 
Greece  0.203  0.000  0.088  0.000  0.291 
Hungary  0.307  0.000  0.160  0.009  0.476 
Ireland  0.310  0.000  0.039  0.014  0.363 
Italy  0.254  0.000  0.079  0.013  0.346 
Luxembourg  0.265  0.000  0.097  0.012  0.374 
Netherlands  0.270  0.000  0.116  0.011  0.397 
Poland  0.168  0.000  0.118  0.015  0.301 
Portugal  0.203  0.000  0.090  0.010  0.303 
Slovenia  0.289  0.000  0.031  0.028  0.317 
Spain   0.240  0.000  0.035  0.001  0.277 
Sweden  0.368  0.000  0.040  0.012  0.420 
United 
Kingdom 
0.267  0.000  0.054  0.031  0.352 
EU   0.260  0.000  0.100  0.017  0.378 
EURO   0.263  0.000  0.108  0.015  0.385 
USA   0.240  0.049  0.039  -0.006  0.322 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM. 
 
170 




Table A8: Decomposition unemployment scenario 
  FEDTax  StateTax  SIC  BEN  TaxSicBen 
Austria   0.163  0.000  0.171  0.252  0.585 
Belgium  0.240  0.000  0.123  0.249  0.612 
Denmark  0.116  0.000  0.092  0.615  0.823 
Estonia  0.173  0.000  0.023  0.036  0.233 
Finland  0.221  0.000  0.049  0.248  0.519 
France  0.075  0.000  0.190  0.303  0.568 
Germany  0.209  0.000  0.145  0.269  0.624 
Greece  0.093  0.000  0.150  0.079  0.322 
Hungary  0.203  0.000  0.191  0.073  0.467 
Ireland  0.178  0.000  0.036  0.173  0.387 
Italy  0.164  0.000  0.105  0.042  0.311 
Luxembourg  0.127  0.000  0.080  0.387  0.593 
Netherlands  0.104  0.000  0.171  0.178  0.452 
Poland  0.134  0.000  0.166  0.030  0.329 
Portugal  0.146  0.000  0.097  0.143  0.386 
Slovenia  0.152  0.000  0.221  0.073  0.431 
Spain   0.124  0.000  0.068  0.184  0.376 
Sweden  0.199  0.000  0.027  0.452  0.678 
United 
Kingdom 
0.191  0.000  0.061  0.163  0.415 
EU   0.156  0.000  0.124  0.188  0.469 
EURO   0.150  0.000  0.133  0.202  0.485 
USA   0.174  0.041  0.051  0.071  0.337 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM. 
 
Table A9: Stabilisation of income groups - Proportional Income Shock 
  TAU  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 
Austria   0.439  0.023  0.045  0.072  0.107  0.192 
Belgium  0.527  0.022  0.051  0.082  0.128  0.244 
Denmark  0.558  0.017  0.046  0.088  0.135  0.273 
Estonia  0.253  0.010  0.019  0.036  0.063  0.126 
Finland  0.396  0.010  0.031  0.063  0.099  0.192 
France  0.370  0.032  0.036  0.053  0.079  0.171 
Germany  0.481  0.019  0.045  0.072  0.116  0.228 
Greece  0.291  0.004  0.015  0.033  0.063  0.176 
Hungary  0.476  0.029  0.041  0.056  0.097  0.254 
Ireland  0.363  0.009  0.026  0.048  0.084  0.197 
Italy  0.346  0.010  0.035  0.051  0.077  0.173 
Luxembourg  0.374  0.019  0.022  0.042  0.082  0.208 
Netherlands  0.397  0.020  0.040  0.062  0.093  0.182 
Poland  0.301  0.017  0.032  0.047  0.060  0.145 
Portugal  0.303  0.012  0.013  0.029  0.055  0.194 
Slovenia  0.317  0.022  0.010  0.008  0.037  0.240 
Spain   0.277  0.006  0.020  0.036  0.062  0.153 
Sweden  0.420  0.022  0.041  0.066  0.096  0.196 
United 
Kingdom 
0.352  0.010  0.034  0.047  0.079  0.182 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.  
 
IP/A/EMPL/ST/2009-07 PE 451.484Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table A10: Stabilisation of income groups - Unemployment Shock 
  TAU  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 
Austria   0.585  0.111  0.094  0.069  0.130  0.181 
Belgium  0.612  0.143  0.087  0.067  0.101  0.215 
Denmark  0.823  0.095  0.189  0.166  0.196  0.177 
Estonia  0.233  0.062  0.019  0.019  0.041  0.091 
Finland  0.519  0.118  0.057  0.074  0.093  0.176 
France  0.568  0.102  0.102  0.088  0.092  0.185 
Germany  0.624  0.144  0.078  0.090  0.118  0.193 
Greece  0.322  0.016  0.031  0.040  0.071  0.164 
Hungary  0.467  0.091  0.045  0.048  0.071  0.212 
Ireland  0.387  0.101  0.049  0.044  0.061  0.132 
Italy  0.311  0.011  0.021  0.047  0.081  0.151 
Luxembourg  0.593  0.148  0.177  0.056  0.070  0.142 
Netherlands  0.452  0.123  0.048  0.054  0.088  0.140 
Poland  0.329  0.031  0.035  0.048  0.066  0.150 
Portugal  0.386  0.014  0.005  0.040  0.075  0.252 
Slovenia  0.431  0.045  0.038  0.056  0.083  0.210 
Spain   0.376  0.038  0.049  0.065  0.076  0.148 
Sweden  0.678  0.160  0.109  0.109  0.110  0.190 
United 
Kingdom 
0.415  0.142  0.034  0.030  0.060  0.150 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.  
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Table A11: General government deficit (-) and surplus (+); Percentage of GDP 
  2000  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Belgium  0  -2.7  0.3  -0.2  -1.2  -6 
Bulgaria  -0.3  1.9  3  0.1  1.8  -3.9 
Czech Republic  -3.7  -3.6  -2.6  -0.7  -2.7  -5.9 
Denmark  2.3  5.2  5.2  4.8  3.4  -2.7 
Germany  1.3  -3.3  -1.6  0.2  0  -3.3 
Estonia  -0.2  1.6  2.5  2.6  -2.7  -1.7 
Ireland  4.8  1.6  3  0.1  -7.3  -14.3 
Greece  -3.7  -5.2  -3.6  -5.1  -7.7  -13.6 
Spain  -1  1  2  1.9  -4.1  -11.2 
France  -1.5  -2.9  -2.3  -2.7  -3.3  -7.5 
Italy  -0.8  -4.3  -3.3  -1.5  -2.7  -5.3 
Cyprus  -2.3  -2.4  -1.2  3.4  0.9  -6.1 
Latvia  -2.8  -0.4  -0.5  -0.3  -4.1  -9 
Lithuania  -3.2  -0.5  -0.4  -1  -3.3  -8.9 
Luxembourg  6  0  1.4  3.6  2.9  -0.7 
Hungary  -3  -7.9  -9.3  -5  -3.8  -4 
Malta  -6.2  -2.9  -2.6  -2.2  -4.5  -3.8 
Netherlands  2  -0.3  0.5  0.2  0.7  -5.3 
Austria  -1.7  -1.7  -1.5  -0.4  -0.4  -3.4 
Poland  -3  -4.1  -3.6  -1.9  -3.7  -7.1 
Portugal  -2.9  -6.1  -3.9  -2.6  -2.8  -9.4 
Romania  -4.7  -1.2  -2.2  -2.5  -5.4  -8.3 
Slovenia  -3.7  -1.4  -1.3  0  -1.7  -5.5 
Slovakia  -12.3  -2.8  -3.5  -1.9  -2.3  -6.8 
Finland  6.8  2.7  4  5.2  4.2  -2.2 
Sweden  3.7  2.3  2.5  3.8  2.5  -0.5 
United Kingdom  3.6  -3.4  -2.7  -2.8  -4.9  -11.5 
Croatia  :  -4  -2.4  -1.6  :  : 
Iceland  :  4.9  6.3  5.4  -13.5  -9.1 
Turkey  :  -0.6  -0.1  -1.2  :  : 
Norway  :  15.1  18.5  17.7  19.1  9.7 
Euro area  0.1  -2.5  -1.3  -0.6  -2  -6.3 
EU (27 
countries)  0.6  -2.5  -1.4  -0.8  -2.3  -6.8 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Table A12: General government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP 
  2000  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Belgium  107.9  92.1  88.1  84.2  89.8  96.7 
Bulgaria  74.3  29.2  22.7  18.2  14.1  14.8 
Czech 
Republic  18.5  29.7  29.4  29  30  35.4 
Denmark  52.4  37.8  32.1  27.4  34.2  41.6 
Germany  59.7  68  67.6  65  66  73.2 
Estonia  5.1  4.6  4.5  3.8  4.6  7.2 
Ireland  37.8  27.4  24.9  25  43.9  64 
Greece  103.4  100  97.8  95.7  99.2  115.1 
Spain  59.3  43  39.6  36.2  39.7  53.2 
France  57.3  66.4  63.7  63.8  67.5  77.6 
Italy  109.2  105.8  106.5  103.5  106.1  115.8 
Cyprus  48.7  69.1  64.6  58.3  48.4  56.2 
Latvia  12.3  12.4  10.7  9  19.5  36.1 
Lithuania  23.7  18.4  18  16.9  15.6  29.3 
Luxembourg  6.2  6.1  6.5  6.7  13.7  14.5 
Hungary  55  61.8  65.6  65.9  72.9  78.3 
Malta  55.9  70.1  63.7  61.9  63.7  69.1 
Netherlands  53.8  51.8  47.4  45.5  58.2  60.9 
Austria  66.5  63.9  62.2  59.5  62.6  66.5 
Poland  36.8  47.1  47.7  45  47.2  51 
Portugal  50.5  63.6  64.7  63.6  66.3  76.8 
Romania  22.5  15.8  12.4  12.6  13.3  23.7 
Slovenia  :  27  26.7  23.4  22.6  35.9 
Slovakia  50.3  34.2  30.5  29.3  27.7  35.7 
Finland  43.8  41.7  39.7  35.2  34.2  44 
Sweden  53.6  50.8  45.7  40.8  38.3  42.3 
United 
Kingdom  41  42.5  43.5  44.7  52  68.1 
Croatia  :  43.7  40.8  37.7  :  : 
Iceland  :  26  27.9  29.1  57.4  : 
Turkey  :  52.3  46.1  38.8  :  : 
Norway  :  44.5  55.3  52.4  49.9  43.7 
EU (27 
countries)  61.9  62.8  61.4  58.8  61.6  73.6 

















Table A13: Projections of general government deficit (-) and surplus (+); 
Percentage of GDP 
  2010  2011  2014  2015 
Belgium  -5.1  -4.4  -3  -2.6 
Bulgaria  -1.8  -1.5  0.1  0.5 
Czech Republic  -5.1  -5.3  -5.2  -5.3 
Denmark  -5.4  -4.1  -0.8  0 
Germany  -5.7  -5.1  -2.3  -1.7 
Estonia  -2.4  -2.9  -4.9  -5.1 
Ireland  -12.2  -11  -6.3  -5.3 
Greece  -8.7  -8.8  -2.6  -2 
Spain  -10.4  -9.6  -8  -7.7 
France  -8.2  -7  -4.6  -4.1 
Italy  -5.2  -4.9  -4.7  -4.6 
Cyprus  -7.5  -8.7  n/a  n/a 
Latvia  -12.9  -9.1  -1.6  -1.8 
Lithuania  -8.6  -9.8  -8.3  -7.3 
Luxembourg  -3.8  -5.1  n/a  n/a 
Hungary  -3.8  -2.8  -0.5  0.1 
Malta  -4.8  -4.6  n/a  n/a 
Netherlands  -5.9  -5.1  -4.3  -4.3 
Austria  -4.8  -4.5  -3.8  -3.7 
Poland  -7.5  -6.9  -4.4  -3.8 
Portugal  -8.7  -7.5  -4.8  -4.4 
Romania  -6.5  -5  -3.1  -2.6 
Slovenia  -6.1  -4.9  -2.4  -1.7 
Slovakia  -5.8  -4.1  -3  -3 
Finland  -4.1  -2.8  -4.2  -4.3 
Sweden  -3.3  -2.1  -.6  0.1 
United Kingdom  -11.4  -9.4  -5.2  -4.3 
Iceland  -9.4  -5.3  2.7  2.7 
Turkey  -3.4  -3  -2.1  -1.9 
Norway  10.8  11.1  11.2  10.9 
USA  -11  -8.2  -6  -6.5 
Source: IMF, 2010b. 
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Table A14: Projections of general government consolidated gross debt as a 
percentage of GDP 
  2010  2011  2014  2015 
Belgium  100.1  101.5  101  99.9 
Bulgaria  16.2  16.5  12.3  9 
Czech 
Republic 
37.6  40.1  48.1  49.9 
Denmark  51.2  53.5  52.1  49.8 
Germany  76.7  79.6  82  81.5 
Estonia  9.7  9.3  21.4  25.3 
Ireland  78.8  87  92.5  94 
Greece  133.2  145.2  146.1  140.4 
Spain  66.9  75.6  89.8  94.4 
France  84.2  88.6  94.3  94.8 
Italy  118.6  120.5  123.9  124.7 
Latvia  48.8  64.7  52.6  51.8 
Lithuania  39.2  47.3  67  71 
Hungary  78.9  77.3  67.6  64 
Netherlands  64.2  68.1  75.6  77.4 
Austria  70.7  72.9  76.7  77.3 
Poland  55  58.3  62.2  62.1 
Portugal  86.6  91.8  97.1  98.4 
Romania  35  36.9  39.4  39 
Slovenia  35.2  38.7  40.7  39.6 
Slovakia  37.3  39.1  41.4  41.9 
Finland  49.9  53.1  70.7  76.1 
Sweden  42.9  43.1  39.3  37.6 
United 
Kingdom 
78.2  84.9  90.7  90.6 
Iceland  119.9  110.7  86.6  86.6 
Turkey  44.5  44.3  43.9  43.5 
Norway  53.6  53.6  53.6  53.6 
USA  92.6  97.4  106.4  109.7 
Source: IMF, 2010b. 
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Table A15: Medium-term fiscal consolidation plans - Spending 













Austria   Increase the 
cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance 
from -0.7 % of 
GDP in 2010 to 
0.2 % in 2013.  
Numerical 




details on how 
this will be 
achieved.  




(0.6 % of 
GDP).  
  Mainly central 
government. 
 
Belgium   Stabilise the 
budget deficit at -
5.5 % of GDP in 
2011 as a first step 
to bring the deficit 
below 3 % of GDP 
by end 2013 and to 
balance the budget 
in 2015.  
Path until 2011 is 
fixed in the 2010-
2011 budgets. 
Path for 2012-
2015 is fixed in 
the complement 




2009-2015   Effort of 
0.5 % GDP 
in 2010, 1 % 
in 2011 and 
1.33 % for 
2012-2015.  
  Until 2012: 65 % 
of the effort by 
central 
government and 
35 % by regional 
and local 
governments. 
Average annual real 
growth of primary 
expenditure of federal 
government of 0.4 % 
over 2009-2011; slower 
spending in health care 
sector yielding total 






around 5.3 % of 
GDP in 2010, 
5.6 % in 2011 and 









Package (CP).  









  Central 
government. 
CP: Reduce current 
spending, 4 % wage 
decrease in the public 
administration. Lower 
child allowance, 
maternity leave and 
sickness benefits, no 
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Consolidation  Type of  Time  Path to  Change in  Level of  Spending   
goal  commitment  period  target  fiscal rule  government 
Denmark  In 2010, the budget 
balance should be 
0.75-1.75 % of GDP 
when adjusted for 
cyclical and other 
temporary factors. 
From 2011 to 2015, 
there should be 
balance or surplus. 
  2010-2015        Public consumption can 
grow no more than 1 % 
annually in 2009-2012 and 
0.75 % annually in 2013-
2015. 
France  Bring fiscal deficit to 
5 % of GDP in 2013. 
Big loan of 
unspecified amount 
to finance extra 
public spending in 
2010.  
Budget proposal 
relying on projected 
GDP growth of 
2.5 % per year from 
2011. No detail on 
how consolidation 
will be achieved.  
2010-2013   Deficit 
reduction of 
1.5 % of GDP 
in 2011 and 
1 % per year 
in 2012-2013.  
Central 
government.  
Hold real growth in 
public spending to 
1 % per year.  
Bring fiscal deficit to 5 % of 
GDP in 2013. Big loan of 
unspecified amount to 
finance extra public 
spending in 2010.  
Germany  Limits for cyclically-
adjusted deficits: 
0.35 % of GDP for 
the federation from 
2016 onwards, 
balance for the states 










equal steps to 
reach targets 




of the golden 
rule a) by 
cyclically 
adjusted 





Hungary  Reduce deficit from 
3.8 % of GDP in 2010 
to 2.2 % in 2013.  
Legislated fiscal 
rule. The magnitude 
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Consolidation  Type of  Time  Path to  Change in  Level of  Spending   
goal  commitment  period  target  fiscal rule  government 
half of the 
growth rate 
in real GDP. 
Debt is 
required to 
be lower in 
the 3rd year 
of the rolling 
plan than in 
the 2nd year 
and the year 
before the 
plan.  
Ireland  Bring the general 
government deficit 
below 3 % of GDP by 
2013.  
Announced as part 
of the April 2009 
Supplementary 
Budget.  




2.2 % of GDP 
in 2012 and 
additional 2 % 





add to the 






    The identified expenditure 
reductions are a minimum.  
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Consolidation  Type of  Time  Path to  Change in  Level of  Spending   
goal  commitment  period  target  fiscal rule  government 
Italy  Increase the actual 
primary surplus by 4 
percentage points of 
GDP (compared with 
2009) by 2013 (re-
duce actual deficit by 
3 percentage points 
of GDP).  
Medium-term 
budget plan.  
2010-2013   Broadly equal 
steps.  
  Central 
government, 




Reduce overall current 
spending as share of GDP. 
Greater than 10 % nominal 
cut in investment spending 
in 2010 (approximately 




















which is to 






0.5 % of GDP 
adjustment 
per year if 
growth is 
higher than 
0.5 %, smaller 
if 2011 growth 
is between -
0.5 % and 
0.5 %.  
  All levels but 
mainly central 
government.  
Cuts in public 
administration costs of 
about 0.2 % of GDP. Health 
care cost cuts of about 
0.4 % of GDP. Increase of 
pension age (from 65 to 
67) estimated to eventually 
yield a structural 
improvement of 0.7 % of 
GDP (full effect only by 
2026).  
Poland  Limit the debt-to-GDP 
ratio at 60 %.  
Constitutional.   A two-year 
con-solidation 
plan expected 
for the 2nd 
half of No-
vember 2009.  
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Consolidation  Type of  Time  Path to  Change in  Level of  Spending   




government deficit to 
3 % in 2012.  
Budget plan for 
2010-2012.  
2010-2012   Deficit of 
5.5 % of GDP 
in 2010 and 
4.2 % of GDP 
in 2011.  
  Central 
government.  
Expenditure cut of EUR 787 
million in 2010.  
Spain  Reduce the general 
government deficit to 
3 % of GDP by the 
date required by the 
European Union 




Details will be 
presented to 
parliament as 
required by law.  




regional and local 
governments to 
en-courage 
spending restraint.  
Central government: Crisis-
related budgetary stimulus 
will be gradually 
withdrawn. Central 
government spending will 
be cut by 3.9 % overall in 
2010 according to the 
budget proposal, with non-
priority spending cut by 
5.4 % and social spending 
programmes exempt from 
cuts.  
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Sweden  General surplus of 
1 % over the 
business cycle. 
Balanced budget 
requirement for local 
governments (a 
deficit in one year 
has to be offset 
within 3 years).  
Decision by 
parliament, stated in 
budget bills.  











caps in 26 
categories.  






equivalent to 1.33 % 
of GDP annually 
2010/2011- 
2013/2014 foreseen.  
Annual Budget 
reports.  










that deficit is 
reduced year 




investment share of GDP.  
Source: CESifo DICE
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